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Counterfactuals about what a patient would consent

were able

to, if

he

to consent, are often cited as justifications, or partial

justifications, for acts of euthanasia.

In virtue of this fact, they

deserve special scrutiny by moral philosophers.
In

Chapter

I,

examine terminology that

I

is

essential to

further understanding the relationship between euthanasia and

counterfactual consent.
analysis of 'consent',

I

propose a definition of 'euthanasia', an

and I present a

brief description of

counterfactuals.
In
is

Chapter

II, I

consider two questions. The

first is,

"When

it

appropriate to invoke counterfactual consent in an attempt to

justify

an act of euthanasia?" By making use of an improved

version of the voluntary, nonvoluntary, and involuntary
distinction

when

it is

among

acts of euthanasia,

I

am

able to determine

appropriate to cite counterfactuals about consent in an

VI

2.tt6mpt to justify

end

is

a.n

uct of Gutha.na.sia,.

counterfactual consent used?"

ThG second
I

"to

is,

what

contend that

counterfactual consent does morally justify some acts of
euthanasia,

and defend an argument

for this claim. Finally,

I

look

at the role of counterfactual consent as a possible legal
justification for acts of euthanasia.

In

Chapter

III,

use possible world semantics to analyze

1

counterfactual consent.

Traditional counterfactuals are

determined

in the closest

world

consequent

also true. Counterfactuals

antecedent

to
is

be true

true, their

about consent have a

and

if

less

is

at

which

straightforward reading.

reject several possible

I

their

consider

ways of reading counterfactuals about

consent, before settling on the correct reading of counterfactuals

about consent.
In

Chapter

fV,

consider evidence for the truth of claims

I

about counterfactual consent.

no counterfactual
Wills

and the

is

I

consider and reject the claim that

either true or false.

I

examine both Living

practice of surrogacy, neither of which offers

sufficient evidence for the truth of claims

about counterfactual

consent.
In

Chapter V,

consent.

I

I

contrast counterfactual consent with actual

review and refute the arguments for the claim that

actual consent

is

preferable to counterfactual consent.

I

conclude

by presenting a principle about the relationship between actual

and counterfactual consent.

vii
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INTRODUCTION

A tragic
a

coma

car accident sends John to the hospital. John

in a hospital

room. The doctors

has no hope for recovery. The family

do they

following decision:

let

John

seem

to

weigh

is

make

the

do they ask the doctors

to

support machines? Several considerations

life

in favor of terminating life support.

always so athletic

"There

forced to

linger in the hospital room, for

days, months, or perhaps years? Or,

shut off John's

John's family that he

tell

is

lies in

seems such a shame

- it

to see

"John was

him

like this."

absolutely no hope for his recovery." "He feels nothing

right now, so turning off the

anything he

is

machines would not deprive him of

currently experiencing." Finally, John's wife says

know John very

well

- if

he could

tell us,

he would say

it's

okay

"I

to

turn off the machines." The rest of the family nods in agreement.

Some people have
would have wanted
she

is

off.

in right

Our

it

this to say

this way", or

now, she would

just

about cases of euthanasia: "He
"Could she know the state that

want us

intuitions are strong here.

to turn these

machines

added

to the act

Something

is

of euthanasia by the consent of the patient. But in
euthanasia, consent of the person

who

is

many cases

being killed

is

of

not

available at the time of his death. In Jack's case, his wife stated

what Jack would have consented
though he was not

able.

to

had he been able

to,

even

Her statement was a counterfactual about

consent; counter-to-the-facts about Jack's inability to consent, this
is

what he would have consented

1

to

if

he were able to consent.

Had Jack not consented
screamed and begged to

an act of euthanasia
for

at

live,

all.

to being killed,

then

killing

Consent

may

an act to be an act of euthanasia.

that an agent

If

him may not have been

be a necessary condition

this

live

were euthanized,

impermissible to

consent

is

is

then the fact

true,

would have counterfactually not consented may be

important. Or, perhaps while the patients

begged to

had he protested and

kill

who screamed and

was nonetheless morally

it

them without

their consent. In this case,

a necessary condition on an act of euthanasia being

morally permissible. The statement

"If

then he would consent to our

him" appears to be either

killing

he were able to consent,

true or false, but what are the truth conditions for such a

Some people compose

statement?

Living Wills, "an advance

declaration of your wish not to be connected to

equipment
ill"i.

if it is

life

support

adjudged that you are hopelessly or terminally

Effectively the Living Will

is

saying

state of being hopelessly or terminally

ill,

"If

1

were to be

then

1

would

in the

like

you

pull the plug." Other people sign Durable Powers of Attorney

giving permission for a friend or relative to
decisions for them.

Attorney,

is

The

make

patient, in signing a

-

life-and-death

Durable Power of

giving consent for another individual to

decisions for him.

to

make

his

But are either of these sufficient to

demonstrate the truth of a counterfactual about consent?

Is

counterfactual consent only a poor cousin of actual consent, never

^

Final Exit Derek
,

Humphry, The Hemlock

2

Society, 1991, p. 21.

3.S r 0 li 3.bl 0 or

ci 0 sir 3.bl 0

3,s 2,ctu 3.1 cons0nt? All of th0S0

3,r0

int0r0sting issuos that dosorvo furthor considoration.

Why Ar0 Th0S0

Important Quostions?

might b0 argu0d that quostions about consont, and

It

countorfactual consont, aro irrolovant in making hoalth-caro
docisions.

If

a pationt

is

dying, or in

immonso pain with no hop0

that th0 pain will oas0, thon tho physician, not tho pationt, will bo

th0 best judgo of what would bo host for tho pationt.
truo,

thon tho physician would bo doing what

is

If

that

is

host for tho

pationt by taking stops to outhanizo tho pationt basod on hor

knowlodgo alono, and not basod on any consont on tho part of tho
pationt.

factor

Why should consont, or countorfactual consont,

whon making

First, in

thoso decisions?

considering

if

a patient would give consent, were he

asked for consent, the physician

may more

action that will be best for her patient^.

from patient

to patient.

willing to live with far

likely

What

be

less likely to

perform that

will

be best differs

There are some patients who

more pain than

will

be

others. By considering

what a patient would counterfactually consent
will

bo a

make broad judgments

to,

that

the physician

do not take

into

consideration each patient's individual beliefs and preferences.

Second, in considering what the patient would consent

were he able

to,

to consent, the physician demonstrates respect for

W. Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays
Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 24-28.
2 Dan

3

in Biomedical Ethics

,

the patient. Without considering what the
patient would consent
to,

were he able to consent, the physician would be behaving

in a

and authoritarian manner. Dan Brock observes

that

paternalistic

consent can be valued for

many reasons:

...such as the

avoidance of frustration involved in
interfering with a person's liberty of action, the

development of individual judgment (especially since
people often learn best from their mistakes), the
satisfaction people often get from making decisions
about their life for themselves, and so forth.3
Brock makes the claim that giving people the opportunity to
consent to treatment

is

extrinsically good, for

in a better state of affairs for the patient,

cite

statements of counterfactual consent

morally problematic

act,

these statements mean,

and

to

it

ultimately results

and those around him.

Finally, statements of counterfactual

used to justify acts of euthanasia. Since

it

consent are actually

it is

a regular practice to

when

justifying a

seems only appropriate

when

it is

to ask

what

appropriate that they are used,

what ends they are used. As an actual

practice,

counterfactual consent's philosophical implications deserve
further scrutiny.

There

may

be a further question, however.

counterfactual consent
about. However,

is

It is

clear that

interesting for philosophers to think

why have

1

restricted

my discussion

of

counterfactual consent to questions pertaining to euthanasia?

3 Brock, p. 32.

4

Counterfactual consent
contexts
I

-

is

philosophically interesting in

many

not only in cases of euthanasia.

agree.

Many

of the points

I

make about

consent are not interesting only to those

counterfactual

who are

interested in

philosophical questions about euthanasia. Counterfactual
consent
is

a concept that has relevance in the philosophy of law, social

contract theory,

all

forms of medical paternalism, and many other

However, there are three reasons

areas.

why counterfactual

consent has special relevance to questions of euthanasia.
acts of euthanasia are unique in that they are
unrectifiable.

Once an

act of euthanasia

is

First,

permanent and

performed,

it is

not

possible to alter states of affairs so as to approximate the

circumstances before the act of euthanasia takes place.

pen

off

If

I

take a

your desk without your consent, you may be upset, but

I

can always return the pen. With a case of euthanasia, the damage
cannot be undone.
Second, cases of euthanasia deal with something far more
valuable than pens.

Human

lives are at stake.

have gone so far as to say that human
Others claim that we have a right to

lives

life.

bear intrinsic value.

Certainly,

longer alive, numerous experiences are denied

human

Some philosophers

us.

if

we

are no

Taking a

a significant moral

act,

and the circumstances

surround the taking of a human

life

should be carefully

life is

considered. Thus, while counterfactual consent

important in

its

own

is

that

philosophically

right, counterfactual consent's implications

for cases of euthanasia

seems

to be especially significant.

5

owing

Finally,

to the

permanent and

unrectifiable nature of

acts of euthanasia, counterfactual consent about
acts of euthanasia
is

able to illustrate important factors about counterfactual
consent

that statements of counterfactual consent for other
acts cannot

demonstrate. In Chapter

III, I

demonstrate precisely what

is

use possible world semantics to

meant by a statement of

counterfactual consent. Most statements of counterfactual consent

do not have the

special features that the statements of

counterfactual consent about euthanasia have.

For example,

statements of counterfactual consent require us to consider the
patient in very different circumstances than he

euthanasia

is

when

the act of

about to be performed. Are we asked to consider

is

the patient's response in circumstances that are so different from
the patient's actual circumstances that the question of performing

an act of euthanasia
light

is

no longer relevant? These questions shed

on counterfactual consent, not only counterfactual consent

in

cases of euthanasia.

Two Tools in My Discussion
I

am

discussion.

not presupposing any moral normative theory in
recognize that this

1

have limited

my discussion

make do with
is

consulting

right in these cases.

those

who

I

may seem

problematic, but

to relatively clear cases,

my

moral intuitions

in

1

to

determining what

recognize the difficulty in this strategy

my conclusions.

taking this strategy.

1

and hope

believe that acts of euthanasia are always

not agree with

my

Flowever, there

have not limited

6

is

wrong

will

an advantage

my discussion

of

-

in

counterfactual consent by chaining

moral normative theory.

my conclusions to a single

Hopefully,

I

have demonstrated some

interesting points about counterfactual consent which are
relevant

regardless of the moral normative theor>' that the reader believes
is

true.
Finally,

harms

that

1

have assumed that

come

come

to a

person while he or she

have not taken into account the benefits or harms that

1

may come
example,

there are any benefits or

to the victim being euthanized or not euthanized,

those are benefits or harms that
is alive.

if

to the victim after that individual

when

1

is

dead.

define 'euthanasia' in Chapter

1,

1

For

will limit

my

discussion of the cessation of suffering that results from an act of

euthanasia to the suffering that a person experiences
she

is still

afterlife.

harms

living,

The

after

not the suffering he or she

rare examples that

an individual

is

dead

time comes.

7

make
will

when he

may experience

in

or

an

reference to benefits or

be mentioned when the

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCING SOME TERMINOLOGY
Pollyanna

York

City.

to death

is

When

confronted by a mugger on her

she refuses to hand over her wallet, she

by the mugger. At the

not argue that his client did not
this fact

is

trial,
kill

shot

is

the mugger's attorney does

Pollyanna

-

the evidence of

overwhelming. Furthermore, the attorney does not

argue that his client did not intend to
is

New

first trip to

not in dispute.

kill

her

-

the motive to

kill

Rather, the attorney takes out a copy of

Beneficent Euthanasia edited by Marvin Kohl. The attorney also
,

has a copy of Biomedical Ethics edited by Thomas
,

Jane

S.

Zembaty. Each

is

A Mappes and

determined by the court to be a

reputable collection of philosophical essays. The attorney reads a
definition of 'euthanasia' presented

by Tristram Engelhardt

Jr:

term euthanasia in a broad sense to
indicate a deliberately chosen course of action or
I

will use the

inaction that is known at the time of decision to be
such as will expedite death. i

The attorney then proceeds

to argue that his client

ought

to

be

given the lightest possible sentence. While the mugger did
deliberately

kill

Pollyanna, he did not perform an act of murder.

Rather, he performed an act of euthanasia, as defined by

Engelhardt. Other individuals

who have performed

acts of

^Tristram Engelhardt Jr., "Aiding in the Death of Young Children",
Beneficent Euthanasia ed. Marvin Kohl, p. 189-190. Also reprinted in
Biomedical Ethics ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S, Zembaty, McGraw
Inc., 1991, p. 413.
,

,

8

Hill,

euthanasia have been acquitted^

should receive a

-

at the

very least his client

light sentence.

There are some bad definitions of 'euthanasia'
philosophical literature,
definitions,

in the

and armed with one of these bad

one can prove almost anything. Before euthanasia can

be discussed appropriately, and the relevance of counterfactual

consent to cases of euthanasia can be discussed appropriately,
first

must explain what mean by
I

'euthanasia'

I

and 'counterfactual

consent'.

A Few

Poor Definitions of 'Euthanasia'

A surprising number of philosophical articles about
euthanasia do not even give a definition of 'euthanasia'^.
the articles that do include definitions of 'euthanasia',

Among

many of

these definitions are quite different. Often an act that will be

picked out as an act of euthanasia according to one definition,
to be

an act of euthanasia based according

One
in

definition of 'euthanasia'

"An Alternative

is

to

fails

another definition.

proposed by Arthur J. Dyck,

to the Ethic of Euthanasia":

a concise summary of both United States and International legal cases
which individuals who performed acts of euthanasia were acquitted, or
never brought to trial, see Fred Rosner, "Euthanasia", Contemporary Jewish
Ethics and Morality ed. Elhot N. Dorff and Louis E. Newman, Oxford
2 For

in

,

University Press, 1995, pp. 350-353.
^See, for example, "Should There be a Legal Right to Die?" by Robert F.
Drinan, and "Justifying the Final Solution" by Helge Hilding Mansson, all
reprinted in Ethical Issues in Death and Dying ed. Robert F. Weir, Columbia
University Press, 1977.
,

9

The term "euthanasia"

is used here, exactly as in the
Voluntary Euthanasia Act of 1969, to mean "the
painless inducement of death" 4.

A similar definition

is

mentioned by Marvin Kohl,

in

The

Encyclopedia of Ethics Kohl proposes three definitions of
.

'euthanasia'.

The

first is:

('euthanasia') is often defined as "the act or method
of painlessly inducing the death of a nonfetal sentient
being" 5.
It

Dyck elaborates on

do not make a reference

'euthanasia' that

by euthanasia
that fails to

Webster's

is

his definition. Ele rejects definitions of

one which

make

this

New World

is

to the fact that a

death

induced. Rather than a definition

important distinction, he considers the
Dictionary 1962 edition, definition of
.

'euthanasia':

an act or method of causing death painlessly so as
end suffering^.

to

Kohl's second definition of 'euthanasia' seems to capture the
spirit

of Dyck's second definition. Kohl writes:

Dyck, "An Alternative to the Ethic of Euthanasia", reprinted in
Ethical Issues in Death and Dying ed. Robert F, Weir, Columbia University
Press, 1977.
^Marvin Kohl, "Euthanasia", The Encyclopedia of Ethics ed. Lawrence C.
Becker, Garland Pubhshing, Inc., New York and London, 1992, p. 335.

^Arthur

J.

,

,

^Daniel Maguire, in "Deciding for Yourself: The Objections", uses this same
defmition of 'euthanasia' (also reprinted in the Weir volume).

10

'Euthanasia'

is

sometimes defined as "the act or

method of directly causing or allowing the painless
and quick death of a nonfetal being, so as to end
suffering or an undesirable existence"

Of course, what

is

meant by an "undesirable

existence"

vagues. Perhaps the most interesting question

what an "undesirable existence"
this

an existence that

is

Is it

is

Is

costing a great deal of

undesirable for the doctors

great deal of time

whom?"

undesirable for the family of the patient,

because the patient's continued care

money?

very

when determining

"Undesirable for

is, is

is

who

are spending a

on a patient when they could be doing other

things? Perhaps Kohl believes that an "undesirable existence"
refers to the degree of the desirability of the patient's existence

for the patient, not the degree of desirability of the patient's

existence for those surrounding the patient.
Finally,

Marcia Angell mentions a definition that

similar to both Dyck's

and

What do Dyck, Kohl and
would

Angell

mean by

life

of a

these definitions?

propose a condensed version of Dyck's and Kohl's

like to

definitions of

very

Kohl's definitions:

Euthanasia means purposely terminating the
patient to prevent further suffering^.

1

is

'

an act of euthanasia', which

1

will refer to as El:

an act of euthanasia =df 1) a is the painless
inducement of death of a non-fetal sentient being,

El: a

is

^Kohl, p. 336.
^Kohl considers what he calls "Conservative", "Moderate"
views on the notion of an undesirable existence.

and "Ubertarian"

^Marcia Angell, "Euthanasia", Biomedical Ethics ed. Thomas Mappes and
Jane S. Zembaty, McGraw Hill, 1991, p. 382.
,
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and

2 ) a is performed so as to end suffering or an
undesirable existence of the being that is killed lo

Phillipa Foot in her article, "Euthanasia", introduces but does

not endorse, the following definition:
Let us insist, then, that when we talk about
euthanasia, we are talking about a death understood
as a good or happy event for the one who dies....For if

we

say that the death must be supposed to be a good
to the subject we can also specify that it shall be for
his sake that an act of euthanasia is performed^i.

This definition of 'euthanasia'

mean

may be

taken literally to

a special type of act of dying. However,

mean by
death

'euthanasia'

itself.

it is

charitable to

an act that causes a death, rather than the

Foot makes this clear later in her paper,

one

man

when

poses the question

"If

thinking that he

in the last stages of a terrible disease,

in fact

he could have been cured,

The action

not?"

beliefs

that

may have some

The

is

is

another, or allows him to die,

this

though

an act of euthanasia or

being questioned

caused the death of the other

killer that

not.

is

kills

she

the action of the

is

man

-

his

mistaken

bearing on whether this was euthanasia or

action of the killed

man

(ie:

dying)

is

the same.

Dyck does not say this, I believe that he meant that acts of
euthanasia are performed "so as to end (the) suffering of the person who
dies ". Were a doctor to be involved in a long, drawn-out malpractice
lawsuit, but realized that were he to painlessly kill his former patient that
his (the doctor's) suffering would end, such a killing would not be
euthanasia. 1 beheve Dyck would endorse this modification of his
definition.

"Euthanasia", Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral
of California Press, 1978, p. 34.
University
Philosophy
11 Phillipa Foot,
.

l^lbid, p. 35.
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regardless of the beliefs of the

killer.

1

will

consider this

definition of 'euthanasia' as E2:
is an act of euthanasia =df a the act of causing
a
death which is 1) a good or happy event for the
person who dies and 2) a is performed for the sake
of the person who dies

E2: a

Finally,

1

would

like to

by Kohl. He mentions a

consider a third definition proposed

third,

more

substantial definition of

'euthanasia':

They [philosophers who

find problems with Kohl's

earlier definitions] define 'euthanasia' as "the act or

method of inducing as painless a death as possible,
where the organism is acutely suffering or in an
undesirable state, where the relief of the latter
condition is the only primary motive and where there
convincing evidence that the resulting death is a
greater good or lesser evil for the recipient than the
is

failure to actively intervene."

This definition

may

be adopted, almost verbatim, into a third

definition of 'euthanasia' which

1

will refer to as E3:

an act or
method of inducing as painless a death as possible,
2) the one who is killed is acutely suffering or in an

E3: a

is

an act of euthanasia =df a

is 1)

undesirable state, 3) the relief of the latter
condition is the only primary motive, and 4) there
is convincing evidence that the resulting death is a
greater good or lesser evil for the recipient than the
failure to actively intervene

l^Kohl, p. 336.
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Of course, what constitutes an "undesirable

state" or

an

"undesirable existence" differs from person to person.

It

may

be

pointed out that E3 offers the patient a greater number
of options

than El does.

If

you are leading an undesirable

existence, the

only immediate option appears to be to cease existing.
However,
if

you are

in

an undesirable

state,

you presumably have the

option to change states, and not merely change whether you exist
or not.
I

would now

like to

demonstrate that no two of these

definitions pick out exactly the

same

acts as acts of euthanasia.

Each of the definitions also picks out certain acts as acts of
euthanasia that are clearly not acts of euthanasia.

demonstrate

by considering several

this

The Case ofJoe. Joe

is

assist

him

Joe, but the only

suffering

in killing himself. Joe's

doctor agrees to help

method of killing Joe

available to the doctor

a hypodermic syringe.

shortly after that Joe will

the injection

According to El,

this

Joe's case did fulfill the

end

is

is

There

will

kill

is

be a very

administered, but

into a deep, comfortable sleep,

fall

die. All of Joe's suffering will

to

is

Joe requests that his

amount of pain when

was performed

cases.

illness.

fatal injection using

small

will

a patient in a hospital. He

from a terminal and very painful
doctor

I

and

be over.

not an act of euthanasia. Although

second conjunct

Joe's suffering),

it

in El (the killing of Joe

did not

fulfill

the

first

conjunct. This was not a painless inducement of death. Joe did
feel

a small amount of pain

when

prick of the hypodermic syringe.
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his

death was induced

-

the pin-

According to E2,

The

act

was performed

have been a good

,

if

would have been best
even

if

that

meant

to be better than

alternative.

him.

this

It is

may have been an

for the sake

of

act of euthanasia.

Joe. Also, the

may

not "happy", event for Joe. Perhaps what
for Joe

was

for his suffering to be over,

his death. In this sense, a 'good'

any

death

alternative,

even

if it is

is

understood

not a happy

The death of Joe may not have been a happy event

unlikely that Joe

was happy

for

at the time of his death.

Relieved, perhaps, comforted in the thought that his suffering

would soon be over,
badness of his death

likely,

but "happy"? Probably not.

may have been outweighed by

The

the goodness

of the end of his suffering. In that case, his death would have

been a good event for him,

albeit not a

happy one.

However, using Foot's own analysis of what makes an event
a "good" one for an individual, Joe's euthanasia

event for him. In saying that euthanasia
event for the one

who

dies",

is

fails to

be a "good"

a "good or happy

one must elaborate on what

is

meant

by a "good or happy event". While Foot does not say much about
about what makes an event happy, she does discuss

makes something good

for a

human

The idea we need seems

in detail

being:

to be that

life

which

is

human life in the following respect - that it
contains a minimum of basic human goods. What is
ordinary in human life - even in very hard lives - is
that a man is not driven to work far beyond his
ordinary

capacity; that he has the support of a family or

community; that he can more or less satisfy his
hunger; that he has hopes for the future; that he can
lie

down

to rest at night...
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what

not the mere state of being alive that
can
determine, or itself count as, a good, but
rather life
coming to some standard or normality. It was
argued
that it is as part of ordinary life that
the elements of
good that a man may have are relevant to the
question
of whether saving his life counts as benefiting
him.
...It is

Ordinary

human

lives, even very hard lives, contain
a
of basic goods, but when they are absent
the
idea of life is no longer linked to that of good.i^

minimum

Using Foot's conception of what

it

means

for

something to be

"good" for a person, then there are no acts of euthanasia
which are

good
life

for anyone!

Acts of euthanasia are performed to end the

of individuals

who

who

are suffering, or

who will be

suffering, or

are in a state in which they experience nothing at

are comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state).
are killed, they will no longer be experiencing the
basic

human

Thus

this

is

goods".

is

this

it is

least painful

of

all!

not

it is

own

not a "good" event either.

was an

method of killing Joe

state", the

at

a "happy" event for Joe, and using Foot's

According to E3,

induced the

"minimum

They will be experiencing nothing

conception of human good,

the only

But after they

not a case of euthanasia according to E2, for

the case that this

they

all (ie:

act of euthanasia, for this

(thus

it

was the method

death possible), Joe

is

in

that

an "undesirable

hope of getting Joe out of the "undesirable

motive for the action, and Joe at

was

state"

least believes that his

the

is

death

is

greater good or lesser evil than his failure to die.

The Case of Doctor Lechter's Patient. Doctor Lechter
accidentally administers a fatal dose of aspirin to a

^"^Foot, pp. 42-43.
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young and

a

happy

patient, in

an attempt to stop a migraine. The

administering of the aspirin was entirely painless, but
ended the
patient s

happy

Certainly this would not be considered a

life.

form of euthanasia!
In this case, the first conjunct in El

painless inducement of death.
satisfied

-

is

satisfied

The second conjunct

-

is

this

also

the doctor performed the action in an attempt to stop

the suffering of his patient. The case of Doctor Lechter

euthanasia according to El! Of course, this

is

euthanasia according to E2

cut short

-

having his

life

euthanasia according to E3.

It is

is

a case of

not an act of

or a happy event for Doctor Lechter's patient.

patient

was a

Nor

is

is

not a good

this

an act of

true that Doctor Lechter's

was acutely suffering and

in a "undesirable state".

Her

current state was one in which she was in great pain due to her
migraine. However, the final condition in E3

death

is

a greater good or a lesser

failure to intervene"

Had Doctor Lechter
continued to

-

is

-

that the "resulting

evil for the recipient

than the

not satisfied in the Doctor Lechter case.

failed to intervene, the patient

live in great

would have

pain for a short time. However, she

would have recovered from her migraine. Every reasonable
expectation indicates that she would have lived an enjoyable
His failure to intervene

would have

cost her a few days pain

a migraine. In intervening, he cost her her

death
final

is

life.

The

is

not satisfied. This

euthanasia according to E3.
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is

from

resulting

certainly a greater evil than his failure to intervene.

condition of E3

life.

not a case of

The

The Case of Mary. Mar>^ was on her deathbed,
a long

illness.

end her
which

She asked her doctor to

suffering sooner.

to

kill

her: sleeping

lethal injection, because
pills later.

In

Mary

many

felt

her, so that she

kill

pills,

another patient might need the sleeping

a slight pin-prick, and died.

ways, the Case of Mary

when her doctor gave her

is

very similar to the Case

Mary

felt

fails to

be a case

a small amount of

the lethal injection, this was not a

"painless inducement of death". Thus, El

Mary

might

or lethal injection. He chose the

of euthanasia according to El. Since

of

end of

Her doctor had two possible methods by

of Joe. As with the Case of Joe, the Case of Mary

pain

at the

fails to

pick out the Case

as a case of euthanasia.

Similarly, E2 has

problems

as a case of euthanasia.

in picking out the

Case of Mary

Mary was probably not happy

was dying. As with the Case of Joe, Foot

will also

concede that the

Case of Mary was not a good event for Mary either, for
enable her to enjoy the "minimum of basic

that she

it

did not

human goods".

However, unlike the Case of Joe, the Case of Mary

fails to

be

a case of euthanasia according to E3. Mary's doctor did not

perform an act that was the "method of inducing as painless a
death as possible".
less painful for

Giving

Mary

sleeping

pills

would have been

her than experiencing the pin-prick of the lethal

injection.

In

summary, the Case of Joe

illustrates that in

some

cases El

does pick out the same acts as acts of euthanasia as E2; while both
El and E2 failed to pick out the act of causing death in the Case of

Joe as an act of euthanasia. The Case of Joe demonstrated that El
18

and E2 pick out

different acts as acts of euthanasia than
E3. While

the case of Joe illustrated an act of
euthanasia according to both
El and E2, it did illustrate an act of
euthanasia according to E3.

Thus, the Case of Joe illustrated that El and E2
are not equivalent
to E3.

Additionally, E2 has been demonstrated to be deeply
flawed.

E2 contends that acts of euthanasia result in deaths
which are

"good or happy event(s) for the person who dies"
It is

unlikely that

who

die.

any deaths are happy events

They may be events which are a

The person's death may be the
his circumstances.

It is

events for the person

odd

who

-

relief,

or a comfort.

happy

Furthermore, using Foot's
is

good

own

either, for

of them allow the persons

who

"minimum

goods". In virtue of this

human

odd.

for the persons

to claim that such deaths are

dies.

is

best possible option for him, under

conception of "good", none of these events

of basic

but this

none

die to then experience the
fact,

no

euthanasias are ever good or happy.

Furthermore,

we

intuitively recognize that the Case of Joe is

a case of euthanasia. But E3 was the only definition that picked

out the case of Joe as a case of euthanasia.
definition that
In the

may

be correct, thus

Thus, E3

is

the only

far.

Case of Doctor Lechter, El did pick out Doctor

Lechter's act of killing his patient as an act of euthanasia.

Our

intuitions lead us to believe that the Case of Doctor Lechter

not a case of euthanasia, demonstrating that El

However,

this

was not an

is

was

flawed.

act of euthanasia according to either E2
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or E3. Thus, the Case of Doctor Lechter
demonstrated that El
not equivalent to E2 nor E3.
Finally, the

Case of Mary was not a case of euthanasia

according to El, E2, nor E3.

Many

people would claim that the

Case of Mary certainly was a case of euthanasia.
of these definitions picked

it

And

yet not one

out as such. None of the definitions

offered so far has adequately captured our notion of
what

meant by

is

’euthanasia'.

The following chart summarizes
the cases of Joe, Doctor Lechter

Table

1.1:

the conclusions

drawn from

and Mary:

Cases of Euthanasia According to El, E2, E3, and

Intuitively Speaking

El

E2

E3

Intuitions

no

no

yes

yes

Case of Doctor Lechter yes

no

no

no

Case of Mary

no

no

yes

Case of Joe

Unless

it is

no

understood what

meant by

is

’euthanasia’, further

discussion of the topic would be quite difficult.

Better Definitions of ’Euthanasia'

I

is

would

like

’euthanasia’ that

now

to turn

do not

my attention

from the over-simplicity that

suffer

resulted in the flaws of El, E2,

to definitions of

and
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E3.

,

Michael Wreen, in his "The Definition of
Euthanasia"
considers a definition of 'euthanasia' is. His
definition
parts (where

A

a person, but

is

it is

is

in

seven

not determined what B

is).

I

will refer to this definition as 'E4':

E4: Person

only

A performed an act of euthanasia if and
A killed B or let her die, 2) A intended

if 1)

to

the intention specified in (2) was at least
partial cause of the action specified in
(1), 4) the
causal journey from the intention specified in
(2) to
the action specified in ( 1 ) is more or less in
kill B, 3)

accordance with A's plan of action, 5) A's killing B is
a voluntary action, 6) the motive for the action
specified in (1), the motive standing behind the
intention specified in (2), is the good of the person
killed,

and

7) the

good

specified in (6)

includes, the avoidance of

There are several interesting points that
discuss in Wreen's definition.
act

is

an act of euthanasia

Why didn't Wreen
doctor

who

patient die,
is

life

and only

and not intend

2,

part

if

1

I

would

Wreen

may

like to

says that an

'A killed B or let her die'.

say that 'A intended to

support machines

or at least

that 'A intended to

shuts off such a machine

weakened by

die in part

First, in

Wreen considers only

But in part 2

Shutting off

if

is,

evil.

B or

kill

let

kill B'.

B die?'

result in death, but the

may only

to kill the patient.

intend to

let his

Wreen's definition

his failure to include the intent to let the patient

and focus only on the

intent to

kill

the patiently.

l^Michael Wreen, "The Definition of Euthanasia", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research vol. 48, no. 4, June 1988, pp. 637-653.
,

^^James Rachels, in his famous "Active and Passive Euthanasia" (reprinted
in Biomedical Ethics ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty, McGrawHill, 1991, 367-370) has argued that the distinction between the two is an
impertinent distinction. Rachels's claim is that there is no morally
,
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Wreen's claim
the act of euthanasia
is

in part 7, that the

"is,

killed,

and not

comas

in the future^^. For

life

that

request to be euthanized

is

in their lives

-

Wreen means

his doctors, family or friends.

who

a

is

if

they

some of these

neutral, neither

there

from

to be

and avoidance of evil of the person who

people

is

results

or at least includes, the avoidance of evil"

also problematic. As stated in part
6,

discussing the good

good that

is

There are many
fall

into irreversible

people, living in a

good nor bad. There

is

coma

nothing

evil

nothing good in them either. Yet, Wreen in

claiming that acts of euthanasia "at least include[s], the avoidance
of evil" would be forced to rule out the terminating the

an individual from being an

life

act of euthanasia, because the

of such

good

that results from that person's being killed does not include the

avoidance of eviUS,
Finally,

abortion,

according to Wreen, some suicides, some acts of

and some martyrdoms are

Some

acts of euthanasia.

of

these acts are occasionally voluntary, for the good of the person
involved,

and

in

some

cases the

good that resulted from the

performance of the act involved the avoidance of evil.

When Joan

of Arc was burnt at the stake, her death was voluntary,
intentional,

and

have been burnt

it

may have even been good

for Joan of Arc to

at the stake; she subsequently achieved

relevant distinction between the two, not that there is no conceptual
distinction between the two.
l^See Chapter IV for the distinction between these options and their
possible application as evidence for the truth of a statement of
counterfactual consent.
^
^For a discussion of a case of a man who is in an irreversible coma, and his
desire to be euthanized if he were in such a case, see Chapter III.
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Saint±ioodi9. But burning

the stake

is

an otherwise healthy 14 year old

certainly not an act of euthanasia.

Wreen proposed

his definition of 'euthanasia' in contrast to

another definition. That definition was proposed by

Beauchamp and Arnold Davidson,
Euthanasia" 20.
as

girl at

1

will refer to

in their

Tom

"The Definition of

Beauchamp and Davidson's

definition

'E5':

E5: the death of a

human

being, A, is an instance of
if and only if 1) A's death is intended by
at least one other human being, B, where B is either
the cause of death or a causally relevant feature of

euthanasia

the event resulting in death (whether by action or
by omission); 2) there is either sufficient current
evidence related to A's present condition such that
one or more known causal laws supports B's belief
that A will be in a condition of acute suffering or
irreversible comatoseness; 3) (a) B's primary reason
for intending A's death is cessation of A's (actual or
predicted) suffering or irreversible comatoseness,
where B does not intend A's death for a different
primary reason, though there may be other
relevant reasons, and (b) there is sufficient current
evidence for either A or B that causal means to A's
death will not produce any more suffering than
would be produced for A if B were not to intervene;
4) the causal means to the event of A's death are

^^The claim that Joan of Arc’s posthumous achievement of Sainthood was
good for her is only true if it is the case that things can be good or bad for
you even after you no longer exist. This notion was first discussed by
Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics (H01a23-1101b9). Aristotle beheves
that the lives of the dead are affected to some degree by what happens even
For further discussion of this question, see Fred
Feldman's Confrontations with the Reaper Oxford University Press 1992,
and Thomas Nagel's "Death", Mortal Questions Cambridge University Press,
after they are dead.

.

.

1979.

20Tom Beauchamp and Arnold Davidson, "The Defmition
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
is reprinted in Wreen, p. 640.
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,

vol. 4, 1979, p.

of Euthanasia",

The

294-312. The definition

A or B to
unless either A or B

chosen by

be as painless as possible,
has an overriding reason for a
more painful causal means, where the reason for
choosing the latter causal means does not
conflict
with the evidence in (3b); 5) A is a nonfetal
organism.

There are a few problems with

problem with part

finds a

1

-

this definition, also.

Wreen

the causal chain from B's intent to

cause the death of A has not been sufficiently established.
killing

and

letting die, not

merely causing of death, which figure

the definition of euthanasia
that

Wreen has argued

(sic)",

an agent's action

is

says Wreen2i.

sufficiently that there

between "causing" a death and
If

"It is

is

in

not clear

it is

a distinction

"killing (or) letting die",

sufficient to cause a death, then

however.

is

there

anything that that agent did in causing that death that would not

have

fallen

die"?

under the description of either

Wreen

offers this example: "If

one night and
an

flip

on the

electric chair in the

light switch,

might meet

his fate,

perhaps, but certainly not
persuasive.

Wreen

kill

killed the

been an unintended

killing, it

responsible for, but certainly
chair in his living room.
didn't

kill

the

man

p.

to

walk into

I

The example

man

in his

may

be one that he

Wreen may

example.

killed the
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man

house

tied to

is

my

his death,

not at

is

It

man

disagree; he

in the electric chair, for the

641.

my

room, hooked up to

and would cause

Wreen

or "letting

example, a

living

him."22

21 Wreen, p. 641.
2 2 Wreen,

were

I

light switch, for

middle of my

"killing"

all

may have

not morally
in the electric

may

person

claim that

who

contrived this sadistic death-trap was a
ieast partly responsible.

answer that the

efforts of both

the electric chair in the living

someone. Certainly a

killed

Wreen and

room were

the person

placed

jointly sufficient to

took place. Wreen

killing

who

I

may

have

reply

that since his efforts alone were not responsible
for the killing, he

did not perform an act of

looked

like killing that

killing.

I

would then ask him

acts that

if

he didn't perform alone such as murders
,

with guns, knives and grenades, weren't acts of killing?
They are
acts of killing,

and Wreen

is

forced to concede that

it is

not

important that an agent alone be the sufficient cause of death
to

have performed an act of

needed

killing.

Wreen may reply

to be the sole agent involved to

that he

perform an act of

killing;

non-living tools like guns and grenades don't count. Does that

mean

that soldiers

their

commanding

suggest that an act
as such!

orders

The mafia
a

is still

on the

battlefield aren't killing, since without

officers they
is

an act of killing only

assassin

killer.

wouldn't be there,

who was

if

is

ask.

You

can't

you alone intended

it

following the Godfather's

Wreen's claim that the

lightswitch isn't an act of killing

I

flick

of his

impossible to defend.

Beauchamp and Davidson's mention of irreversible
comatoseness

encountered

in part 2 eliminates the

in part 7 of his definition

euthanasia having to eliminate

problem that Wreen
-

the problem of the

evil for the patient,

and not merely

be a good. However, there are other problems with E5. What

meant by the claim

in part

evidence for either

A or

3b that "there

is

is

sufficient current

B that causal means to A's death will not

produce any more suffering than would be produced for
25

A if B

were not
will

to intervene"?

cause

less suffering

patient? Or, does

suffering at all?
at

Does

it

If

is

mean

than the act of

mean

A

this

that the act of euthanasia

failing to

euthanize the

that the act of euthanasia will cause no

already comatose, then

A

is

not suffering

However, euthanizing a comatose patient by giving a

all.

hypodermic
comatose

injection

A was

his death
slightly

But this

is

some

injection of a

pain,

where the

suffering than he

a mistake

-

According to

at.

comatose patient that

not an act of euthanasia

more
is

result in

previously not feeling any pain

hypodermic

3b, the

may

was

if it

results in

causes the patient even

feeling before the injection.

of course this would be considered an act of

euthanasia.

E5 eliminates the possibility that an agent can die of

euthanasia by his

which an agent

own hand.

kills

someone

Is

every case of euthanasia one in

else?

Derek Humphry

talks

extensively about killing yourself in case you are diagnosed with a
terminal, debilitating illness, before
act of killing yourself.

Humphry calls

legalization of euthanasia
suicide" 23. According to

definition

This

is

point;

-

be

it

perform the

himself an advocate for the

"suicide" or a case of "assisted

kills

himself.

would eliminate such

acts

from being acts of euthanasia.

Wreen agrees with

can see no reason for insisting that

A and

Exit

.

The Hemlock
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this

B be distinct

persons". 24

23Derek Humphry, Final
24wreen, p. 641.

acts of

Beauchamp and Davidson's

too strict a prohibition, however.
"1

to

Humphry, euthanasia includes

which an agent

killing in

you are unable

Society, 1991, p. 149.

A

final

problem with E5

euthanasia for

human

is

the conspicuous defining of

beings only.

It is

the case that animals can

be euthanized. Beauchamp’s and
Davidson's definition defines
euthanasia only for human beings,
and not
for animals. This

raises the question

why

it is

that they

end

their definition

mentioning "non-fetal organisms

(italics

mine)",

clearly discussing only non-fetal

human

beings.

by

when they

are so

While E5 does have some problems, on
the whole E5

is the
best of the definitions of 'euthanasia'
thus far discussed. With a

few modifications, Beauchamp's and
Davidson's definition of
'euthanasia' will be adopted.

A New

Definition of 'Euthanasia'

Beauchamp and Davidson's
fair

definition of 'euthanasia'

one, with only minor problems.

I

will

adopt a modified

version of their definition of 'euthanasia', that

E6: the death of

only

A is an

was a

I

call 'E6':

instance of euthanasia

if

and

A's death is intended by at least one
human being, B, where an action of B's is either the
cause of death or a causally relevant feature of the
event resulting in death (whether by action or by
if 1)

omission); 2) there is sufficient current evidence
related to A's present condition such that either one
or more known causal laws supports B's belief that
A will be in a condition of acute suffering or
irreversible comatoseness; 3) (a) B's primary reason
for intending A's death is cessation of A's (actual or

predicted) suffering or irreversible comatoseness,
where B does not intend A's death for a different
primary reason, though there may be other
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relevant reasons,

and

(b) there is sufficient current

evidence for either A or B that causal
means to A's
death will not produce any more suffering
than
would be produced for A if B were not to
intervene4) the causal

A

chosen by

means

to the event of A's death are
or B to be as painless as possible,

unless either A or B has an overriding reason
for a
more painful causal means, where the reason for
choosing the latter causal means does not conflict
with the evidence in (3b); 5) A is a nonfetal
organism.

1

have made two more

changed the definition so as
euthanasia by their

own

such cases in

it is

detail,

slight modifications to E5.

to allow that

hands. While

1

human

will

have

beings can die of

not be discussing

important that any correct definition of

euthanasia include such a modification. Finally,
the claim that this

1

I

have removed

a definition of euthanasia for people.

is

It is

the case that animals can be euthanized, and E6 does describe

euthanasia of animals as accurately as
people.

It

may

be noted that while a

own hand and such an
according to E6,

it is

act

may

act be called

one of the

(ie:

the individual

who

according to part
It

1

describes euthanasia of

human

being can die by his

be called an act of euthanasia

not the case that an animal can die of its

hand and such an
parties

still

it

is

an act of euthanasia, for

own

at least

the person doing the killing or letting, and
killed or let die)

must be a human being

of E6.

should be pointed out that some people

with E6. They will single out 3b

-

will take issue

the claim that there

is

sufficient

current evidence for either the patient or person performing the
act of euthanasia that the euthanasia will not produce
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any more

suffering than
place.

would be produced

Some people

will

if

the euthanasia did not take

say that there

evidence for this claim. For example,
euthanasia

person

if

never sufficient current

you

is killed,

then

it is

say that this

is

all

acts of

in hell for the

certainly better not to intervene, no

matter the amount of suffering the patient
will

believe that

be punished by endless suffering

will

who

is

not a problem for

is

undergoing. They

my definition,

it is

merely

evidence for the claim that there are no morally permissible
acts
of euthanasia. 2 5

1

disagree.

of 'euthanasia' in which

morally right.

1

do not

all

1

did not wish to advance a definition

acts of euthanasia are

believe that

definition morally right. By the

by definition
Regrettably,

all
1

all

by definition

acts of euthanasia are

same token,

1

do not

by

believe that

acts of euthanasia are morally wrong.

cannot see a way of altering E6 so as to

accommodate those who disagree with

it

on these grounds.

Consent and Informed Consent

While the term 'informed consent' refers to a more complex
concept than mere 'consent', when
'informed consent'. What

'informed consent', and

is

1

refer to 'consent'

1

will

mean

the difference between 'consent' and

why

is

the later preferred over the

former?

^^The importance of this objection is evident in Chapter II. Without the
claim in 3b, the argument presented in Chapter II, that counterfactual
consent can be used to morally justify acts of euthanasia, is not sound.
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Seemingly, any time a patient says
"yes"

when asked

if

he

is

willing to

undergo a treatment, that patient has
consented
treatment. Yet, merely saying "yes"
seems too weak

to that

a sufficient
condition for consent to that treatment.
Imagine a delirious
patient,

mumbling

"yes" for a

a treatment. In that case,

when asked

said "yes"

if

hour before being asked

to

undergo

was mere coincidence that the patient
he would be willing to undergo a
it

treatment. Perhaps the patient was asked

if

he wished to undergo

a treatment, and said "yes". But even
that statement of assent, or
"affirmative agreemenf'26

Perhaps the patient
his doctors, to

is

not sufficient for consent.

felt

undue pressure from

his family, or

undergo a treatment that he would under other

circumstances refuse. In this case, the consent

is

not voluntary27.

The notion of 'consent' must be improved upon so

as to eliminate

these cases in which a patient's mere utterance
of the word

'yes',

or uninformed assent, or an unfree seeming assent,
should not

count as true consent.
So as to eliminate these obviously
consent,

which

I

I

will

now

introduce a complete analysis of consent,

will call 'IC, for

IC:

false cases of giving

'informed consent':

A

patient, S, gives informed consent to treatment x
for condition y iff 1 ) S assents to treatment x for
y,
2) S is given sufficient information about x and
y

and the

effect

x would have on

y, 3) S

comprehends

2^Ruth Macklin, "Autonomy, Beneficence and Child Development: An
Ethical Analysis", Social Research on Children and Adolescents: Ethical
Issues ed. Barbara Stanley and Joan E. Sieber, Sage Pubhcations, 1992, p. 90.
27poot observes that persuading a patient to consent to euthanasia against
their will is a possible abuse resulting from the possible legalizing of
euthanasia (p. 59).
,
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the information given to him about
both x and y
and 4) the assent given by S for an agent
to
perform treatment x for is given freely
y
and
voluntarily 2 8

There are several terms that require further
analysis before
can be properly understood.

How much must

Sufficient information.
his condition

and the treatment

sufficient information

know

not only

S

know about both

for his condition before S has

about his condition?

It is

important that S

the details about the effect of x on
y, but

also be the case that S

know enough about y

the possible alternative treatments are.

he has y and that x
,

so as to

If all

that S

one possible treatment, but

is

1C

S

it

must

know what
knows
is

is

that

unaware of

other possible treatments, then S does not have enough

information so as to make an informed decision about treatment
x29.

It is

on which

important that the patient not have too

little

information

to base his decision.

However, does the patient have to be aware of every
alternative? This

too

numerous

to

would be

prohibitive!

even name,

let

The

alternatives

may

be

alone be described in any detaipo.

^^This analysis of 'informed consent' is based upon an analysis advanced
Office for Protection from Research Risks, National Institutes of
Health, Protecting Human Research Subjects United States Department of
Health and Human Services, 1993, p. xxii. See also Dan W. Brock, Life and
Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics Cambridge University
Press, 1993, p. 22. This analysis would also be endorsed by Joel Feinberg,
who claims that an agent can consent to relinquish any right as long as his
choice is fully informed, well considered, and uncoerced. See Joel
Feinberg, Harm to Others Oxford University Press, 1984, pp 274-275.

by the

.

.

.

29Brock, p. 22.
^^The Hastings Center appears to have overlooked this fact when they
claimed on page 21 that the patient or his surrogate should be careful to
consider all possible outcomes the patient might experience. The Hastings
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There

a point at which

is

alternative treatments. At

impossible to say. Suffice
alternatives

no longer reasonable

it is

what point

is

to say that

it

must be known

this?

It is

keep naming

nearly

each of the reasonable

to the patient for

informed decision that treatment x

to

him

to

make an

the one to which he

is

is

willing to consent.

Given that the patient knows that there are
alternatives
treatment

x,

how much more does he have

would be irresponsible

in

involved in each of them.

is

knowing that there are numerous treatments, without

knowing what
to

is

involved in each

make an informed

what

is

is

not sufficient for the patient

choice. However, there

amount of information

that

is

is

a limit to the

necessary for a patient to

involved in each treatment. Another problem

a patient has too

much

information.

It is

effects in

such detail that he

will

may

if

and

is

possible side

be too informed, and

is

will

an otherwise preferred treatment, out of fear^i.

Against this view,

ready to die

may arise

be paralyzed by fear at what

involved. In this case, the patient
to chose

know

possible that a patient

told the details of his alternative treatments

fail

know? The doctor

merely naming the possible reasonable

treatments, without explaining what
Just

to

to

if

he

is

Humphry

questioning

suggests that an agent

if

This seems misguided. The agent

is

not

dying his best alternative^^.

who

is

both rational and

informed enough about his alternatives so as

to question those

Center, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the
Care of the Dying The Hastings Center, 1987.
.

Brock, p. 49.

^^Humphry,

p. 104.
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alternatives
If

you

seems best able

failed to

alternatives,

your best
actualize

be both rational and informed
about your

it is

let

from being

you would not be able

you might not have the

alone recognize

an alternative

if

possible that

alternative, for
it,

to actualize the correct
alternative.

is

his best

to actualize

faculties to

Just because an agent questions

it!

does not eliminate that alternative

his best^^.

Brock recommends that the patient be
told what a
reasonable person would want to know,
and then have the
opportunity to ask for additional information
that he might find
important to making his decision34. However,
this raises an
interesting dilemma:

how

will the patient

important additional information

is

know what

that he needs to

the

make

his

informed decision unless he already has that information?

It

may

not occur to the patient to ask what the effects on
his eyesight

be

if

his leg

is

amputated, but that

is

not to say that there

will

will

not

be any effects on his eyesight. Putting the responsibility
on the
patient to ask

all

the right questions, so that he might

informed decision,

will

much

is

information

the patient

Able

not solve the problem of determining

enough.

knows enough so
to

comprehend

It is

nearly impossible to say

how

when

as to be properly informed.

the information. This

a notion as the notion of 'sufficient information'.
to

make an

comprehend the information

is

not as complex

For S to be able

that has been given to him,

it is

^^See Chapter IV for a discussion and rejection of a related view - that the
best alternative is defined as the one an agent chooses for himself.
^^Brock, p. 50.
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important that the information be stated in
a way that S can
understand it. S's circumstances and mental
abilities must be
taken into consideration when determining
if

the information

is

presented in such a way that S can in fact
understand the
information's,

it is

important to

patient has the ability to

realize,

however, that not every

comprehend information given

to him.

For example, infants or young children, as well
as severely

retarded individuals,

anything at

all.

It

may have

makes very

limited capacity to understand

sense to say that such

little

patients consented" to anything, for

it is

reasonable to assume

that they can not understand that treatment to which
they give
their "consent"^^^
It is

essential that the patient

is

rational to be able to give

informed consent to any treatment. Dan Brock considers a
thought experiment which
in

illustrates the

importance of rationality

informed consent. Suppose that you are concerned for your

own

well-being,

make your own

and

at the

decisions.

same time you value your

When would you want your own

decisions to be used to determine your fate, and

want others

when would you

to accept responsibility for determining

Brock claims that in those cases

making

in

to

make

your

fate?

which your own decision-

abilities are severely limited

you are unable

ability to

by

irrationality,

rational decisions,

and thus

on your own

behalf.

^^Office for Protection from Research Risks, p. xxii.
^^However, while these agents never actually consent to anything, it may
nonetheless make sense to attribute true statements of counterfactual
consent to them, using either a "best interests" standard or a "rational
agent" standard, both of which are discussed in Chapter IV.
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you would want others
you

irrational,

conform

A

to

make

decisions on your behalf37.

you may consent

to a treatment that

Were

would not

your preferences.

patient

treatments

to

is

who

is

one who

able to
is

make

able to

a rational decision about his

communicate and understand

what the treatment and the

alternatives are,

about those treatments, and

is

those treatments which
preferences38.

is

in

come

able to

is

able to deliberate

to a decision

about

accord with his beliefs and

not enough for the patient to merely have
a

it is

preference, rather, the patient must be able to
connect that

preference to an alternative and understand
best accords with his preference.
sufficient for the patient to
in

own

accord with his

preferences

rational choice
- it

is

choosing

is

wrong, for

would have made were she
However, a choice

is

if

need not be

other people's preferences. The doctor
patient

that alternative

important to note that

It is

make a

how

may

the choice

in

accord with

if

another rational agent would
is

irrational

not follow from the beliefs and preferences of the agent

choosing

is

from the

patient's

if it

who

does
is

the doctor believes that what the patient

wrong, for what the patient

own

what the

believe that

in the patient's circumstances.

not irrational

If

is

not the choice that the doctor

it is

not have chosen the same thing. The choice

doing the choosing.

it is

is

choosing does not follow

preferences, then the doctor can

reasonably assume that the patient
decision.

3^Brock, p. 37.
38Brock, p. 38.
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is

is

unable to make a rational

Freely

and

voluntarily.

It is

important that a patient has not

been coerced into giving consent.
However, the cases
patient has been coerced into giving
consent are

in

which a

often very

difficult to separate

from those

in

which the patient has given

free

and voluntary consent.
I

will

use the following test to distinguish
between

circumstances that are truly coercive and those
that are not truly
coercive.

If

the undesirable consequences of the
patient's decision

are caused by the patient's

illness,

consequences are not coercive;

if

then those undesirable

those undesirable consequences

are caused by another agent, then they are
coercive.
following examples should illuminate the distinction.
patient

who

is

suffering from a disease,

and he

treatment, or his medication will be withheld.
this treatment," his doctor tells him,

medication and you

will

end up

"I

will

is

The
Imagine a

told to accept a

you don't accept

"If

withhold your

in pain." In this case,

another

agent would create the negative consequences that would result
the patient did not consent to the treatment.

another agent

If

creates the negative consequences, then the patient

coerced. Thus, in the case in which the patient

more pain by another agent
treatment, the patient

is

if

is

is

being

threatened with

unless he complies with the

being coerced.

However, consider a case

in

which a patient

will suffer

equally painful consequences of not accepting the treatment, but
that pain will be a result of his disease, not a result of the actions

of any agent. The doctor

you don't accept

may come

this treatment,
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you

to the patient
will

end up

and

tell

in pain",

him,

"If

but this

is

a warning about the results of his decision,
not a threat.

an unfortunate circumstance, but
alternatives are "bad"

no sound reason

and

and

leave

it is

little

not coercive. "That

It is

all

or no "real choice" provides

to set aside the patient's choice as
involuntary

to transfer the decision to another." 39

Counterfactuals and Counterfactual Consent

A counterfactual

is

might, or should be true,
true.

David Lewis,

in the

a statement about what would, could,
if

some antecedent

famous

first line

state of affairs

were

of his book

Counterfactuals says:
.

had no tails, they would topple over*
me to mean something like this: in any

'If kangaroos

seems

to

possible state of affairs in which kangaroos have no
tails, and which resembles our actual state of affairs
as
much as kangaroos having no tails permits it to,

kangaroos topple

The sentence

'If

over."^o

kangaroos had no

a counterfactual conditional

-

tails,

they would topple over'

a conditional about what would,

could, might or should be true

if its

antecedent were

truth value of a counterfactual conditional depends

values of

its

is

true.

The

upon the

antecedent and consequent at various possible

worlds^i.

39Brock, p. 45.

^^David Lewis, Counterfactuals Harvard University
^dbid, p. 1.
.
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Press, 1973, p.

1.

truth

Lewis adopts two counterfactual
conditional operators,

and
’a->’ to

which he believes

to be interdefinable42. Lewis
uses

abbreviate the counterfactual relation

then

’

it

would be the case

,

then

it

S,

that

A were

A,

in this

able to consent to

S,

'0->'

were the case that

Two

an agent.

consent to would be symbolized
If

'if it

might be the case that

the state of affairs,

were the case

The symbol

that

abbreviates the counterfactual relation

'if it

statements about

would counterfactually
manner:

then

A would

consent to

s*

A

is

If

A were able

able to consent to S d->
to

consent to

A consents
S,

then

to S

A might consent

to

S.

A

My

is

able to consent to S 0->

A consents

to S

discussion of counterfactuals about consent and their

relevance to euthanasia will be limited to the use of the '->'
counterfactual, not the '0->' counterfactual. While
interesting to consider

had he been able

may be

what an agent might have consented

to consent,

I

am

an agent would have consented
If

it

to,

to,

primarily concerned with what

had he been able

to consent.

an agent might have consented, there of course remains the

possibility that the agent

concerned with

might not have consented.

Since

I

am

justifications of acts of euthanasia, considerations

about whether an agent might or might not have consented are
too

weak

for

my

philosophical purposes^B.

The

fact that

"^^Ibid, p. 2.

"^^Thus,

I

am

similai'ities

eliminating the possibility that there are ties in comparative
(ie: it is not the case that there ai'e two worlds

among worlds

38

an agent either might or might not
have consented
euthanasia
killing

if

him

-

euthanasia

he had been able to consent

is

to his

not enough to justify

the fact that the agent would have
consented to his

he been able to consent

if

justificatory power44.

if it is

might or might not give consent
if it is

-

obvious45. Thus,

-

in

which an agent either

the obvious choice

is

-

where

he were asked

if

my focus will be on

-

it is

clear that the

the choice

merely what they might have consented
if

is

the closest possible world in which the antecedent

conditional

is

true^^.

consent to being

if

killed,

is

less

to,

not

to.

a counterfactual conditional

that world the consequent

is

the counterfactual

conditionals about what agents would have consented

To determine

to obtain

a choice between obtaining actual

consent and counterfactual consent
agent would give consent

greater

a question between obtaining actual

consent and counterfactual consent

actual consent. But

may have

true, consider

is

true.

If

in

also true, then the counterfactual

in the closest

world

in

which an agent can

he does consent to being

killed,

then the

which are both the

closest to an agent's actual world, such that the agent
consents to being killed in one, and does not consent to being killed in the
other). Lewis does permit ties in orderings of worlds; Lewis,
pp. 48- 52.
Robert C. Stalnaker's theory of counterfactuals is, in Stalnaker's words,
"essenti^y equivalent" to Lewis's, expect for allowing both a hmit
assumption and a uniqueness assumption, which allow that for for every
possible world i and every proposition which describes a change in the
state of affairs of a possible world
there is at least one A - world
minimally different from i and at most one A -world minimally different
from j respectively. See Robert C. Stalnaker, Inquiry The MIT Press, 1979,
,

,

.

p. 133.

44see Chapter

II for a discussion of the use of counterfactual consent to
justify acts of euthanasia.

45see Chapter V.
4^Lewis, p.

9.
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counterfactual

he were able to consent

to being killed, then

true. Certainly there are

worlds in which the

'If

would consent'

is

agent does not offer consent, but not

all

he

worlds that have a true

antecedent are relevant. Only the closest
possible world to the
agent's actual world in which he

world that need be considered.
that world
'If

and does, then

able to offer consent

is

If

the agent

in his actual

is

world

the

is

able to consent in

it

can be truly said

he were able to offer consent, then he would.'^^

Counterfactual Consent and the Definition of 'Euthanasia'

With a clear definition of 'euthanasia' and an understanding
of what

is

meant by "counterfactual consent" an important point

about the relationship between the two can be observed. The
definition

of 'euthanasia' doesn't include anything about

counterfactual consent.

Acts of euthanasia are not acts that by definition are

consented

to,

either counterfactually or otherwise! Part 4 of E6

means

says "the causal

to the event of A's death are

or B to be as painless as possible, unless either

A or

chosen by
B has an

overriding reason for a more painful causal means". This

question of choosing or consenting to the euthanasia

choosing a method of death.

method of death

Chapter

III,

I

is

It

tantamount

will elaborate

may be argued

A

is

itself,

not a

but

that choosing a

to choosing death

itself.

This

is

a

on Lewis, demonstrating that
more complex understanding than

counterfactuals about consent require a
first anticipated.
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mistake, however.

This

IS

I

choose to die in as painless a way
as possible.

not the same as saying that

There

I

choose to

die.

another reason for claiming that the
concept of
counterfactual consent is not a part of
the definition
is

of

•euthanasia’. Part

or

B,

4 of E6

talks

about actual choosings, either by

not counterfactual choosings.

A may not

be in a position to

say what she consents to for herself
at a particular
time. Perhaps she

or

is

a small infant

is

in a

coma and can no

who never was

A

moment

in

longer can give consent,

able to give consent. This

is

not to say that the fact that she would have
consented to being
euthanized, or would not have consented to
being euthanized, is
irrelevant.

Counterfactual consent' and 'euthanasia' are

conceptually distinct. However, there are interesting
and

important philosophical connections between them.
In the next chapter,

I

will

attempt to clarify the role of

counterfactual consent in acts of euthanasia.

when

counterfactual consent

make use

is

is

I

will

invoked.

I

will

ask
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why

When acts of euthanasia make

use of counterfactual consent, what are they relying on
counterfactual consent to do?

ask

invoked. Which acts of euthanasia

of counterfactual consent? Second,

counterfactual consent

First,

CHAPTER

II

THE USES OF COUNTERF ACTUAL CONSENT:
ACTS AND JUSTIFICATIONS

In

Chapter

I,

I

answered the question, "What

counterfactual consent?" In this chapter,

I

will

is

attempt to answer

two more questions about counterfactual consent: "When
appropriate to use counterfactual consent?" and

is it

"Why do we

use

counterfactual consent?"

Counterfactual consent

is

used to

justify acts of euthanasia,

but which ones? Several philosophers have drawn distinctions

between different types of acts of euthanasia. One of the most

famous distinctions
However,

I

will

is

between

"active"

demonstrate that

and

"passive" euthanasia.

this distinction

is

not helpful in

determining which acts of euthanasia invoke counterfactual
consent, as opposed to other forms of consent.

However, there

is

a distinction between types of acts of

euthanasia that proves to be more helpful.

I

will use

Helga

Kuhse's and James Rachels' notions of "voluntary", "nonvoluntary"

and "involuntary" euthanasia

to distinguish cases in

which

it is

appropriate to use statements of counterfactual consent from
those in which

it is

not appropriate to use statements of

counterfactual consent.

I

will

summarize both Kuhse's and

Rachels' understanding of "voluntary", "nonvoluntary",

and

"involuntary" euthanasia, and demonstrate the difference between
their understanding of these terms. Finally, after demonstrating
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several shortcomings in Rachels'
terminology,

1

adopt a

will

modified form of Kuhse's terminology.
After

which

1

have explained the types of acts of euthanasia

will

then consider the following question:

counterfactual consent

sense does

moral

for

appropriate to invoke statements of
counterfactual

it is

consent,

1

it

is

used to

justify

an agent's

if

actions, in

what

justify those actions? Is counterfactual
consent a

justification for

an

act of euthanasia, or

a legal justification for an act of euthanasia?
of these questions in turn.

1

will

might
1

succeed as

it

examine each

will

conclude that counterfactual

consent does morally justify some acts of euthanasia,
but

does

it

not and would not succeed as a legal justification for
acts of
euthanasia. There are mistaken arguments for the claim that

counterfactual consent morally justifies acts of euthanasia,
including the "best judge" argument and the "Principle of

Determination" or the "Principle of Autonomy" argument.

Self1

will

consider each of these, and demonstrate their shortcomings. Then,
using the definition of 'euthanasia' offered in Chapter
Scanlon's view

on the value of choice,

1

will

1

and T.M.

demonstrate how

counterfactual consent in fact does morally justify some, but not
all,

acts of euthanasia. Finally,

1

will

examine two questions about

counterfactual consent and legal justifications. Does

counterfactual consent legally justify acts of euthanasia? Should
counterfactual consent be used to legally justify acts of

euthanasia? The answer to each of these questions
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is 'no'.

When

is

C ounterfactual Consent Invoked?

An

It is

Impertinent Distinction

not the case that counterfactual consent

appropriately invoked in

all

competent individual asks

cases of euthanasia. Cases in which a

to be killed in his hospital

cases in which actual consent
In
to,

such cases,

were he able to consent.
to

bed are

given, not counterfactual consent.

is

not wondered what the patient would consent

it is

would consent

is

-

he

tells us.

euthanizing such a person

wanted, were he able to
of euthanizing him

is

It is

is

clear exactly

The

justification for the act of

not that this

tell us";

that this

is

what the patient

is

what "he would have

rather, the justification for the act

"that to

which he actually

consented."

The above case
consent

is

tells

us one case in which counterfactual

not used. In which cases of euthanasia

is

counterfactual

consent appropriately invoked to justify the act of euthanasia? To

answer

this question,

it

would be helpful

between different types of

acts of euthanasia.

most famous distinctions between
helpful in determining

to try to distinguish

when

Perhaps one of the

acts of euthanasia will be

counterfactual consent

is

appropriately used: the distinction between active and passive
euthanasia.

James Rachels introduces the concepts of active and passive
euthanasia, and attempts to draw a distinction between them:

The

and passive euthanasia
is thought to be crucial for medical ethics. The idea is
that it is permissible, at least in some cases, to
distinction between active
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withhold treatment and allow a
patient to
never permissible to take any direct
kill

die, but

it is

action designed
to
^

the patient. 1

According to Rachels, active euthanasia
takes place when direct
action designed to kill a patient is
taken. Passive

euthanasia takes

place

when treatment

Thomas
seems

is

withheld, and patients are allowed
to die.

D. Sullivan elaborates: "By "active
euthanasia" Rachels

to

mean doing something

to bring

about a patient's death,

and by passive euthanasia," not doing anything,
the patient die."2 Of course,

very

it is

distinction between direct action that

and a non-action, the intended
of

life^.

difficult to
is

result of

i.e.,

draw the

designed to

which

is

just letting

kill

someone,

the termination

Rachels does not attempt to rigorously analyze these
two

concepts. Instead, he offers several examples that
supposedly
illustrate the difference

between the two concepts. One of these

examples

who

die

is

of a patient

and whose doctor agrees

is

dying of throat cancer,

who

asks to

to withhold life-prolonging

treatment. Withholding the treatment would hasten the patient's

death, and the withholding of such treatment would be a case of
passive euthanasia.^ However, were the doctor to inject the
Ijames Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia", Biomedical Ethics ed.
Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty, McGraw-Hill Inc., 1991, p. 367.
,

^Thomas D. Sullivan, "Active cuid Passive Euthanasia An Impertinent
Distinction?", Biomedical Ethics ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty,
,

McGraw-Hill, p. 371.
^For examples of attempts to draw a distinction between actions and nonactions, see Jonathan Bennett's "Positive and Negative Relevance",
American Philosophical Quarterly vol. 20, 1983, pp. 185-194; Daniel Dinello,
"On Killing and Letting Die", Analysis vol. 31, 1971, pp. 83-86; and Bruce
Russell, "On the Relative Strictness of Negative and Positive Duties",
American Philosophical Quarterly vol. 14, 1977, pp. 87-97.
,

,

,

^Rachels, "Active

and Passive Euthanasia",
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p. 368.

patient with

some drug

would be an

act of active euthanasia. In another
example, a child

would

that

kill

him, then such an act

with Down's Syndrome and an intestinal
obstruction

is

allowed to

die of starvation, rather than have the
obstruction surgically

removed. This

is

a case of passive euthanasia, for the doctors
are

merely withholding an operation that would save
the
rather than taking direct action designed to

kill

infant,

the infant.5

Does the distinction between passive and active euthanasia
help to draw the distinction between cases of
euthanasia that

might appropriately be

justified using counterfactual

consent and

the cases that might appropriately be justified using actual

consent?

It

does not. In the case of the patient with throat

cancer, the patient certainly gave actual, and not counterfactual,

consent to his

own

death.

He asks the doctor

to help

him

The

die.

doctor agrees to withhold treatment, and thus the patient dies

from passive euthanasia.

In this case, the doctor

may justify

his

choice to perform an act of passive euthanasia by citing the
patient's actual consent to the withholding of treatment.

have been inappropriate

It

would

for the doctor to justify his actions using

counterfactual consent; actual consent was available.

However, the doctor could have given the patient an
injection
die.

which would have

This would have

euthanasia.

made

The patient

this case, the

doctor

killed him, after the patient

asked to

the patient's death an act of active

still

gave his

may justify

explicit actual consent. In

his choice to

^Rachels, "Active cind Passive Euthanasia", p. 368.
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perform an act of

active euthanasia

by

citing the patient's actual consent
to the

lethal injection. Again,

it

would have been inappropriate

in this

case for the doctor to cite a statement
of counterfactual consent

when

actual consent

was given.

seems that actual consent may be used
appropriately

It

both cases of passive and active euthanasia.
Thus,

it is

in

not the

case that either active or passive euthanasias
are acts of

euthanasia that

may

appropriately be justified exclusively via

counterfactual consent.

Is it

the case that counterfactual consent

is

appropriate in only passive, or in only active, acts of
euthanasia?

No

-

neither of these

case illustrates this

is

the case. Rachels'

fact.

It is

Downs Syndrome

infant

not the case that infants can offer

consent to anything. Yet, the parents of the infant, along with the
doctor,

may reach

healthy.

the following conclusion: "Our child

The quality of her

life will

is

not

be forever compromised.

Furthermore, the time and resources that would be used in taking
care of this child would disproportionately subtract from the time

and resources

that could be spent

able to understand

would

tell

us that

this,

it is

and able

okay for us

on our other
to tell us
to allow

children.

Were she

what she wanted, she
her to

die.

Thus,

permissible for us to withhold treatment of this infant."

If

it is

this

is

the parents' and the doctor's line of reasoning, and they withhold
giving the infant the life-saving operation, then they will have

attempted to

justify this act of passive euthanasia using

counterfactual consent. Such a line of reasoning

is

an appropriate

use of counterfactual consent in an attempt to justify an act of
euthanasia.
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A similar

line of

reasoning could be used for them to
justify

the infant's active euthanasia using
counterfactual consent. The
parents may consider that allowing the
infant slowly to starve to

death would be needlessly painful. While the
infant would have
wanted to die, they think, it is not the case that she
would have

wanted

to die like this.

A painless

and save her days of slow
their

daughter

s

injection that

starvation,

is

would

what any

kill

her,

rational agent in

circumstances would have preferred. Thus, the

parents justify their daughter's active euthanasia
using
counterfactual consent. This too

is

an appropriate use of

counterfactual consent to justify an act of euthanasia.

have

1

is

illustrated that neither active

nor passive euthanasia

appropriately justified exclusively using counterfactual consent

or actual consent. Actual consent
passive

and

is

appropriate in both cases of

active euthanasia. Counterfactual consent

is

appropriate in both cases of passive and active euthanasia.

Another distinction between types of

drawn
is

to distinguish those cases in

acts of euthanasia

must be

which counterfactual consent

appropriately invoked, and cases in which

it is

not.

Kuhse and Rachels on a

Three-Way Distinction Among Acts of Euthanasia

While the passive/active distinction between acts of
euthanasia has not proven helpful

in

determining which acts of

euthanasia appropriately use counterfactual consent as part of
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their justification, this

is

not the only distinction

acts of euthanasia. Several
philosophers

among

types of euthanasia.

among

draw another

This distinction

is

types of

distinction

among voluntary

euthanasia, non-voluntary euthanasia,
and involuntar>^
euthanasia^. Helga Kuhse explains the
differences

among

these

three kinds of euthanasia:

The case of Mary

F. is a clear case of voluntary
euthanasia; that is, euthanasia carried out by
A at the
request of B, for the sake of B.... Euthanasia can
be
voluntary even if the person is no longer competent
to

assert her wish to die when her life is ended.
You
might wish to have your life ended should you ever
find yourself in a situation where, whilst
suffering
from a distressing and incurable condition, illness or

accident have robbed you of all your rational faculties,
and you are no longer able to decide between life and
death. If, whilst still competent, you expressed the
considered wish to die when in a situation such as this,
then the person who ends your life in the appropriate
circumstances acts upon your request and performs an
act of voluntary euthanasia.
Euthanasia is non-voluntary when the person
’

whose

life is ended cannot choose between life and
death for herself - for example, because she is a
hopelessly ill or handicapped newborn infant, or
because illness or accident have rendered a formerly
competent person permanently incompetent, without
that person having previously indicated whether she
would or would not like euthanasia under certain

circumstances.

Euthanasia is involuntary when it is performed
on a person who would have been able to give or
withhold consent to her own death, but has not given
consent - either because she was not asked, or because
^James Rachels, "Euthanasia", Matters of Life and Death. New Introductory
Essays in Moral Philosophy ed. Tom Regan, Random House, 1986, pp. 38-39.
,

See also Helga Kuhse, "Euthanasia",
Basil Blackwell, 1993, pp. 295.
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A Companion

to Ethics

,

ed. Peter Singer,

)

she was asked but withheld consent,
wanting
so on
® to ^
living^.

In

summary, Kuhse claims

voluntary euthanasia:
to

1

)

when

that there are two kinds of

the person

who

is

killed requests

be euthanized at the time of death, and
2) when the person

who

is

killed

had previously requested

circumstance

(c)

that

were she

to be in a

such that she could not consent to being

euthanized, she would desire to be euthanized, and
c obtains.
Hereafter,

I

will refer to these

as 'voluntary r

and

two kinds of voluntary euthanasia

'voluntary2', respectively.

distinction between voluntary 1
in cases of

The relevant

and voluntary2 euthanasia

whereas

in cases of

the patient requested euthanasia at

voluntary2 euthanasia

some time

prior to the time of

death. There are two kinds of nonvoluntary euthanasia:

who

is

killed

had never previously been able

consent to being euthanized, and

person

that

voluntary 1 euthanasia the patient requests euthanasia

at the time of death,

the person

is

who

is

killed

is

euthanized, and 2)

had previously been able

euthanized under condition

(c),

is

euthanized.

I

)

when

to

when

the

to consent to being

the person did not previously

consent nor deny consent to being euthanized under

and the person

1

will refer to these

c,

c obtains,

two kinds of

euthanasia as 'nonvoluntaryl' and 'nonvoluntary2', respectively.
Finally, involuntary euthanasia occurs

consent or withhold consent to being

does withhold consent to being

^Kuhse,

p.

295.
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when

killed.

killed,

or 2)

the person

is

able to

This person either
is

1

never asked for her

consent to being

killed,

and

is

killed

anyway.

two kinds of euthanasia as
'involuntary 1 and
'

I

will refer to these

'involuntar>'2'

euthanasia, respectively.
It IS

the case that the notion of
counterfactual consent

used, in part, to distinguish

among

is

the different types of

voluntary, nonvoluntary, and
involuntary euthanasia. In several
of these types of euthanasia,
agents are asked to consider what
the patient would have consented
to, had he been able to
give
consent. Which of the types of
voluntary, nonvoluntary and

involuntary acts of euthanasia
appropriately
counterfactual consent?
It is

attempt

will

I

not appropriate

to justify

to cite counterfactual

voluntary 1 euthanasia. The

these cases, the patient

for

it is

It is

I

voluntary 1 euthanasia. In

is

actually

consent in an

some voluntary2 euthanasias, but not

"I

in

my doctors and

consent to

which the patient says

family killing

am ever in condition c", and condition c
um

and

obtained.

cite counterfactual

Voluntary2 euthanasias are cases

statement
iO

type of

to justify voluntary2 euthanasia. Counterfactual
consent

explicitly,
I

first

not appropriate to cite counterfactual consent,

plays an important role in

if)

consent in an

actually asked for consent,

is

can be appropriate to

attempt

all.

is

not needed. Actual consent

It

use of

consider each of them in turn.

euthanasia that Kuhse considers

gives consent.

make

"I

consent to

in condition c"

my doctors and

is

consent, for the patient

family killing

actually giving consent;
is

it is

me when

the case

giving consent to being killed
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(or

The

later obtains.

not a statement of counterfactual

is

however that the patient

me when

when

(or

(or

condition c obtains, long before condition
c does obtain.
Perhaps the patients make these statements
of consent known to
if)

their families via Living Wills, or

which they

state that

when

(or

some

if)

explicit conversation in

they were ever in the condition

they are in now, that their family and
doctors have their consent
to euthanize them. Such a statement
is a statement
of assertoric

antecedent consent, or problematic antecedent
consent, but not
counterfactual consent^. However, the euthanasias
that

appropriately use assertoric antecedent consent or
problematic

antecedent consent and those that appropriately use
counterfactual consent are not exclusive. The family and
doctors

of patients

who

die of voluntary 2 euthanasia

may justify

their act

of euthanasia by making reference to counterfactual
consent.

"Were she able

to give

consent to her death right now, then she

would give consent," they

will claim.

They

will take as

evidence

for their claim the Living Will, or their earlier conversation with

the patient.

It is important to note that the Living Will, and the
conversation in which
the patient stated that when she is in condition c in the future, then she
would hke for her relatives to kill her, are not statements of counterfactual
consent. They are evidence for the truth of a statement of counterfactual
consent, but they are not statements of counterfactual consent themselves.
Rather, they are statements of assertoric antecedent consent. Similarly,
the conversation in which the patient stated that if she is in condition c in
the future, then she would hke her relatives to kiU her, is not a statement
of counterfactual consent. Rather, such a statement is a statement of
problematic antecedent consent. The agent, in composing a Living Will, is
saying to her doctors and family, "When (or if) condition c obtains, you
have my consent to kih me." This is not a statement of counterfactual
consent. Consent has been given long before condition c has obtained (and
it is entirely possible that condition c will never obtain!).
For a complete
discussion of the difference between assertoric antecedent consent,
problematic antecedent consent, and counterfactual consent, see Chapter
IV, "Evidence for the Truth of Statements of Counterfactual Consent."
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Of course,

in cases of

possible that there

voluntaryZ euthanasia,

was no use of counterfactual consent

justifying the act of euthanasia.

may have

patient

it is

in

The doctor or family of the

consulted the Living Will and said, "This

clear statement of

thus

entirely

it is

a

is

what the patient previously gave consent

to,

permissible to euthanize this patient" without

considering what the patient would consent to

now

,

if

he were

able to consent. In such voluntaryZ cases,
counterfactual consent
is

not employed to justify the act of euthanasia. Thus,

counterfactual consent

is

appropriate in some, but not

all,

cases of

voluntary2 euthanasia.

can be appropriate to

It

attempt

to justify

cite counterfactual

consent in an

nonvoluntary 1 euthanasia. Deformed infants

are unable to consent to being killed.

We may justify their deaths

by saying, "Were they

to live, their lives

they could realize

then they would choose to be

Effectively,

we

this,

are saying that

rational choices, they

if

to

by saying, "They

choose what

is

can't

best for themselves.

Were they

themselves, they would choose death." In this case,

model and the

"best interest"
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we

will

is

is

best for

we use a

what the infants would have

wanted, had they expressible preferences.
choice"

the

would want what

able to choose what

best-interest criterion to determine

is

to justify

decision, so

best for them. Certainly, they

make

intestinal

we may attempt

make a

If

killed."

be euthanized. Such

Syndrome and an

blockage, described by Rachels. Or,
their deaths

unfulfilling.

these infants were able to

would choose

case of the infant with Down's

would be

Both the "rational

model used

to ascribe

statements of counterfactual consent
to the infant.^

Nonvoluntaryl euthanasias are performed
on individuals who
lack decision-making capacities,
such as infants

and severeiy

retarded individuals. These are cases
in which the patients are
unable to make a judgment about those
actions to which they

would consent. Not

nonvoluntaryl cases of euthanasia are
justified using statements of
counterfactual consent, but
all

it is

appropriate to do

so.

can be appropriate to

It

attempt

to justify

cite counterfactual

consent in an

nonvoluntary2 euthanasia. Nonvoluntary2

euthanasias are acts of euthanasia to which
the patient neither
gave assertoric antecedent consent or problematic
antecedent
consent, nor denied assertoric antecedent
consent or problematic

antecedent consent. Counterfactual consent

used to justify the euthanasia: were

now, then he would consent

may

this individual to

to being killed. Alas,

explicitly express his preference while

he

can't express his preferences, the best

we can do

he would

say,

were he able

be appropriately

to tell us.

still

be asked

he did not

could.
is

Now

that he

imagine what

Nonvoluntary2

euthanasias are performed on individuals

who

at

one time were

able to express rational preferences. However, circumstances

prevent them from voicing rational preferences when the issue of
consent

is

actually discussed. Nonvoluntary2 euthanasia might be

^For further discussion of these two models, see Chapter
Conditions for Statements of Counterfactual Consent".
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IV,

"The Truth

.

performed on comatose persons who
were formally

rational, but

currently are unable to express a
preference lo.
It

can be appropriate to

cite counterfactual

attempt to justify involuntaryl
euthanasia.
person

who might

available to him. His family realizes
this,

we ought

Imagine a case of a

be unduly depressed by the thought
of being

euthanized, even though he realizes
that this

to ask him,

consent in an

the best option

is

and concludes, "Were we

he would certainly consent to being
euthanized. But

not add more misery to his final hours.
Instead,

we

should just euthanize him without asking
his consent." 1 1 In

way involuntaryl euthanasias may
,

appropriately

make

this

use of

counterfactual consent.
It is

not appropriate

to cite counterfactual

attempt to justify involuntaryl euthanasia.

consent in an

In cases of

involuntaryZ euthanasia, the patient explicitly denies
actual
consent! Since the patient was able to

about consent

,

there

is

no need

to

make an

actual decision

determine counterfactually

if

the patient would have consented, had she been asked. The
patient

had been asked, and

said no. However, consider the

patient

who

rational, but

at

one time was

whatever reason his judgment

is

no longer

is.

impaired, and while

For

when he

lOOne case of nonvoluntaryZ euthanasia which is currently being debated
that makes use of counterfactual consent is discussed in Michael deCourcy
Hinds's "Uncharted Law for a Man Between Life and Death", The New York
Times June 6, 1994. The mother of 39 year old Joey Fiori claims her son
"Was an outdoors person. He was interested in sports, surfing and bowling.
If he could speak, there is no way he would want to hve this way [in a
persistent vegitative state for the past 23 years]."
,

^

^For a complete discussion of such a case, see Chapter V, "Counterfactual
Consent and Actual Consent".
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was
IS

he would have consented to
euthanasia, now that he
he has denied consent. Might
our euthanasia of such

rational,

irrational

an individual be a case of involuntaryZ
euthanasia,
counterfactual consent?

do not

believe so, for

justified using

do not believe
that the irrational patient truly
denied consent to being

euthanized. As

and only
about

X,

if

3)

I

stated in Chapter

1

l)he assents to

he

is

x,

2)

he

1,

is

1

an agent gives consent

to x

if

given enough information

able to

4) the assent to x

is

comprehend the information about x, and
given freely and voluntarily. An
agent who is

not rational cannot meet the third
criterion, and probably cannot

meet the fourth

deny consent,

either.

Thus, such an agent cannot consent, nor

to anything.

Such a case would more appropriately

be a case of nonvoluntary2 euthanasia, and
not involuntary2
euthanasia.

But what

who

the patient

lying? Consider the the patient

is

believes that asking for euthanasia

killed,

he would be better

But his family

him,

if

is

off.

able to say

we would euthanize

When

"If

him.

wrong, but

if

he

is

asked, he denied consent.

we were
It is

is

to

do what

what he wants

is

best for

for himself."

But the family hasn't justified his euthanasia using counterfactual
consent.

The family has merely

patient's best interest.

what he knows

said

They never

what would be

said,

in the

"And he would consent

to be best for himself." This patient does not

consent, and would not consent. The family
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may justify

his

to

euthanasia using other methods,
but not using counterfactual
consent 12.

The foilowing chart summarizes
the

roie that consent,

counterfactual consent, and lack
of consent play in Kuhse's
distinctions between voluntary,
non-voluntary,

and

involuntar>-

euthanasia:

Table

2.1:

Kuhse's Distinctions

consent

voluntaryl

yes, ex-

Among Types of Acts of
counterfactual

denial of

consent

consent

inappropriate

no

plicitly

voluntary2

no

may

be
appropriate

no

nonvoluntary 1

no

may

be
appropriate

no

nonvoluntary2

no

may

be
appropriate

no

involuntaryl

no

may

be
appropriate

no

involuntary2

no

no

yes, explicitly

2xhe patient who is lying, and the patient who is irrational, were
mentioned to me by Fred Feldman as possible cases that tested the
boundaries of what counts as involuntary2 euthanasia.
1
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Kuhse

is

not the only philosopher to draw the

voluntary/non-voluntary/involuntary distinction. James
Rachels
discusses these distinctions:

Vdiunfary euthanasia occurs whenever the patient
requests death. The cases of Barbara B. and Charles
C.
are both examples of voluntary euthanasia, since
both
patients asked to be killed. Nonvolunt3Ty euthanasia
occurs when the patient is unable to form a judgment
or voice a wish in the matter and, therefore, expresses
no desire whatever. The cases of Edward E. and
Frances F. are both instances of nonvoluntary
euthanasia; Edward was senile and only semiconscious,
while Frances was permanently comatose, so neither
could form a preference.
Finally, involuntary euthanasia occurs when the
patient says that he or she does not want to die but is
nevertheless killed or allowed to die. In this essay 1
will not be concerned with involuntary euthanasia.
My view is that it is simply murder and that it is not
justified. If a person wants to live on, even in great
pain and even with the certainty of a horrible end,
that is the individual's right

Rachels and Kuhse do not have the same notions of
voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. According
to Rachels, voluntary euthanasias are

performed

in cases

the patients explicitly ask to be killed. Thus, there

appeal to counterfactual consent in these cases
actual consent. However, Rachels does not say
explicitly asks to be killed. In the cases

-

is

where

no need

to

the patients gave

when

the patient

he mentions, both

patients ask to be killed at the time of their deaths.

What about

cases like Kuhse's voluntaryZ euthanasia, in which the patients

^

^Rachels, "Euthanasia", pp. 38-39.
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ask to be killed in possible circumstance

(c),

before

(c) actually

obtains? Rachels will have to put cases of
euthanasia which cite

statements of antecedent consent,
his

like Living Wills,

somewhere on

While such cases of euthanasia aren't necessarily

list.

using count 0 rfa.ctua.l consent, and

may

justified

be justified using only

antecedent consent, some cases of voluntary euthanasia are
appropriately justified using counterfactual consent. These cases

belong with cases of voluntary euthanasia, although Rachels
doesn't mention them.
Rachels' discussion of nonvoluntary euthanasia
parallels Kuhse's discussion.

closely

He discusses two kinds of non-

voluntary euthanasia, cases in which

make

more

1)

a patient

is

unable to

a judgment about his condition and cases in which 2) a

patient

is

The cases

unable to express his judgment about his condition.
in

which patients are unable

to

make a judgment

are

co-extensive with Kuhse's nonvoluntary 1 cases, while the cases in

which the patients are unable

to express a

judgment are

co-

extensive with Kuhse's nonvoluntaryZ cases. In both of these
cases of nonvoluntary euthanasia,

it

would be appropriate

to cite a

statement of counterfactual consent in an attempt to justify these
acts of euthanasia.

He

says that without consent, what

is

supposed to have been an act of euthanasia would

in fact

murder. While the patients who are euthanized

nonvoluntary

in

be

cases are unable to give consent, were they to deny consent they

would have been murdered. Thus, Rachels must assume
patients

who

that

are nonvoluntarily euthanized would give consent,

were they able

to

do

so.

Thus, there
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is

an

implicit appeal to

counterfactual consent in justifying both
types of nonvoluntaiy'
euthanasia.
Finally, Rachels discusses involuntaty
euthanasia. Here,

Rachels departs dramatically from Kuhse.
Rachels’ claim

involuntary euthanasia takes place only
asked,

and denies consent

when

that

is

the patient

is

to be euthanized. In these cases, the

patient actually denies consent. This notion
of involuntary^

euthanasia corresponds to Kuhse's notion of involuntary2
euthanasia.

What of Kuhse's involuntaryl

euthanasia, in which

the patient could have consented or denied consent,
but was not

asked? Involuntaryl euthanasia does not correspond
to Rachels'
notion of involuntary euthanasia, for there

may

be cases in which

the patient would have consented had he been asked, only
he

wasn't asked. Rachels claims that every case of involuntary^

euthanasia has a patient

who

is

asked, but explicitly says no.

Certainly involuntaryl euthanasia

is

euthanasia, for the patient both can
to voice a

judgment about

not a case of nonvoluntary

make a judgment and

is

certainly not the

as Rachels' voluntary euthanasia, for again, the patient

explicitly

able

his death in cases of involuntaryl

euthanasia. Finally, involuntaryl euthanasia

same

is

asked and consents

in Rachels'

is

notion of voluntary

euthanasia. In cases of Kuhse's involuntaryl euthanasia, the
patient does neither.

Rachels has no

way

to account for cases of

involuntaryl euthanasia.

The following chart summarizes

the role that consent,

counterfactual consent, and denial of consent play in Rachels'

notions of voluntary, nonvoluntary, and involuntary euthanasia:

60

Table 2.2: Rachels's Distinctions
Euthanasia
consent

voluntary

Among Types of Acts of
counterfactual

yes, ex-

consent

denial of
consent

unnecessary^

no

plicitly

nonvoluntary
no
without judgement

may

be
appropriate

no

nonvoluntary
without a voice

no

may

be
appropriate

no

involuntary

no

no

yes, explicitly

Kuhse

s

6-part distinction

among

the different types of

voluntary nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia illuminates
,

distinctions that Rachels fails to observe.
is

One of these

distinctions

the difference between actual consent given at the time of

euthanasia, and assertoric antecedent consent or problematic

antecedent consent, in the form of a Living
antecedent consent

may

Will.

Statements of

be invoked as evidence for the truth of a

statement of counterfactual consent. Kuhse's distinction between

voluntary 1 and voluntary 2 euthanasia illustrates the difference

between actual consent and antecedent consent which may be
used as evidence for a claim of counterfactual consent.
distinction Rachels fails to observe

is

A second

the difference between acts

of involuntaryl and involuntary2 euthanasia. Since Kuhse's
analysis does observe these distinctions, her analysis will be
effective.
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more

The Use o f Counterfactual Con.sentTustifications

Now

that

it is

clear

which

make use of counterfactual

how

is

acts of euthanasia appropriately

consent, the next question

counterfactual consent used?

counterfactual consent do for those

obvious:

is

What does a statement

of

who are considering

performing an act of euthanasia?
Statements of counterfactual consent are used in the

attempt to justify acts of euthanasia.

In

making reference

to a

claim about counterfactual consent, an agent attempts
to

demonstrate that

this act

was permissible.

But

how does

counterfactual consent justify an act of euthanasia? In Chapter
1

demonstrated that counterfactual consent

is

not part of the

definition of 'euthanasia'. But counterfactual consent

may add

something to the performance of acts of euthanasia.

Does

a moral justification for the act? Or,

is it

used to offer a

an act of euthanasia?

believe that

legal justification for

when

1,

possible that

it

it

give

could be
1

agents use statements of counterfactual consent

to justify their acts of euthanasia, they are using those statements
in

an attempt

there are

to morally justify acts of euthanasia.

some

However,

interesting considerations in evaluating the legal

question.

62

A Few Words on
Before

morally
justify

I

can consider

justifies

if

counterfactual consent either

an act of euthanasia or could be used

an act of euthanasia,

mean by

lustifirarinn

it is

important to understand what

the claim that an agent justifies
an action.

mean by

saying

'S justifies

shows P

is

data",

am not taking

to legally

P by mentioning Q;

is

What

1

I

will

that an agent,

S,

permissible by pointing out that a
proposition, or set of
propositions, Q, is true.
For example, if an agent considered the
following true propositions, "I am experiencing
ordinary sensory
"1

hallucinogens",

and

"1

seem

to see a cat

yonder mat", he would then be "epistemically justified"
believing that there

convey that

it is

is

P.

in

a cat on the mat. Such propositions would

epistemically permissible to believe that there

a cat on the mat. This conception of justification
William

on

is

is

similar to

Alston's conception:

To be

justified in believing that

p

is

for that belief to

be based on adequate ground. The ground must be of
a sort that is typically directly cognitively accessible to

normal human subjects; and the adequacy is a matter
of the grounds being sufficiently indicative of the
truth of the belief.... (Justification) makes an important
contribution towards making a true belief into

knowledge 14.
In other words,

an epistemic

justification gives

an agent

reason to believe that the proposition he believes

l^william

P.

true.

Alston, Epistemic Tustification: Essays in the Theory of

Knowledge Cornell University
.

is

sufficient

Press, 1989, p. 10.
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Alston

observes that epistemic justifications contribute
to knowledge by
helping us to "attain the true and avoid the false". is
If

an epistemic

justification

is

a proposition or a set of

propositions about a proposition

p

reason to believe that

then a moral justification

p

is

true,

that gives

you a

sufficient
is

a

proposition or a set of propositions about an action a that
gives

you

sufficient reason to believe that a

Similarly, a legal justification

is

proposition about an action a
believe that a
It is

is

is

morally permissible.

a proposition or a set of

that gives

you

sufficient reason to

legally permissible.

important to note that while counterfactual consent

may

serve as one type of justification for an act of euthanasia,

may

not serve as another. Counterfactual consent

justify

an act of euthanasia, but would

fail

may

it

morally

to succeed as

an

appropriate legal justification of the same act of euthanasia.
Phillipa Foot claims that while

morally

justified,

it

may

euthanasia to be legally
act

which

is

proposition

When
moral or

justified.
is

considering

if

be

it is

not the case that every

legally justified. Thus, the

same

counterfactual consent could serve as a

is this: Is

an act of euthanasia, the question

counterfactual consent a sufficient

justification? Alston's notion of

sufficient justification.

1

may

serve as one type of justification, but not another.

legal justification for

being asked

acts of euthanasia

be impossible for the practice of

morally justified

may

some

an 'epistemic

justification'

is

of a

The true propositions expressed by the

^Alston, p. 10.

l^Foot, "Euthanasia", p. 59.
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sentences

am experiencing

"I

taking hallucinogens", and

"I

ordinary sensory data",

seem

to see a cat

"I

am

not

on yonder mat" are

jointly a sufficient epistemic justification
for believing that a cat

on the mat. This question ought not be confused
with asking
counterfactual consent

complete

is

justification.

if

a necessary, but not sufficient, part of
a

Typically,

when we ask

proposition serves as a justification,
sufficient justification.

is

When

I

we

if

some

are asking

if it

serves as a

ask the question, "Can

counterfactual consent morally/legally justify this act
of
euthanasia?",

am asking

I

if

counterfactual consent

is

a sufficient

justification for the act in question.

Counterfactual Consent: TustiWing the
Moral Permissibility of Euthanasia?

The following argument may be presented

to

demonstrate

that counterfactual consent does not morally justify acts of

We often

euthanasia.

consent to acts that are not morally

right.

Consent, either actual or counterfactual, does not entail moral
rightness.
act

is

right

There
if

is

no moral normative theory that says

and only

if

that an

the agent/ s affected by the performance

of that act would have given consent to the performance of that
act.

Thus,

it is

not the case that counterfactual consent

is

sufficient to justify acts of euthanasia.

However, the conclusion that counterfactual consent
sufficient to

may

is

not

determine the moral rightness of an act of euthanasia

be too hasty.

It is

true that in general
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it is

possible to

consent to an act that
euthanasia

is

Chapter

1.

not morally right, but perhaps the
act of

peculiar in that consent, either actual
or

counterfactual,

A definition

is

is

sufficient for that act to be morally
permissible.

of 'euthanasia', E5, has already been
advanced in

Parts 3 of E5 reads:

primary reason for intending A's death is
cessation of A's (actual or predicted) suffering
or
irreversible comatoseness, where A does not
intend
A's death for a different primary reason, though
there
may be other relevant reasons, and either (b) there is
sufficient current evidence for either A or B that
causal means to A's death will not produce any more
suffering than would be produced for A if B were not
to intervene, or (c) there is sufficient current
evidence
for B that the causal means to A's death, when A is
irreversibly comatose, will not result in any more
suffering than would be appropriate to cease A's
irreversible comatoseness;
3) (a) B's

and part 4 of E5

reads:

4) the causal

chosen by

A

means

to the event of A's death are
or B to be as painless as possible, unless

either A or B has an overriding reason for a more
painful causal means, where the reason for choosing
the later causal means does not conflict with the

evidence in (3b) or

(3c).

Significantly, 'euthanasia'

is

defined as an act that

is

performed

with the intention to prevent actual or future suffering, and

performed

in

such a way so as to promote the smallest amount of

suffering as possible. 'Euthanasia'

among

is

is

defined as the act that

the best actualizable alternatives. Perhaps

it is

the case

that the patient's consent, either actual or counterfactual,

66

is

is

sufficient to

among

make an

act of euthanasia not merely

is

the best actualizable alternatives, but
makes euthanasia

Why do we

the best alternative.
to

one that

determining which

One reason

the best alternative?

is

that

is

best judge of his or her

believe that consent contributes

we

own

often believe that a person

is

the

happiness. Ronald Dworkin cites this

view as one of the reasons given for respecting the
autonomy of
persons:

"We should

themselves, even

respect the decisions people

when we regard

anyone

else."^^

consented to ending her own
that

the

life is

life,

the right thing to do^s.

amount of happiness

that her

she consents to terminating her
Similarly,

if

for

these decisions as imprudent,

because each person generally knows what
interests better than

make

If

we
if

in his

own

best

a person would have

often believe that ending

a person

life

life,

is

is

the best judge of

or death will bring her, and

then we take her at her word.

she didn't actually consent to terminating her

we have evidence
terminating her

would be what
However,

to believe that she

life,

is

we

life,

would have consented

but

to

use this as evidence that her death truly

best for her.

it is

important to recognize that each person

always the best judge of her

own

is

not

happiness. There are three

possible reasons for an agent's failure to be the best judge of her

own

happiness.

First,

people often change their minds as to what

^Dworkin, p, 223.
l^For a consideration and subsequent denial of a similar view, see Phillipa
Foot, "Euthanasia", Virtues and Vices University of California Press, 1978,
pp. 40-41. Foot considers If a necessary condition on the life of an agent
being a good be that the agent beheve it to be a good.
1

.
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maximize their happiness. Dworkin points
out that this is a
problem with Living Wills and surrogates,
"There is no guarantee
that he [the patient] did not change
his mind sometime after the

will

last

formal or informal declaration, or that he
wouldn't have

changed

his

mind

if

he had thought about the matter again."

Given that people can and do change their minds,
they can not
always be relied upon to settle on a course of
action that
will

maximize their happiness. Second, people are often mistaken
about what will bring them the most happiness. Third,

despite the

fact that

we

think that a person

is

makes her happy, she may not be

often the best judge of what

know what

in a position to

those things are. Dworkin finds the claim that others
better judges of a patient's happiness than she
paternalistic^o.

mistake

is

Whether

made when

would not be best
It is

isn't

what

is

be

to be

paternalistic or not, a

a patient chooses for herself that which

for her.

possible to object to the claim that each person really

the best judge of her
is

this claim

is

may

own

happiness.

meant by "the happiness of S"

person wants precisely

makes her happy

is

is

that

"what S wants". What a

is

that

1

think that this

all

the time!

1

is

no one can ever make a

mistake about what makes her happy. But this

make mistakes

is this:

which makes her happy, and what

what she wants.

wrongheaded. The implication

is

The objection

is

foolish

-

we

need not come up with dozens of

^Dworkin, p. 191. See also Chapter IV, "The Truth Conditions for
Statements of Counterfactual Consent".
^Ooworkin, p. 193.
1
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examples in which people have
thought that what they wanted
was what would make them happiest,
and they were wrong. The
reader can certainly consider several
examples from his or her

own

A variation on
makes

S happiest"

is

the notion that "what S wants"

is

"what

the Principle of Self Determination,
or the

Principle of Autonomy. These
principles state that a patient has
the right to make all of her own
treatment decisions22. why

should a patient have the right to make

all

of her

own treatment

decisions? Presumably, the patient
should not have the right to

make

all

patient

of these important decisions

would be making wrong

that the choices that the patient

interests. 23

The

were thought that the

choices. Instead,

it is

believed

makes are by definition the

choices for the patient: "The patient

own

if it

the best judge of his or her

is

Principle of Autonomy

attempt to avoid medical paternalism

best

-

is

motivated by an

doctors making decisions

without the patient's input based solely on what would
be "best
for the patient".

If

what the patient decides determines what

best for the patient, then

it is

is

impossible for the doctor, without

patient input, to determine what

is

best for the patient.

Tti 0 legal term for the right of an agent to choose
an alternative that is
not in the agent's best interest is the "right of folly". An example of the
right of folly is that an agent has the right to give all his money away
to a
corrupt charity, without his family preventing the transaction. Implicit in
the right of folly is the notion that what an agent wants, and what would
make the agent happiest, are not always identical, for it is possible to
choose one without choosing the other.
22see Dworkin, p. 188, 190, on the Principle of Autonomy; the Hastings
Center Report, p. 7, on the Principle of Autonomy; Dan Brock, Life and
Death Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 28-35, on the Principle of Self
Determination.
,

^^Brock, p. 31.
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The

Principle of Autonomy

and

Principle of Self

Determination, while admirable, are
too strong. Even defenders of
these principles will admit that it is
possible for patients to be
mistaken about what is in their best
interests. Dan Brock
discusses the circumstances in which it
is permissible to waive
the
right to Self Determination.

the patient admits that she

One of these circumstances
is

promote

people's choices

to

and the demand

to

and they can often

pull in opposite directions. "25 Phillipa Foot
argues that in

we

is

good

is

is

demand

their welfare are quite independent,

the mistake that what

when

not in a position to know what

best for herself24. t. M. Scanlon observes
that "the

make outcomes depend on

is

making

what an agent has chosen,

that

are often confusing a prudential and a moral sense
of

goodness26.

it

getting caught

may be
is

good

the case that embezzling millions without
for

an agent

in a prudential sense, but

embezzling millions without getting caught

is

not good in a moral

sense; hence, the pull in opposite directions.
T.

M. Scanlon on the Value of Choice and Consent

Those who

still

think that counterfactual consent does

morally justify acts of euthanasia
fact,

the

consent has intrinsic value.

first

case one

is

.

may respond
If

in this fashion: in

there are two agents, and in

given consent to the performance of an

act,

24Brock, p. 33.
25t.M. Scanlon, "The Significance of Choice", The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values ed. SterUng M. McMurrin, Cambridge University Press, 1988,
,

p. 189.

26philhpa Foot, "Goodness and Choice", Virtues
California Press, 1978, pp. 132-147.
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and

Vices. University of

and

in

a second case the other agent

performance of a similar
consented

is

obtained.

The case

act,

is

not given consent to the

the case in which the agent

better than the case in which no
consent
in

which the agent had consented

performance of the act

is

was
to the

better because the consent has

Intrinsic value, tipping the scales
in favor of the act that

consented

to.

If

this

true,

is

value, for consent has

some value

in itself. Thus, if acts of
will

alternatives that will result in the least
suffering,

consented to (where consent has some

(when

it is

an

is

consented to

is

be

among

the

and they are

intrinsic value),

then an act

the best available alternative

alternative).

The view

that consent has

by T.M. Scanlon27. Scanlon
choice are valuable's.

more

was

then counterfactual consent has some

euthanasia are already defined as those that

of euthanasia that

some

likely to coincide

Scanlon's example
in a restaurant

First,

some value

offers

two senses

in itself
in

is

expressed

which consent and

those acts that agents consent to are

with what those agents actually want.

is this: if

he (Scanlon)

and the food brought

to

is

presented with a

menu

him coincides with the

^^Scanlon, pp. 151-216.
28while Scanlon primarily discusses acts of choosing, and 1 am interested
in acts of consenting, many of Scanlon's points are relevant to my
discussion. Both choosing and consenting involve free and informed
assent to alternatives. The difference between choosing and consenting is
this: if an agent chooses an alternative, it is commonly understood that the
agent who does the choosing is the one who effects a change (in that his
choosing is sufficient to actualize an alternative). If an agent consents to
an alternative, it is commonly understood that the agent exercises
permission-granting power in offering his consent (but his consent is not
sufficient to actualize an alternative). If 1 choose the next speaker, my free
assent is sufficient for the next speaker to come to the podium. If I consent
to the next speaker, my free assent contributes to the legitimacy of the next
speaker to take the podium. See Chapter 1.
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food he chose from the menu,
the food brought to him is
more
likely to be the food he really
wants29. This demonstrates that
consent has instrumental value - if
an agent chooses or consents
to something, that which he
consents to is likely to be the option
that best serves the agent. This
example roughly parallels the
intuitions behind the Principle of Self
Determination and the
Principle of Autonomy. Scanlon,
however, rejects the intuition

behind the Principles of Self Determination
and Autonomy
isn't always the case that the
option the agent
chooses

which would coincide with

his experience in

when he

menu

faced with a

Here, choice

fails to

S,

in a

an

an exotic restaurant,

language that he can't read.

have instrumental value^o.

However, there
Consider agent

that

his preferences. Scanlon offers

example that describes
is

is

- it

is

a second

who values

memory, imagination,

skill,

way

in

which consent has value.

personality traits such as awareness,

loyalty,

and resourcefulness.

confronted with task of buying an anniversary

gift for

S

is

her

husband. S could just ask her husband to pick something out that
her husband would

like,

Scanlon claims that

if

or S could pick something out herself.

S picks out the gift herself, then the gift has

"demonstrative value", for
that S holds valuable^k
gift,

the gift

If

it

S

demonstrates those personality

were

to go out

would have low instrumental

and choose a

value, but

have the same degree of demonstrative value. Since

2^Scanlon, p. 178.
^^Scanlon, p. 178.
^^Scanlon, pp. 179-181.
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it

terrible

would

all

traits

still

alternatives that follow

from an agent's choices do have some

demonstrative value, Scanlon concludes
"People reasonably attach
intrinsic significance to having

outcomes depend on

their

choices." 32

One problem with
there

is

Scanlon's account

is

that isn't clear that

a distinction between "instrumental"
and "demonstrative"

value. Might the demonstrative value
that attaches to S's choosing

a

gift

herself be cashed out in terms of
instrumental value?

chooses the

gift herself,

then she

is

If

S

happier because she did so on

her own, her husband has the experience of
being surprised, and
her husband doesn't know precisely how much
the gift cost, which
he would have had he picked it out himself. S may
have

demonstrated some of her positive personality
there instrumental value in that?
distinction between instrumental

It

may

traits,

but

isn't

be true that the

and demonstrative value

is

unclear, but this isn't a great problem for Scanlon. All that
he

needs to establish
free choice, or

consent,

is

is

that an action that follows

an action

somehow

which the agent offered

to.

if

S

Scanlon has demonstrated

is

gift,

and thinks

chosen for

my

this.

not available to pick out a

asks her sister to do her shopping for her?

a

his free

better than a similar action that the agent did

not choose or consent

What happens

to

from an agent's

S's sister

to herself, "This isn't the gift I

boorish brother-in-law, but

it
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and she

comes across

would have

looks to be exactly

the kind of thing that S would have chosen herself.

32scanlon, p. 189.

gift,

It is

true that

s isn’t picking out the gift herself,
but as her surrogate shopper,
IS

my responsibility

to pick out a gift that will both
please

it

my

brother-in-law and would be something
that S would have
chosen. S's sister justifies her choice
by citing a counterfactual

about what S would have chosen. Without
such a counterfactual
to support her choice, S's sister may
not have been
justified in

making her purchase.
almost entirely intact

one that S

s

husband

The instrumental value of the
the gift

-

one that

S

pleased to receive.

is

demonstrative value of the

she would purchase

is

proud

if

it"

lost,

the counterfactual

were

to give,

and

Some of the

may have been

gift

find the gift herself. However,
this gift,

is

gift is

false,

for S did not
"If S

could see

then both the

instrumental value and the demonstrative value of the

gift

would

be yet smaller.
Scanlon's account does demonstrate

why alternatives

that

agents choose/ consent to are often better than those alternatives
that agents neither choose nor sanctioned with consent. Applying

Scanlon's arguments to cases of euthanasia,

easy to see that

it is

if

an agent actually consents, or would have given consent had she
been asked, that

this

which

among

is

already

alternative

.

is

enough

In this way, counterfactual consent
-

the fact that this act

agent would have consented
this act

However,

it is

an act

the best alternatives to the best

justify acts of euthanasia

marks

to elevate the status of

to,

can morally

is

had he been able

one that the
to consent,

out as the best alternative for the agent.

important to recognize that counterfactual consent

only justifies those acts of euthanasia that are already among the
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best alternatives for the patient
patient's euthanasia

would be best

would

If it is

.

in fact

not the case that a

be among the alternatives that

for the patient, then the
instrumental

and

demonstrative values of the agent's
euthanasia following from
what she would would have chosen will
not morally justify the
euthanasia.

If

euthanasia

not

is

among

the best alternatives for

the patient, then counterfactual
consent does not justify the

A

final objection

Scanlon

s

may

act.

be raised, however. Has the lesson of

experience in the exotic restaurant been
forgotten?

Scanlon observed that the best outcomes don't
always follow from
an agent s own choice - Scanlon himself admits
that his choice

from a menu that he could not read might end

in disaster.

Might

the instrumental value of choosing a bad
alternative be so low
that

no amount of demonstrative value would make up

poor choice? This

is

some of the choices

absolutely the case

off the

menu

- if

for the

Scanlon would find

repulsive, then the

demonstrative value of choosing his

own meal may

the negative result of having a terrible meal. But

I

not outweigh

have already

established that counterfactual consent only justifies acts of

euthanasia that are

among

Imagine Scanlon with an
choices. Scanlon chooses

only was

it

the best alternatives for the agent.

illegible

one

-

menu

of only the most pleasing

the meal

is

extraordinary^! Not

pleasing to the palate (instrumental value), but

Scanlon's dish was one he chose himself, as a competent and

responsible adult (demonstrative value).

euthanasia

is

already

among

Agents for

their best alternatives,

consent to euthanasia, or for

whom it can
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whom

who

actually

be truly said that they

would have consented had they been
able

to consent, will

have

the act of euthanasia transformed
from a good choice to the best
choice.

Having consented makes a good choice

all

the better.

Thus, counterfactual consent can and
does morally justify some
acts of euthanasia.

Coun terfactual Consenti

justifying the
Legal Permissibility of Euthanasia?

Counterfactual consent morally
euthanasia. Might

it

justifies

some

acts of

also be used to legally justify acts of

euthanasia?

The question I am asking

is

not,

"Does counterfactual

consent in fact serve as a sufficient legal justification for
acts of
euthanasia in the United States?" or

"Is

counterfactual consent in

fact necessary to legally justify acts of euthanasia in
the United

These are straightforward empirical questions, that can

States?"

be answered by looking into a law book.
consent

is

In fact, counterfactual

neither sufficient, nor necessary, to legally justify

euthanasia in the United States33.
It is

not in fact a sufficient legal

justification.

There have

been many highly publicized court cases of men and

wanted

to die, asked for assistance in dying,

who helped them
If

actual consent

women who

and yet the agents

die performed acts which were legally wrong.

is

not sufficient to legally justify an act of

33Marcia Angell, "Euthanasia", Biomedical Ethics ed. Thomas Mappes and
Jane S. Zembaty, McGraw-Hill, 1991, p. 382.
,
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euthanasia,

it

seems improbable that the same

act could be legally

justified using counterfactual
consent.

Without a Living

Will,

or a surrogate established by a

Durable Power of Attorney, to speak on
behalf of a patient,
legally impermissible to terminate
that patient's life34.

it is

Living

Wills contain statements of assertoric
antecedent consent or

problematic antecedent consent that can presumably
demonstrate
the truth of a statement of counterfactual
consent. Durable

Powers of Attorney sanction the use of surrogates
patient s behalf. Since the surrogate

patient s beliefs

is

to

speak on a

supposed to give voice the

and preferences, the surrogate presumably

position to utter a true statement of counterfactual
consent

behalf of the patient.

A

patient

whose

life is

is

in a

on

terminated as per

the directions in a Living Will or the order of a surrogate
does

have support for a claim about counterfactual consent
As mentioned

justify his death.

to legally

earlier, the surrogate bears a

special relationship to the patient. This relationship intimates that

the surrogate's claim that the patient's

based

in part

consent. But

on a
it is

belief

life

may

be terminated

is

about the patient's counterfactual

not the case that a Living Will or Durable Powers

of Attorney themselves are statements of counterfactual consent.

A

surrogate

euthanasia.

one of them.

may

say

many

things to legally justify an act of

A statement of counterfactual consent
Thus, counterfactual consent

is

need not be

in fact not

necessary to legally justify acts of euthanasia in the United States.

^"^Hastings Center Report, pp. 6-8.
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1

am asking a more

interesting philosophical question
than

the straightforward empirical
question,
in fact sufficient

euthanasia?"

I

"is

counterfactual consent

or necessary to legal justifications
for

am

asking

if

counterfactual consent ought to be

considered as either a sufficient legal

justification,

or a necessary

part of a legal justification, for acts of
euthanasia?

One of the most important
legal justification

is

"clear

Ronald Dworkin says that

if it is

legal justification

manner

is

it

legal

evidence must be

justification,
is

which

morally

right, a

establish proof of the

The problem with using counterfactual consent
that while there

is

a fact of the matter about

what a person would have consented
consent,

to serve as sufficient

true that the act in question

must be one that can

legality of the act.

in this

would have

it

and convincing". 35 Unlike a moral

merely asks

and

provability. For something to serve as
a

sufficient legal justification,
legal evidence.

distinctions between moral

may be

difficult to

to,

had he been able

to offer

provide sufficient legal evidence for

this claim.36

Living Wills

and Durable Powers of Attorney

that establish

surrogacy are legal documents, but they are contestable, thus the
claim that they in fact provide "clear and convincing" evidence
disputable.
Living Will

It is

possible to argue that the agent

was not

in a position to

who

is

signed the

determine what she would

35Dworkin, p. 187.
3<3Drew Christie has argued that there is no fact of the matter about what a
person would have consented to, had he been able to offer consent.
For a
reply to the objection that these counterfactuals don't have a truth value,
see Chapter IV.
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have wanted were she

to

be come gravely

ill.

After

all,

at the

time that she wrote the Living Will,
presumably she was not
gravely ill. She was consenting before
the fact to a state of affairs

about which she could not possibly be able
consent.

to offer

informed

Thus, she could not accurately state what
her wishes

would have been

in the

very situation she describes.37

an agent may believe that

in signing

Similarly,

over a Durable Power of

Attorney to a relative or close friend, that she
has chosen someone

who

best represents her interests. But she

about

this fact

-

the individual

may

Finally, Justice Scalia of the

all.

claimed that a state

is

may be mistaken

not represent her interests at

United States Supreme Court has

not legally required to honor a Living Will

if it

has decided that the precedent

Will

would be an

it

sets in

honoring the Living

insult to the sanctity of life.38

The

counterfactual consent that agents ascribe to patients on the basis

of the Living Will

may

still

be legally disputed.

Without a Living Will or surrogate,
difficult to legally justify

consent.

It

it

would only be more

an act of euthanasia using counterfactual

has been argued in the Missouri Supreme Court that

the "informal, casual statements" of friends and family do not
offer the

same

"clear

and convincing" evidence of a

wishes as a Living Will.39 Questions about
as a surrogate

is

why

patient's

the person acting

best qualified to represent the interests of the

patient could be raised^o.

it

appears that counterfactual consent

37This and other problems with Living Wills are discussed in Chapter
38Dworkin, p. 198.
^^Dworkin, p. 187.
'^'^See

Chapter IV for a discussion of the qualifications of surrogates.
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IV.

should not be used as a sufficient
legal justification for acts of
euthanasia.
Similarly, counterfactual consent
should not be necessary to
a legal justification for acts of euthanasia.
Our evidence for the

truth of claims about counterfactual
consent

is

the legal standard of "clear and convincing".

simply not up to

Living Wills, one of

the best indicators of what a person
would have consented to

under trying circumstances, can be contested.
is

legally impossible to

consent or not, then

it

determine

if

there

is

would be impossible

If

they are, and

counterfactual
to

determine

if

the act

of euthanasia in question would be legally
permissible or not.
this

were

true,

it

would be

If

then there would be no legally permissible acts of

euthanasia. Insofar as there are
euthanasia,

it

it is

wrong

some morally permissible

to hold a legal standard that

legally impossible to

of euthanasia.
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is

acts of

so high that

perform those morally right acts

CHAPTER

III

COUNTERF ACTUAL CONSENT AND THE
RATIONAL MAN PARADOX
Often

we

consider cases in which the patient

unable to consent to euthanasia.

We attempt

is

actually

to justify

euthanasia in these cases by use of the concept of counterfactual
consent:

if

the patient were able to consent, then he would

consent. However, what

the very conditions that prevent the

if

patient from consenting are those conditions that determine what

the patient’s choice would be? There are cases in which the
closest possible

world where the patient

very property of being able to consent
to withhold consent.

How

then

is

is

is

able to consent, the

sufficient for the patient

counterfactual consent to be

understood?
I

will

begin this chapter by considering a problem for

counterfactual consent: the Rational
offer a

number of solutions

Man

paradox.

I

will

then

to this problem: odd-worlds solutions,

the ideal surrogate solution, several versions of the double

modality solution, and the implicit actuality solution.

demonstrate the mistakes
ideal surrogate solution,

in

I

will

each of the odd-worlds solutions, the

and the double modality

However, the double modality solutions

solutions.

will illustrate

an

important point about any true interpretation of counterfactuals

about consent

-

then consider a

the need for a cross-world comparison.
final

I

will

reading of counterfactuals about consent, the

implicit actuality solution.

The
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implicit actuality solution succeeds

as a reading of counterfactuals about consent.

paradox

is

solved.

I

will

conclude

reformulation of precisely what

is

this

The Rational Man

chapter with a

meant by counterfactual

consent.

The Problem of Co unterfactual Consent and the

Rational

Man

Statements of counterfactual consent typically take this
form:

If

A were

As stated

in

able to consent to

Chapter

I,

S,

then

A would

consent to

one of the necessary conditions on an

being an act of consent

is

that the person consenting

is

S.

act

rational. If

an individual

is

that he/ she

consenting to anything. As discussed in Chapter

is

not rational, then

it

makes very

little

sense to say
I,

the truth conditions for a statement of counterfactual consent

require us to travel to the closest possible world in which the
subject

is

able to consent to

some

state of affairs.

If,

in that world,

the subject does consent to that state of affairs, then the

A were

statement

"If

S"

In other words,

is

true.

the antecedent

is

counterfactual

is

able to consent to
if

then

A would

in the closest possible

true, the conclusion
true.

S,

is

consent to

world

in

which

also true, then the

True statements of counterfactual consent

are often cited as justifications for performing euthanasia.

However, there

may be

a problem with our conventional

understanding of the truth conditions for statements of
counterfactual consent. The Rational

Imagine a

man who values

being rational

is

Man

illustrates this

problem.

his rationality to such a degree that

both necessary and sufficient for him to think

82

.

that

worth

life is

studying,

Pleasures of

life like

eating, traveling,

and any experience you could name may come and

but as long as he
life is

living.

worth

is

able to think, the Rational

Man

believes that

While such a view seems odd to many,

living.

certainly metaphysically possible that such a

Rational Man, losing his rationality
truly of him, "If he

were able

is

man

go,

it is

For the

exist.

enough that we would say

to consent to being euthanized

that he has lost his rationality, then he

would consent

now

to being

euthanized."

According to the conventional method of determining truth
conditions for counterfactuals,

we have

possible world in which the Rational

being euthanized, and

to

Man

go to the closest
is

able to consent to

we ask him, "Do you consent

euthanized?" But in that world, he

is

to being

rational, for rationality

is

a

necessary condition of his being able to consent. Being rational

is

both necessary and sufficient for him to refuse consent to our
euthanizing him.

world

in

which he

is

loses his rationality,

claim

"If

worth

Life is

living for the Rational

able to consent. So, even

we have

if

Man

in the

the rational

nonetheless spoken falsely

man

when we

he were able to consent, then he would consent to being

euthanized."
the Rational

And

Man

yet,

"If

it

seems that we are able to say truly of

he were able to consent, then he would

consent to being euthanized"

in those cases in

which he

is

no

longer rational
1 Edward Wierenga introduces a version of the Rational Man paradox in
"Proxy Consent and Counterfactual Wishes", The Toumal of Medicine and
Philosophy vol. 8, no. 4., November 1983, pp. 405-416. Wierenga describes
an 83 year old priest. Brother Fox, who made known during his lifetime his
,
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It

would seem

that counterfactuals about consent are

more

complex than ordinary counterfactuals. The Rational Man
paradox
demonstrates that the conventional analysis of counterfactuals
not always sufficient to give the truth conditions for
counterfactuals about consent.

is

all

A new means of determining

the

truth conditions for counterfactuals about consent must be
found.

How do we

solve the problem of the Rational

Man?

A First Solution: Odd Worlds
A possible

solution to the problem of the Rational

Man

is

to

claim that there are some very odd worlds, in which the Rational

Man

is

both rational and not rational at the same time. In these

worlds, the Rational

Man

consenting, and yet he

euthanized because his

is

has the rationality to perform an act of
arational

life is

enough

to desire that

no longer worth

living.

he be

Thus, the

Rational Man, in being both rational and arational, both can

consent to being euthanized, and has sufficient motivation to
consent to being euthanized.

A second odd world

solution

which the Rational Man was

may

be to posit a world in

rational for a brief period after the

belief that the withdrawing of hfe support machines from some
unconscious patients was morally permitted. When Brother Fox lapsed into
a coma, the court concluded that "were Brother Fox competent, he would
direct the termination of the respirator that presently supports him"
(Wierenga, p. 410). Wierenga points out however that if Brother Fox were
competent, that he would not allow the respirator to be turned off, for it
was not part of Brother Fox's view that conscious patients need not be
assisted by hfe support machines. "Accordingly, it is false that if Brother
Fox were competent he would direct the termination of the use of the

respirator." (Wierenga, p. 411).
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accident that rendered him comatose. In this world,
he regained

consciousness and rationality for just enough time for
his doctors
to ask him,

you again

"Do you consent

in

is

We may lose

another few seconds, so answer quickly!" In

world, the Rational

he

to being euthanized?

Man

rational for just

is

about to face a

enough time

this

of arationality, but

life

to consent to being euthanized.

This solution does have some appeal. Certain facts have to be
fixed for the question,

"Do you want

to

be euthanized?" to have

any relevance. The Rational Man would have
rationality, or at least

be sure of losing

it

have

to

lost his

very soon, for such a

question to have any relevance. In this world, that fact

Furthermore, in this world the Rational
being euthanized, because he

is

Man

is

Man

both

fbced.

able to consent to

rational for just

consent. In this world, the Rational

is

is

enough time

to

able to consent to

being euthanized, and has sufficient motivation to truly give

consent to being euthanized. Perhaps this

is

how many

of us

understand the plight of those suffering from Alzheimer's disease.

Those patients have short moments of lucidity as the disease
progresses. Might the closest world in which the Rational

Man

consents be one of these worlds in which he moves in and out of
arationality?

However, both the odd worlds solutions have only limited
appeal.
that

The

anyone

first
is

solution

is

nonsensical

- it is

both rational and arational

logical contradiction for
this state of affairs

meaningless to say

at the

same

time.

It is

a

anything to be both rational and arational;

cannot obtain
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at

any possible world.

do not believe that the second odd worlds solution

I

appropriate solution to the Rational

Man paradox

illustrates

Man

is

an

paradox. The Rational

an interesting problem. What are the

truth conditions for a counterfactual, C,

world to find a true antecedent for

C,

if

in traveling to

another

you have eliminated the

very conditions that must be held fixed for the consequent of C
to
obtain?

Counterfactuals about consent are precisely the

counterfactuals that suffer from this problem. Consider this

example:

"If

Nixon could consent, then he'd consent to our

cremating him". This counterfactual

world

in

which Nixon

is

alive

and able

consent to being burned to ashes. Yet,

would have wanted
Nixon

is

alive,

to be cremated.

in the closest possible

is false:

to consent
it

may

it

true that Nixon

Considering a world in which

and then dead, doesn't help us

this counterfactual; rather,

he does not

to better

understand

masks the problem of the true

antecedent that eliminates the possibility of a true consequent.
Briefly rational worlds offer

Man

paradox.

worlds
again,

-

we can

There

is

an ad hoc solution to the Rational

no true paradox

just wait

it

out until the Rational

and the paradox disappears. This

Rational

in the briefly rational

is

Man

no way

is

rational

to solve the

Man paradox.

Edward Wierenga

odd worlds

of his arationality for a brief

the following claim:

arational,

1

second objection to the second

solution. In briefly rational worlds, the Rational

who comes out

happen.

offers a

"1

seem

remember being
and now

to be in a

world

moment may make
in

which miracles

rational, then they told

my rationality is
86

back!

If

Man

me became
1

such miracles can

happen,
miracle

I

am a fool to consent

may occur, and

permanently.
the Rational

will

1

1

my own euthanasia

to

my rationality

could get

Man does

briefly rational

the Rational
I

Man

is

must be

offered.

odd world

resolves the problem.

A Second

We go

How do we

"If

very

much

- 1

like

/

in that

world

in that world.

-

world in which

am

is

buy low

my

not trading stocks in

an individual more

She

I'd

this counterfactual

here, in the actual world. But there

me

than anyone else

we

traded stocks.

I

to the closest possible in

am

A better solution

determine whether

counterpart trades stocks. Certainly
that world

solutions to the

Solution: Ideal Surrogates

Consider this counterfactual:

true?

not true^.

paradox.

Man paradox

is

is false,

"If

too miraculous to give a solution to

believe that neither of the

sell high."

back,

not offer consent, and the counterfactual

world

Rational

and

another

not consent." In the briefly rational world,

he were able to offer consent, then he would"

The

-

is

someone

like

me

my counterpart. Whenever

say of someone that he/she does something in another

possible world,

what we mean

is

that his/her counterparts

those things in other possible worlds.
individuals

-

we

exist in

We are

do

not trans-world

one world, and one world only^.

^Wierenga, pp. 411-412.
^David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds

.

Basil Blackwell,

1986, p. 213. Lewis

denies the possibility that there are trans-world individuals. There are
views about trans-world individuals, counterparts, and the interpretation
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There

is

a counterpart of mine

possible world. This world

is

who

trades stocks in another

the closest possible world to the

actual world that has a counterpart of mine

This counterpart

me

the individual in her world

is

than anyone else in her world.

very carefully. One day

and

sell high,"

true after

counterpart

We watch

to the

"If

all,

traded stocks,

1

1

One way

"If

of

lives in the

in that possible

which
sell

me

your counterpart has

to

buy

1

low,

and

my extensive

have a

high.

were you.

I'd
is

buy
go

to

position, but in

same job

as

you

in the

world your counterpart

of the relevant characteristics that

world that incline

high"

sell

same house, has the same breakfast

mornings as you do. But

many

The

my beliefs and

preferences. Perhaps your counterpart has the

has

1

which your counterpart holds your

many

like

"By low

to analyze this counterfactual

that world your counterpart has

do now,

more

would buy low and

trades stocks, she does buy low and

sell high."

in

is

her movements

for in the closest possible world in

who

world

who

my counterpart places an order.

Consider the following counterfactual,

low and

trades stocks.

my counterpart whispers into the phone.

counterfactual
is

who

sell

1

have

in the actual

high. In that world,

knowledge of the

stocks,

my

impressive connections in the bonds market. In that world, your

counterpart

is still

your counterpart but your counterpart thinks
,

about stocks the same way that
the

way

that

we understand

1

do

in the actual world.

the counterfactual,

"If

1

This

is

were you,

1

of counterfactuals other than Lewis'. However, in the interest of sunplicity
and brevity, I have chosen to consider the Rational Man paradox solely
from Lewis' perspective.
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would buy low and
counterparts

-

sell

We

high."

the counterpart

imagine one of your

who

also has

some of my

beliefs

and preferences.
Perhaps in the case of the Rational Man, we ought to
interpret the counterfactual "If the Rational

consent to his euthanasia, then he would"

understand counterfactuals
low and

sell

high."

like "If

We ought to go

I

Rational

Man

is

all

of the relevant

in the

able to

same way

were you, then

I

that

we

would buy

to the closest possible world in

which the Rational Man's counterpart
individual with

Man were

is still

beliefs

standing close-by.

comatose, but an

and preferences of the

This individual

is

the Rational

Man's counterpart's ideal surrogate: someone who has the Rational
Man's counterpart's desires, for these desires are the same desires
that the ideal surrogate has himself.

The Rational Man's

counterpart's ideal surrogate would want to be euthanized in

those cases in which he were to lose his rationality. As he stands

over the Rational Man's counterpart, he gives consent for the
Rational Man's counterpart's euthanasia. Thus,

Rational

Man would have wanted

it is

to be euthanized

true that the
if

he were

comatose, for in the case that the Rational Man's counterpart was

comatose, the Rational Man's counterpart's ideal surrogate would

consent to the Rational Man's counterpart's euthanasia. Positing

an

ideal surrogate

perhaps

it is

might solve the Rational Man paradox

the case that

to his euthanasia, then he

if

the Rational

would consent,

Man were

-

able to consent

for his ideal surrogate

does consent to the Rational Man's counterpart's euthanasia.
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There are advantages

to the ideal surrogate solution over

the previously considered odd-worlds solutions.
the ideal surrogate in solving the Rational
logically impossible, like the first

the ideal surrogate solution
all

the use of

Man paradox is

not

odd-world solution. Nor does

to address

fail

First,

one of the problems

for

counterfactuals about consent, like the second odd-worlds

solution. Second, in the ideal surrogate solution, the Rational

Man's counterpart

is

comatose

in the

world

in

which

his ideal

surrogate consents to the Rational Man's euthanasia. Thus
still

relevant to ask

if

euthanasia

is

it is

an appropriate option for the

Rational Man.

However, despite these advantages, the ideal surrogate
solution has deep problems. First, consider what the ideal

surrogate says of the Rational Man's counterpart in the world in

which he consents

to the Rational

He probably says something
would want
he

is

we determine
if it is

like "If

The

to be euthanized."

speaking truly

when he

Man's counterpart's euthanasia.
1

were

in his position,

then

1

ideal surrogate believes that

utters this counterfactual.

the truth of this counterfactual?

How do

We can determine

true only by going to the closest possible world in which the

ideal surrogate's counterpart

is

comatose, and determine

if

in that

world the ideal surrogate's counterpart would consent to being
euthanized. But the only

way

to

determine

this is to

have yet

another individual standing at the ideal surrogate's counterpart's
bedside

-

the ideal surrogate's counterpart's ideal surrogate. This

second ideal surrogate then looks down
first ideal

surrogate and says,

"If
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1

were

at the counterpart of the
in his position,

then

1

would want

to be euthanized." Yet a third ideal
surrogate

needed, at a fourth possible world, to determine
counterfactual

is

never determine

true. This goes
if

on

infinitely.

if

It

is

this

seems we can

the ideal surrogate speaks truly about whether

or not he would want to be euthanized.

However,

this

may

not be what the ideal surrogate

is

thinking. Perhaps he thinks this: the previously rational
agent in

front of

me

has ceased being rational. Rationality

condition for

life

being worth

necessary condition for
euthanized. This

but

it

may

living. Since this

being worth

life

-

Rational
will,

Man

Man

is

person has

much

faith in

a

line of reasoning,

Man and any

incredibly conceited.

has great faith in himself, and his

but he hasn't

lost

the problem of the

egocentric person. Imagine that the Rational

counterpart of the Rational

a necessary

then he should be

living,

be the ideal surrogate’s

runs against another problem

is

anyone

else.

own

He

The

strength of

believes,

mistakenly, that his counterpart does not share the beliefs that he
has,

even though

his counterpart certainly

The conceited Rational Man
1

am

ever comatose, but

1

says truly,

"1

does have those

want

beliefs.

to be euthanized

wouldn't put such words into other

people's mouths. Other people just don't have the strength of

character that

1

have." Imagine the possible world in which the

conceited Rational Man's counterpart

is

lying comatose, as his

conceited ideal surrogate stands at the bedside. The conceited
ideal surrogate

who

speaks on the Rational Man's counterpart's

behalf would say truly that he believes that the Rational Man's

counterpart would not want to be euthanized, although
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it is still

if

the preference of both the ideal surrogate, the
Rational Man's
counterpart, and the Rational

Man

to be euthanized

under these

circumstances. So even though the ideal surrogate speaks
on

behalf of the Rational Man's counterpart, the ideal
surrogate gives
the

wrong answer! Having an

Rational

Man paradox in

But the Rational

we

the case of a conceited Rational Man.

Man and

egocentric. This brings

surrogate solution.

ideal surrogate does not solve the

me

Who

is

his counterparts

to a final

may

not be

problem with the

this ideal surrogate

ideal

anyway?

Why do

require such a complicated apparatus to interpret a seemingly

straightforward counterfactual like

"If

he were able

to consent to

being euthanized, then he would consent to being euthanized."

The world
ours.

what

in

which ideal surrogates

Do we have
is

exist

is

very far away from

to travel such a great distance to

meant by counterfactuals about consent?

understand

It is

implausible

that ideal surrogates are required to understand otherwise simple

counterfactuals. There has got to be a

more natural

interpretation

of counterfactuals about consent than one that requires traveling
to very distant worlds

A third

and the postulation of an

solution to the Rational

The

First

Man paradox

is

ideal surrogate.

required.

Double Modality Solution

Perhaps we ought to reinterpret counterfactuals about
consent altogether.

Up

until

now,

1

was content

to read

counterfactuals about consent in the conventional
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way of reading

all
X,

counterfactuals.

consenting to
If

x's

A conventional counterfactual about an agent,
euthanasia, would read:

X were able to consent to x's euthanasia, then x
would consent to x's euthanasia

Formalized using David Lewis'

'a->'

symbol for counterfactual

implication, the above reads:

X

able to consent to x's euthanasia
x's euthanasia"^
is

iih>

x consents to

Those who endorse the double modality interpretation believe
that

we ought

read counterfactuals about consent with a double

to

modality, which

1

will call 'DCl' for the

'Double Counterfactual

Solution One':

DCl:

If X were able to consent to x's euthanasia, then x
would consent to being euthanized if x is ever

arational

Formalized,

X

is

->

DCl

reads:

able to consent
X is euthanized)

-> x consents to (x is arational

According to DCl, the consequent

is

would consent

in

to

about situations

a counterfactual about what x

which x

is

in a

coma

in

another possible world. In other words, rather than going to the
closest possible

world

in

which x

and ask him what he would want

's

in that world,

the closest possible world in which
^David Lewis, Counterfactuals

.

counterpart

x's

able to consent

we ought

counterpart

Basil Blackwell, 1973,
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is

p

1.

is

to

able to

go to

consent, and then ask him what he would
consent to for his

counterpart in the closest possible world to that world
in which

he

is

comatose. As

1

have just described counterfactuals about

consent, the Rational Man’s counterfactual consent
requires us to

consider three possible worlds:

world 1

world2

The Rational

The Rational

Man
tose

coma
and we

>

is

part

which

closest

possible world
in which the
counterpart of
Rational Man's

able to

consent to the
euthanasia of his
counterpart in

closest possible
in

is

The

—>

Man's counter-

look to the

world

worlds

counterpart

is

comatose
Figure 3.1:

The Rational Man Across Three Worlds

According to

comatose

this solution, the Rational

However,

in his actual world.

say truly of him that

if

he were able

to

it is

Man

is

lying

the case that

we can

consent to his euthanasia,

then he would consent. For we look to the the closest world

which he

is

able to consent,

counterfactual,

"I

and

in that

world he utters the

consent to being euthanized,

Thus, the Rational

Man paradox is

in

if

1

were comatose."

solved using the double

modality solution.
This solution does not require the postulating of an ideal
surrogate.

It is

true that

it is

complex, but

analysis of the counterfactuals

its

complexity

is

in the

and the postulating of other

possible worlds, not in the postulating of
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some

fantastic ideal

surrogate. This solution requires both a
double modality and two

cross-world analyses to understand counterfactuals
about consent.

While the conceptual apparatus
counterfactuals

understanding these

in

slightly complex,

is

to use counterfactuals in this way,

ideal surrogates

why

this version of the

Man paradox has
There

is

philosophically

mundane

whereas the postulating of

more extraordinary. This

far

is

it is

is

one reason

double modality solution to the Rational

merit.

a second reason

why

the double modality solution

has merit. The above description of the double modality solution
suggests that the world in which the Rational
(worldl),

and the world

in

exists (worlds) are not the

may

which

Man

actually exists

his counterpart's counterpart

same world. This

is

not necessary.

be that the closest world to worldl in which the Rational

has a counterpart

who

is

conscious

is

It

Man

world2, and the closest

world to worldZ

in

which world2's Rational Man has a counterpart

who

is

worldl. Since the counterpart relation

is

comatose

symmetric,

it

makes sense

that

one of the counterparts of the

actual Rational Man's counterpart

There

is

is

is

the actual Rational Mans.

not even any guarantee that the counterpart of the actual

Rational Man's counterpart has any other counterpart besides the
actual Rational Man.

It is

possible that the entire double modality

scenario requires only two worlds, and not three. In this case, the

cross-world comparison

is

simplified dramatically:

SLewis, p. 214.
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world!

world 2

The Rational Man is
comatose and we look

The Rational Man's counter-

—>

to

part who is able to consent
the euthanasia of
I

The Rational Man
Figure 3.2:

With

<

The Rational Man Across Two Worlds

this interpretation, the

double modality reading of

counterfactuals about consent makes a great deal of sense.

This

does seem to intuitively capture what we mean when we utter
statements of counterfactual consent on behalf of those

who

in the

the actual world can not consent themselves, but whose
counterfactual consent does relate to something in the actual

world.

When we

say

"If

he were able to consent to his own

euthanasia, then he would"
3.2.

We are

we

picture a scenario

in the actual world,

like Figure

with the Rational Man, thinking

about those actions to which he would give

his consent.

consider the closest possible world in which he
is

much

isn't

We

comatose, and

able to consent. In that world, he consents to his euthanasia in

the closest possible world in which he

which he

is

comatose

is

is

the actual world

comatose. That world in
-

we can

cite

counterfactual consent in an attempt to justify the Rational Man's

euthanasia in the actual world. This captures our common-sense
intuition about

what happens when we attempt

to justify^

someone's euthanasia via counterfactual consent.
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The double

modality reading of counterfactuals about consent
offers a
solution to the Rational

Man

paradox^.

However, there are several problems with

this version of

the double modality solution to the paradox of
the Rational Man.

The

first

problem

is

that

counterfactuals like

If

it

isn't clear that

seemingly simple

she were able to consent, then she would

consent" require the complex apparatus of a cross-world

comparison and a double modality.

Isn't

there a

more

straight-

forward approach to these counterfactuals than moving across two
worlds and including two counterfactuals

appears on the face of

been trained

in

it

in a

to include only one?

sentence that

Those who have not

philosophy would never think to consider that an

otherwise simple statement of counterfactual consent really

means something

A second

far

more complex.

objection to this solution considers the difference

between the solution that pictures the Rational Man across three
worlds and the solution that pictures the Rational
worlds.

It is

Man

across two

simpler to consider the two worlds solution

solution the actual Rational Man's counterpart

is

-

in that

consenting to his

counterpart's euthanasia in the actual world. But that solution

assumes that the

closest "comatose Rational

to the "conscious Rational

Man world"

^There

Man" world (worldl)

(world2)

is

the same world

is another advantage to the double modality solution. It offers a
straightforward parallel to cases in which patients have written Living
Wills that offer statements of assertoric antecedent consent or problematic
antecedent consent. For example, when there is assertoric antecedent
consent, the Living Will states "1 consent now ("now" corresponding to the
condition of the patient in world?) to being killed in those cases in which 1
am comatose ("the cases in which 1 am comatose" corresponding to the
condition of the patient in worldl). See Chapter IV.
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as the Rational Man's actual world.
Hence the arrow in the Figure
3.2 that points

world. But

back to worldl, instead of pointing out yet
a third

it is

not necessarily true that the closest comatose

Man world

Rational

fact is the first

to the closest conscious Rational

comatose Rational Man world. What

comatose Rational Man world
world

is

Man world
if

the closest

to the closest conscious Rational

not the actual world?

How would

this

in

Man

change the double

modality solution?
Figure 3.1 illustrates a case in which the Rational Man's

counterpart

is

not consenting to the euthanasia of the actual

Rational Man, but instead he

someone

else.

counterpart
is

is

It is

is

consenting to the euthanasia of

possible that the actual Rational Man's

consenting to the euthanasia of a counterpart

many worlds

who

away. This version of the double modality

solution doesn't allow that the Rational Man's counterpart

consenting to the euthanasia of all of his counterparts

-

he

is

may

only be consenting to the euthanasia of his very closest
counterparts.

If

the double modality solution guarantees

counterfactual consent only in the closest possible world to the

world

in

which the Rational Man's counterpart

consent, and that world

is

is

able to give

not the Rational Man's actual world,

then the double modality solution does not guarantee
counterfactual consent in the Rational Man's actual world. In

fact,

the double modality solution does guarantee counterfactual

consent only in the closest possible world to the world in which
the Rational Man's counterpart

world

is

is

able to give consent; the actual

not necessarily the closest world. Therefore, the double
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modality solution does not guarantee counterfactual
consent
Rational Man's actual world.

Any

in the

solution that does not guarantee

counterfactual consent in the actual world

is

not an appropriate

analysis of counterfactual consent, for the
point of the analysis
to

is

determine what a statement of counterfactual consent
on behalf

of the actual Rational
analysis

is

Man

means.

Thus, the double modality

not an appropriate analysis of statements of

counterfactual consent.

A Revised Double

However,

it is

modality solution.
modality solution

possible to breathe

The
is

Modality Solution

greatest

that

it is

Rational Man's counterpart

is

some

life

into the double

problem with the double

not necessarily the case that the

consenting to the euthanasia of the

actual Rational Man. Rather, the Rational Man's counterpart

consenting to the euthanasia of one of his counterparts,

is

who

is

not necessarily the actual Rational Man. One way to remedy this

problem

is

to qualify the counterfactual in the consequent of the

larger counterfactual with a necessity operator.

1

will call this

revision of the double modality solution DC2:

DC2:

If X were able to consent to x's euthanasia, then x
would consent to necessarily being euthanized if x
is

arational

DC2 may be open
X

is

->

to several interpretations, but

able to consent -> x consents to UK x
X is euthanized)
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is

1

take

it

to read:

arational

2

How does the DC2

reading succeed over the DCl reading? The
DCl

reading does not say anything about the world
in which the
patient should be euthanized.

according to DCl

for

is

The counterfactual consent given

any world that

world to the consent world

and

-

this

is

the closest comatose

world

is

not necessarily the

The Rational Man's counterpart may be

actual world.

giving

counterfactual consent, but not to the euthanasia of the
actual
Rational Man, but to one of his other counterparts.

The DC

reading does say something about the comatose world in which
the Rational Man's counterpart consents to being euthanized:

them! The Rational

Man

is

of

has counterfactually consented to being

euthanized in every possible world
actual world

all

in

which he

comatose. The

is

one of those worlds. Thus, the Rational Man's

counterpart has consented not merely to his counterparts'
euthanasias several worlds away, but he has consented to his
counterpart's euthanasia in the Rational Man's actual world.

However, DC 2

is

much

too strong to be a true reading of a

counterfactual about consent.
Rational
life

to

on

his earth

DC 2,

were

Man were

Imagine

a counterpart of the

an irreversible coma, but the existence of

in

would be destroyed by

that Rational

if

Man would

in those circumstances.

still

his euthanasia.

According

consent to euthanasia

But obviously this

is

false

-

he

if

the

Rational Man's counterpart would not have consented to

euthanasia

if

his entire earth

have thought that
longer rational,

life

it is

hung

in the balance.

was no longer worth

living

While he

may

once he was no

not the case that he would have consented to

being euthanized and taking his entire planet with him. In the
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world

in

which the Rational Man's counterpart

is

comatose, but his

euthanasia would have resulted in the destruction
of his entire
planet,

Thus,

DC 2

he would have hoped for a speedy, but natural death.

DC2

is

is

an incorrect reading of counterfactuals about consent.

too strong

-

a further revision will have to be

double modality solution for
It is

it

"If

possible to revise the double modality solution by

no one

else's

then the Rational
this solve

to the

to stick.

altering the second counterfactual.

stated

made

harm would

I

I

stated above

-

the second counterfactual

result

Man would consent

DC2's problems?

problem that

If

from

his euthanasia,

to his euthanasia",

don't believe

so.

It

may

would

solve the

the reluctance of the Rational Man's

counterpart to be euthanized in those worlds

in

which

his entire

earth would be destroyed by his euthanasia. But this solution
also unsatisfactory.
is life

is

Consider the possible worlds in which there

after death, acts of euthanasia are

suffering in hell for the person

and those people who are

who

punished by endless

dies as a result of euthanasia,

alive in that

world are entirely aware of

these facts. In those worlds, the Rational Man's counterpart would

not look forward to his body lingering in a meaningless existence

without rationality. However, he certainly would not have

consented to euthanasia

either, for fear of

what awaited him. The

Rational Man's counterpart in that world would hope for a speedy

natural death

if

he were to end up

in a

coma,

Man's counterpart whose euthanasia would

just as the Rational

result in the

destruction of his entire planet would hope for a speedy natural

death

if

he were

to

end up

in a

coma. Any attempts
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to fix

DC2 by

merely changing the circumstances that are
described
second counterfactual

will

not be sufficient to cover

One can always come up with
Rational

Man

in that

all

end up

in

the cases.

a counterexample in which the

world would not have consented to

euthanasia, and would have preferred a natural
death
to

in the

if

his

he were

a coma.

The problem with DC2

is

that

it is

too strong. In including a

necessity operator in the consequent of the larger counterfactual,

the result was that statements of counterfactual consent

committed us
clearly

to consent to acts of euthanasia in situations that

would not merit consent. The necessity operator made

counterfactuals about consent too strong. However, the necessity

operator did do some important work in the double modality
solution. Including the necessity operator guaranteed that the

Rational Man's counterpart, in giving counterfactual consent, was

counterfactually consenting to the actual Rational Man's

euthanasia in the actual world.

A true
the Rational

solution to the Rational

Man

Man paradox would

not have

consenting to his counterpart's euthanasias in

worlds which are significantly unlike the actual world: worlds

which the entire earth would be destroyed
were

to be euthanized, or worlds in

linger in hell forever

if

operator picked out too
individual
is

known

if

the Rational

in

Man

which he knows that he would

he were to be euthanized. The necessity

many conditions under which

as the Rational

Man

is

the

euthanized. However,

possible to limit the conditions under which the Rational

euthanized to the conditions he
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is

in at the actual world.

it

Man

An

is

actuality operator will perform this function.
implicit actuality solution offers both the

1

believe that

most elegant, and

ultimately the most intuitive, reading of
counterfactuals about
consent.

The

Implicit Actuality Solution

Consider the following counterfactual conditional:

would be

six feet tall,

then

understand

this counterfactual conditional?

to say that

I

counterpart

1

taller

than

It

doesn't

travel to the closest possible world in
six feet tall,

is

Obviously no one

is

world you choose.

and see

if

she

ever taller than she

is taller
is -

Yet, this counterfactual

were

1

How do we

am.

1

If

make

which

sense

my

than she

is.

no matter which
does make sense.

The way we understand such a counterfactual

is

by

recognizing an implicit modal operator in the consequent of
counterfactual conditional. This modal operator
'actual',

and

it

taller

than

the adjective

operates on sentences. Instead of the

counterfactual literally reading

be

is

I

'If

would have been

counterfactual in this way:

'If

I

I

were

six feet tall

(at six feet tall)',

were

six feet tall,

would have would be greater than the height

then

we read

in

which

counterpart

my counterpart

is taller

is

that

six feet tall.

by seven inches than

world, at five-feet, five-inches. There
in

understanding

this counterfactual
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-

is

I

am

would

this

then the height
I

I

actually have.'

We interpret this counterfactual by looking to the closest
world

I

possible

In that world,

my

in the actual

a cross-world comparison

we compare my

counterpart
world^.

s

The

height in another world with

my height in

the actual

implicit actuality reading of a counterfactual
about

consent, 'lA', will read as follows:

X were able to consent to x's euthanasia, then
x
would consent to being euthanized if x should ever
be in the medical condition x is actually in

lA: If

Formalized, using

to symbolize the actuality operator, the

above reads:
X

is able to consent to x's euthanasia p-> x
consents to
(x is in the condition, C, such that @(x is in C)
x is

->

euthanized)

Using the actuality operator,

another solution to the Rational
Rational

Man

consent"

we

it is

Man

he could consent to

"If

possible to

come up with

When we

say of the

his euthanasia, then

he would

paradox.

recognize an implicit actuality operator in the

counterfactual.

The Rational man's counterpart who

consent does give consent, but he gives consent

if

is

able to give

he should ever

be in the Rational Man's actual condition. The lA solution picks
out precisely the conditions under which the Rational Man's

counterpart would consent to euthanasia
actual condition.

The lA

solution

is

-

the Rational Man's

illustrated in the following

way:

^Lewis’ example, "If I had turned to crime, (the world) would have been
worse than it is" captures the same idea. Certainly no world is worse than
Rather, the world in which Lewis had
is - this is logically impossible.
turned to crime is worse than the actual world is. A cross-world
comparison is needed to properly understand this counterfactual

conditional (Lewis, p. 124).
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it

world 1

world 2

The Rational Man is
comatose and we look

The Rational Man's counter-

—>

to

part who is able to consent
the euthanasia of
I

The Rational Man

he
the condition that he

is

in

is

in here)

(if

|

|

<

The Rational Man's Counterpart Consents to the
Euthanasia of His Counterpart in the Rational Man's Actual
Figure 3.3.
Condition

Unlike

many

of the double modality solutions, the lA

solution does not confuse the conditions the Rational Man's

counterpart picks out

when he consents

of the problems with

DCl was

that

it

to being euthanized.

One

was unclear under which

conditions the Rational Man's counterpart was offering consent to

be euthanized

in,

the closest world.

world was

because he was only offering consent to acts
It

was not necessarily the case that the

in fact the actual world.

DC2 attempted

to

in

closest

remedy the

problem, by using a necessity operator to allow the Rational Man's
counterpart to consent to euthanasias in every world in which he

had a counterpart
in solving

in

a coma, including the actual world. However,

one problem, DC2 created another.

It is

true that

guaranteed that the Rational Man's counterpart consented

DC2

to the

actual Rational Man's euthanasia while he was in the condition of

being in a coma, but the counterpart also consented to the

euthanasia of

many counterparts

inappropriate,

and even

for

disastrous!
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whom consent would
Any attempt

be

to solve this

problem would allow that the Rational Man

offer consent only in

those conditions that were similar to his
own. But which

conditions were these?

The lA solution

clearly picks out

which conditions the Rational Man's counterpart
picks
the Rational Man's actual conditions.
Just as including an

precisely

out

-

implicit 'actuality' operator in counterfactuals
like "If
feet

tall,

then

I

would have been

taller

than

better understand these counterfactuals,

Man paradox can

it

1

I

were

am" helps us

six

to

seems that the Rational

be solved by including an implicit actuality

qualifier in the statement of counterfactual consent
that

we

utter

on behalf of the Rational Man«.
Figure 3.2 demonstrated the very best

DCl

scenario.

Optimally, the closest world to the world in which the Rational

Man's counterpart

is

able to consent in which the Rational Man's

counterpart has a counterpart

Man's actual world.

If

who

this is true,

is

in a

coma

is

the Rational

then the Rational Man's

counterpart consents to the euthanasia of the actual Rational Man.

However,

it is

not always the case that the DCl solution

this result.

The lA solution

With the lA

solution, the world that the Rational Man's

will

will

have

always have this result, though.

counterpart picks out as the world in which he would consent to a

counterpart being euthanized

is

always the actual world, for the

®The lA solution assumes that the 'actual world' always refers to the
Rational Man's actual world, and not to the actual world of the counterpart
who is offering consent. This is a rigid reading of the word 'actual', one
that always refers to a single world, as opposed to an unrigid, indexical
reading of 'actual'. Lewis, pp 92-94.
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Rational Man's counterpart consents to
the euthanasia of the

Man

Rational

only

if

he

is

in the Rational

Man's actual conditions.

Counterfactuals about consent often are stated in
the
following manner:

'If

x were able to consent to being euthanized,

then he would consent to being euthanized.'
However,

this

chapter establishes an important fact about
counterfactuals about
consent: while you

person

is

is

to travel to

is

true),

you must hold

fixed the conditions such that

consenting to to be euthanized

make

another world before a

able to consent to something (the world in which
the

consequent

he

may have

the antecedent true).

It

may

if

ever in them (the facts that

be the case that in traveling to

another world to find a true consequent, you have eliminated the
very conditions that must be held fixed for the antecedent
true. This

forced

me

problem, illustrated by the Rational
to

Man

to

be

paradox,

pursue another way of reading counterfactuals about

consent.

Given the
it is

lA's success in solving the Rational

Man

paradox,

important to recognize the double modality and implicit

actuality operator in every counterfactual about consent.

Counterfactuals about consent should be read to literally mean:

he were able

to consent to being euthanized, then

consent to being euthanized
actually

if

If

he would

ever in the condition that he

is in.9

would like to thank Fred Feldman, Phil Bricker, Willem deVries, Ned
Markosian, Morgem Hott and Jennifer Armstrong for their invaluable help
in writing this chapter.
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CHAPTER

IV

EVIDENCE FOR THE TRUTH OF

STATEMENTS OF COUNTERFACTUAL CONSENT
Actual statements of consent are performative
utterances,

and

as such have

appear

to

no truth valued Counterfactuals about
consent
.

have a truth value

- it is

agent would have consented to an

either true or false that an
act, if

he were asked.

evidence for the truth of these counterfactuals
through. The Rational

Man

is

But the

difficult to sort

paradox, discussed in Chapter

III,

demonstrates that counterfactuals about consent are not
analyzed
in the

same manner

as counterfactual conditionals that are not

about consent. In Chapter
conditional

'If

I, I

considered the counterfactual

kangaroos had no

tails,

they would

fall over.'

If

at

the closest possible world to the actual world in which
kangaroos

have no

tails,

they in fact do

kangaroos had no

tails,

fall

over, then the counterfactual

they would

fall

over'

is

'If

true.

Counterfactuals about consent can be analyzed using the

same

we

possible world semantics. However,

it is

not the case that

consider the closest possible world in which the counterpart of

the patient

is

able to consent to being killed and see

to his death in that

were able

to

world to determine

consent to his

Rather, the counterpart

^J. L.

is

own

he consents

the counterfactual

death, then he would'

is

'If

he

true.

consenting to a death of a patient in

Austin, "Performative Utterances",

A.P. Martinich,

if

if

Oxford University

The Philosophy of Language

Press, 1985, pp. 115-124.
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.

ed.

that patient's actual circumstances,
not the counterpart's

own

circumstances.

However,
patient

it is

the case that

the

counterpart would say to the question
'Would you

s

consent to being killed

were

we must determine what

in a

if

your circumstances were such that you

coma?' In this chapter

1

will

consider possible sources

of evidence for claims that a patient's
counterpart either consents
or denies consent. 1 will first consider two
objections that have

been raised to the claim that there are truth
values for
counterfactuals about consent. These are objections
from either

the lack of a fact of the matter about the
consequent of any

statement of counterfactual consent, or the overabundance
of facts
of the matter about the consequent of any statement
of
counterfactual consent.

be very strong.

1

will

Neither of these objections will prove to

then explore assertoric antecedent consent,

problematic antecedent consent, surrogacy, the "best interest"

and the

test

"rational agent" test as possible evidence for the truth of a

claim about counterfactual consent.

1

will

conclude that none of

these offers sufficient evidence to support a claim about what a
patient's counterpart consents to.

Two

Objections:

No Truth Values,

Some philosophers claim
too

weak

to

or Too

Many

that possible world semantics are

determine the truth values of any counterfactual.

Those who believe

this claim

may cite one

objections to the claim that there
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is

of two possible

a fact of the matter about

what a

patient's counterpart counterfactually
consents to.

The

an objection from the ciaim that
counterfactuals about
consent have no truth value at all. The
second is an
first is

objection

from the claim that counterfactuals about
consent have too many
truth values.

The objection from the claim
consent do not have truth values

is

that counterfactuals about
as follows. Counterfactuals

about consent are propositions about states of
affairs
in

very special circumstances, have not obtained.

we

say

"If

he were able to consent to our

would" in those cases
being killed^.

It is

in

killing

which the patient

is

that, except

Very rarely do

him, then he

able to consent to

not that there are no counterfactual

conditionals with antecedents that obtain in the actual
world.

Such counterfactual conditionals do have truth values. But
focus on the ones that do not
individuals like the Rational
in

-

specially, the

Man

consent to being

killed,

ones about

of the previous chapter,

an irreversible coma when we say of him

who

is

he were able to

"If

then he would." There

case in which a patient in an irreversible

us

let

will

never be a

coma will consent

to

anything. The antecedent of a counterfactual about what such a
patient

would consent

to, if

he were able to consent, never obtains

in the actual world.

Some philosophers claim
truth value at

all.

Drew

that such counterfactuals have

Christie has offered the

example of

determining what should be done about a terminally

^Such a case

is

diseased in the following chapter.

no

no

ill

relative.

3

No one will be

able to agree that

any course of action

would have wanted", because "there
say there

is is

to falsify the

This objection

is

moral

is

"What Dad

is

no objective truth and

to

situation."

closely tied to a type of objection

from

paternalism against using counterfactual consent
to justify acts of
euthanasia. If there is no fact of the matter
about what a patient

would have consented
agents

who

to,

had he been able

to consent, then those

try to use counterfactual consent to justify
their act of

euthanasia are not acting based upon what the patient
would

want

for himself, but

they want

what they want

for themselves.

If

what

to "further the patient's best interests", then

is

said that they are performing a paternalistic act

it

can be

intervening on a

-

person's behalf so as to promote his best interests without that
person's permission^.

When

the objection

is

raised that counterfactuals about

consent do not have truth values,

more

to

it

seems that the objection has

do with the moral weightiness of performance of an

act of

euthanasia than with the lack of a fact of the matter about the
truth value of counterfactual conditionals.

Would

philosophers object to the truth of the claim
this pen,

in the

it

would

fall

"If

I

were

down"? No. However, very

dropping of a pen. Much more

is

at stake

these
to let

go of

little is at

stake

when we

utter a

3Drew

Christie offered these comments at a reading of a version of Chapter
at the University of New Hampshire on November 17, 1994. Professor
Christie went on to argue that the project undertaken in Chapter III, an
III

attempt to analyze what counterfactuals about consent mean, is a fruitless
one precisely because there is no fact of the matter about the truth of any
counterfactual.

was also raised at the reading
Hampshire, by Professor Val Dusek.
"^This objection

Ill

at the University of

New

counterfactual about consent in an
attempt to justify the taking of
a life. Perhaps the reluctance of an
agent to assign a truth value
to a counterfactual

believe that there

about consent

is

no

will lead

fact of the

test the truth

it

may

may argue

that

if

would be prohibitive

me

for

for,

is

consent

is

no

to, if

fact of the

exist.

to argue against this radical
it

to say that

at the least controversial.

the reason for the mistake,
that there

A radical

then they simply do not

empiricist view at this point, but suffice
radical empiricist view

false.

the truth values of counterfactuals

about consent cannot be tested
It

be argued that since we

of a counterfactual about consent,

such statements must be neither true nor
empiricist

to erroneously

matter about the truth value of

counterfactuals about consent. Or,

can never actually

him

it is

such a

Regardless of

nonetheless a mistake to claim

matter about what an agent would

he does not consent.

The objection from the claim
consent have too

many

that counterfactuals about

truth values

is

as follows.

possible world in which the patient's counterpart

If
is

in the closest

able to

consent to being euthanized, he consents to being euthanized

were comatose
were able

in

he

in the actual world, then the counterfactual "If he

to consent, then

case in which there

world

if

which the

is

he would"

is

true. But consider the

more than one world which

patient's counterpart

is

is

the closest

able to consent.

Consider two worlds, wl and w2, and their relation to the
patient's actual world. Let us say that both

wl and w2

are

equally close to the patient's actual world, and that there

other world that

is

closer to the actual world in which the

112

is

no

patient

counterpart can consent than either wl or
w2. Imagine
that in wl the patient's counterpart
does consent to being
euthanized if he were comatose in the actual
world. In w2,
however, the patient's counterpart refuses to
consent to being
euthanized if he were comatose in the actual
world. We can no
longer say that the patient either would or
would not consent to
s

being euthanized

if

he were able to consent

that he might consent.

It is

-

at best

not the case that there

we can

is

no

fact of

the matter about what the patient's counterpart
consents
rather, there are too

say

to;

many. He might have consented, he might

not have; each state of affairs

is

equally possible in the actual

world.
If

the patient merely might have consented to being

euthanized, then

we can not use

an attempt to morally
in

Chapter

II,

a counterfactual about consent in

justify his euthanasia.

As

1

have discussed

counterfactual consent can morally justify some acts

of euthanasia. But that

is

would have consented.

true only

If

if it

can be said that a patient

the patient might,

might not, have consented, then

it

and

same time

at the

cannot be said that the patient

would have consented. Without the true claim that the patient

would have consented, the counterfactual may not be invoked.
Hence,

my adoption of Robert C.

assumption

-

for every

possible world

from

i .5

^Robert

i,

there

Thus, there

Stalnaker's uniqueness

non-empty proposition A and
is

is

at

for every

most one A-world minimally

no more than one world which

C. Stalnaker, Inquiry,

MIT

Press, 1987, p. 133.
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different

is

the

closest

world to the actual world

in

which the

counterpart can consent to being euthanized

patient's

if

he needed to be

euthanized.

Although

1

have adopted Stalnaker's methodology

determining the truth conditions for counterfactuals,
say that the counterfactual

"If

in

this

he were able to consent to

death, he might have consented"

is false,

is

not to

his

or meaningless. In such

a counterfactual, the word 'might' could have
one of two

meanings.

First,

those things that "might" have happened

may be

those states of affairs that possibly happen in some
world,

perhaps the closest possible world, perhaps one a

little

further

away. This way of reading "might" counterfactuals establishes
a
metaphysical point about the possibility of the truth of such
counterfactuals.

When

might have won the
world
is

in

which

1

say

lottery,"

"If
I

1

had bought

mean

that there

my counterpart does win

ticket this week,

1

is

some

possible

the lottery. That world

not necessarily very close though; rather, the state of affairs

not logically impossible. That

bought a
latter
close.

date,

ticket this

week,

1

is

not the same as saying

would have won the

statement implies that the world in which

if

only

I

1

won

had played those lucky numbers

would have won, because

in fact those

were

this

"If

lottery."

Perhaps the winning numbers were 04-22-67,

and

1

1

is

had

The

is

rather

my

birth

this

week,

1

week's winning

numbers. Second, those things that "might" have happened may
be those states of affairs that happen
in saying they "might"

idea

how

far

in

have happened

away the world

in
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1

some

possible world, but

concede that

which those

1

have no

states of affairs

obtain

is.

This

way of reading "might"

counterfactuais establishes

an epistemic point about such counterfactuais.

"If

Harry and

Sally

hadn't gotten a divorce, then they might
have been happy
together."

happy, but

I

I

don't

know enough

to say

if

they would have been

won't rule the possibility out. The closest
possible

world in which their counterparts didn't get a
divorce may have
been one in which they were happy, and it may be
one in which
they were not. Both of these are readings of the
"might"

counterfactual that do not incorporate
possible worlds. Either one, or both,

counterfactual

"If

he were able

ties for

closeness

may be what

is

among

meant by the

to consent to being killed, then

he

might have consented". However, given Stalnaker's uniqueness
assumption,

it is

a mistake to assume that the "might"

counterfactual implies that the worlds in which the patient

consents to being killed and denies consent are equally near.

Antecedent Consent: The Living Will

Derek Humphry introduces the notion of a Living

Will:

you have not already done so, sign a Living Will and
have it witnessed. Get the one that is valid for your
particular state. This document is an advance
declaration of your wish not to be connected to lifesupport equipment if it is adjudged that you are
hopelessly and terminally ill^.
If

^Humphry, p. 21. PhiUipa Foot, who calls Living Wills "eminently
would concur with Humphry's view that if you have not already
done so, you should sign a Living Will. PhiUipa Foot, "Euthanasia", Virtues
and Vices University of Califomia Press, 1978, p. 59.
sensible",

.
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^

If

a patient

is

able to

time, while he

make a
able to

is still

decision, his statement

declaration of his wishes ahead of

make a

rational

and informed

would be either one of assertoric

antecedent consent, or problematic antecedent
consent.

Immanuel Kant introduces the

distinction between assertoric

hypothetical imperatives and problematic
hypothetical
imperatives:

A

hypothetical imperative thus says only that an
action is good for some purpose or other,
either
possible or actual. In the first case it is a

problematic practical principle; in the second case

an assertoric practical
By

principle.

'assertoric antecedent consent'

that

an agent gives before the

I

mean

a statement of consent

state of affairs that

the agent's need to give consent has obtained,

such a state of affairs

will obtain.

Lou Gehrig's disease may
ever in a
is

coma and am

say,

"I

would

when

result in

clear that

it is

For example, the patient with

consent to your

relying solely

on

life

me

killing

machines

if

I

am

to survive"

a statement of assertoric antecedent consent. Lou Gehrig's

Disease will inevitably result in the patient lying in a coma,
relying solely

on

life

support machines to survive. The patient

consented for you to perform an action before the
sadly inevitable that the time will

come

fact,

and

it is

that such consent will be

needed. By 'problematic antecedent consent'

I

mean a statement

of consent that an agent gives before the state of affairs that
^Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphvsic of Morals ed. H.J.
Paton, Harper and Row, 1964, p. 82.
,
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would

when

result in the agent's
it is

need

to give consent has obtained,

not clear that such a state of affairs

example, consider a

he would end up

man with

in a

coma, but such a

solely

on

life

killing

machines

me

if

1

For

cancer whose doctors predicted that

guaranteed as part of his prognosis.
consent to your

will obtain.

am

If

state of affairs

such a

ever in a

to survive",

man

was not

said to you,

coma and am

"1

relying

he would be offering you

actual consent about a possible, but not
guaranteed, state of

He has

affairs.

action, but

it is

in the action

actually consented to your performance of an

not clear that the state of affairs that would result

he has consented to

will obtain. Either assertoric

antecedent consent or problematic antecedent consent

may be

used as evidence to support the truth of a statement of
counterfactual consent.

A

Living Will

may

be either an expression of assertoric

antecedent consent, or problematic antecedent consent.

If

an

agent writes a Living Will with no expectation that the state of
affairs will obtain

such that the Living Will

be invoked, then

will

the Living Will documents the agent's problematic antecedent
consent.

The agent

is

giving consent to a course of action

if

a

certain state of affairs obtains, but he has no expectation that such

a state of affairs will obtain. He just wants to be prepared for that

contingency.

If,

however, the agent writes a Living Will with the

expectation that the state of affairs will obtain such that the
Living Will will be invoked, then the Living Will
assertoric antecedent consent.
will

come

is

a statement of

The agent recognizes

that the time

that others will have to decide whether or not to
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terminate his

life

support,

before the time has

come

and he
for the

them consent

offers

life

to

do so

support to be terminated.

Of course, there are other forms of assertoric
antecedent
consent or problematic antecedent consent
than Living
patient

may have merely

writing

it

down,

if

Wills.

A

discussed what he would want, without

he ever were on a

life

support machine.

An

accurate reporting of that conversation could serve
as evidence
for the truth of a statement of counterfactual
consent. But such

informal statements of assertoric antecedent consent or

problematic antecedent consent are of course very

difficult to

verify.

Problems for Antecedent Consent

One problem

for both assertoric antecedent consent

problematic antecedent consent

consent that are

made

is

that both are statements of

long before the patient

is

faced with a

mortal decision. Consider the Living Will that states

my

life

and am

support machines being turned
relying solely

thus consents

is

on machines

not in a coma

support machines turned

off.

off, if

1

to survive.'

'1

consent to

am ever

in a

coma

The agent who

when he consents
In

and

to having the

life

most cases the agents who are

making such a prediction have never been

in a

coma.

How can

the

agent make an informed decision about a state of affairs he has

never experienced?

Both assertoric antecedent consent and

problematic antecedent consent are offered long before the
patient has experienced the state of affairs that directly precedes
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the action to which he

is

consenting.

Can such consent

possibly be

informed?

There are two replies to the objection that
assertoric
antecedent consent and problematic antecedent
consent to acts of
euthanasia are not informed, and thus should not
be used as
evidence to support the truth of a claim about
counterfactual
consent.

The

first is

that

may be

it

true that most people

who

give assertoric antecedent consent or problematic
antecedent

consent have never been experienced states of affairs similar
to
those they describe in their Living Wills, but some of them
have

experienced similar states of

have been

in

comas or have

There are some people who

affairs.

relied

on

life-support machines, have

recovered, and after their ordeals have written Living Wills.

It is

the case that their consent to be killed in case they are in a coma,

or have their

However,

it is

life

support machines turned

the case that not every individual

Living Will has experienced being in a

support machines.

one

- it

off, is

I

contend that

coma or

this reply is

does not demonstrate that

all

informed.

who

writes out a

relying

on

life

not a very strong

cases of assertoric

antecedent consent and problematic antecedent consent are
informed.

The second, stronger

reply,

of antecedent consent before the

is

that

fact,

we

even

often offer statements
if

we

something we have never experienced before.

problem offering consent
will offer this

to

in

many of these

We

have no

cases. For example,

statement of antecedent consent:

your invading

are consenting to

I

hereby consent

my personal space and giving me CPR,
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I

if

you

ever rescue

even come

me from

close.

drowning'.

never drowned;

I

am confident that

my antecedent consent would

if

that statements of antecedent consent ask
agents to

judgements about

The objection

make

states of affairs they are ignorant of,

they are not statements of informed consent,

is

my

such a situation

stand.

still

never

I've

never been given CPR. Yet, despite

I've

ignorance in these matters,
arose, that

I've

and thus

not very

convincing.

Or perhaps

would

let

on.

I

(or not given!)
life is like

at least

-

more convincing than

it is

don't

CPR

know what

in

it is

drown, or to be given

such an instance. But

I'm pretty pleased with

one of the

like to

my drowning analogy

alternatives,

and

it.

feel

do know what

I

I

am

I

could do

my

well acquainted with

much worse

than to have that alternative actualized. But the healthy agent

making out

his Living Will

has never experienced
the patient

is

.

is

choosing

among

The Hasting Center Report claims

responsible to "consider

all

A patient

There

is

just too

that

How

is

this

even

simply can not be responsible to consider

possible alternative futures

much

and appropriately plan

to consider.

At least

my alternatives

consent that you try to keep

me

consent to acts of euthanasia, the agent

for them.

holds for

In cases of

who

all

am somewhat

I

acquainted with what one of

alive.

he

possible alternative

futures that the patient might experience." ^
possible?

alternatives that

is

me when

antecedent

offering consent

is

unable to make an informed choice.
^ Guidelines

on the Tennination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care
of the Dying. Hastings Center, 1987, p. 21.
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I

There

is

consent that

a second problem for both types of
antecedent

is

closely related to the

an uninformed choice. What

if

problem of the agent making

the writer of the Living Will

changes his mind? Consider the agent who
makes out a Living
Will that says "If

machines

to

an accident and

am
me

keep

die peacefully".

stay alive.

I

ever relying solely on
alive, please

is

forced to rely solely on

While she

is

life

support machines to

unable to respond to her doctors, she has
is

going on around

She changes her mind, however. She realizes that

in

What happens when

her hospital room to discuss the

located her Living Will

and are planning

support machines? They

cite

fact that

this is not

the doctors

they have

to shut off the

life-

her antecedent consent in her Living

Will as evidence for a claim about counterfactual consent

believe that

shut

off,

if

to

After making out the Living Will, she meets
with

so horrible an existence for her.

meet

support

remove them and allow me

a complete understanding of everything that
her.

life

-

they

she were able to consent to having the machines

then she would. They are wrong, of course.

Now

that she

has changed her mind, her Living Will does not reflect what she
currently wants for herself.

If

she were able to withdraw the

consent she had given in the Living

Will,

she would do

so.

The Hastings Center Report considers the problem of
changing your mind.

It

advises that "the individual should review

the directive (eg: the Living Will) eveiy^ one or two years to

ensure that
individual

it

continues to represent his or her wishes. The

may make additions,

121

changes, and deletions at any

time. 9 Similarly, the person

may revoke

the directive at any

time. However, this

recommendation doesn't say enough. Our
preferences may change more rapidly than
once "every one

or

two years"

-

this is

preferences.

important to
it

altogether,

possible to

it

represents our

More importantly, the moment when it is most
make changes to the Living Will, or perhaps revoke
is

do

qualified to

not enough to ensure that

probably the very

so.

know

Only after
if

it is

moment when

it is

no longer

too late will the patient be

the directive in the Living Will

is

what she

wants at that moment.

Dan Brock does not

mind

is

believe that the changing of a patient's

as serious a problem as

I

have claimed, when the patient's

decision-making capacities have been impaired:

At least when our future decision-making capacities
be impaired, there is nothing morally
objectionable, in itself, in our present self binding our
future self in a way which will be contrary to the
desire of the future self. This is a function in part of
the fact that we each view ourself as one single self
that continues over time, so that it is my future that
my present action seeks to control. Odysseus lashed
himself to the mast for just such purposes... lo
will

Brock's point
selves, that

we

desire

may

is

we

that sometimes

we

desire things for our future

nonetheless are unable to recognize as the things

when

the time comes to actualize our choice.

resolve to go

on a

diet.

Today

Tomorrow may be tempted by
1

The Hastings Center, p. 81.
l*9Dan Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 104.
9,
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1

chocolate, but by resisting the chocolate

my desires. When we
we

truly want,

it

I

am

true to myself

are likely to be tempted

makes sense

about what we want, even

for us to

we appear

if

away from what

make antecedent
to

and

claims

change our minds

in

the future. Brock's argument works only in
cases in which our
future decision-making capacities are impaired,
however. In the
case

I

described above, in which the patient changes her
mind

after realizing that her circumstances are not
so bad,

Brock say? What
fine,

if

what

will

the patient's decision-making capacities are

but the patient's decision- expressing capacities are not?

This remains a problem for

all

statements of assertoric antecedent

consent and problematic antecedent consent.

The Hastings Center Report claims

that a Living Will dictates

"what form of care (the patient desires) under various
circumstances."
Living Will can

Unfortunately, however, the best that the

do

is

dictate the

form of care that the patient

desires at the time that he composes the Living Will

There

is

no guarantee that a statement of assertoric antecedent consent or
problematic antecedent consent reflects the patient's desires at
the time that the directive in the Living Will

Problems such as the

fact that a patient

views will be until after he

is

is

carried out.

can not know what his

unable to change his Living

Will,

or

the agent's changing his or her mind, prevent the Living Will from
effectively demonstrating

what a patient would counterfactually

11 Hastings Center, p. 13.
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consent

toi2.

in light of this, assertoric antecedent
consent

and

problematic antecedent consent cannot be used as
accurate
predictors of the actions to which

we can

ascribe an agent's

counterfactual consent.

Durable Powers of Attorney and Surrogacy

There are three cases

in

which a patient

a rational and informed choice for himself.

is

not able to

A patient

make

may no

(a)

longer be able to express his rational and informed choice. In
this case, the patient has preferences, but

them. The patient

and

(b)

to express rational

while the patient

is

may have

lost his

and informed

able to express

is

unable to articulate

both his ability

to

make

decisions. In this case,

some

things,

he

is

no longer

able to express rational or informed wishes about his case, for his

capacity for rational thought has

left

him. In these cases,

it is

often assumed that someone else will either articulate the

make

decisions, or

decisions, for him.

Finally,

a patient

(c)

may

have never been able to make a rational and informed choice for
each of these cases, either a Durable Power of

himself.

In

Attorney

will

be cited to

name

a surrogate, or a surrogate will be

assigned.

Humphry

introduces the notion of a Durable Power of

Attorney:

l^Brock mentions two other legal and/or practical problems with the type
of antecedent actual consent or antecedent predictions of consent found in
Living Wills: not enough people have Living Wills, and the legal effects of
advance directives are often hmited by the language of Living Wills. See
Brock, pp. 154-155.
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A more

potent document [than the Living Wili] is the
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, which,
in
different forms, is available in all American
states.

Here you assign to someone
health care decisions

if

else the power to make
and when you cannoti^.

Durable Powers of Attorney allow for a friend or

relative,

someone who is/was aware of the values and preferences of the
patient, to be asked to
cases, the patient

is

make

the decision for the patient. In these

unable to make such decisions on his own, but

the patient at one time was able to express and

No

decisions.

Living Will exists

from the patient about
affairs
it is

up

had obtained.
to friends

and

his wishes

individuals

now

is

own

no formal statement

that the current state of

relatives to

make

a choice on behalf of the

Power of Attorney allows agents

on behalf of the patients they

who

his

Instead, such circumstances have occurred,

patient. Effectively, the Durable

to give consent

there

-

make

represent. Those

are given decision-making power by Durable

Powers of Attorney are called "surrogates".
All cases of

Durable Power of Attorney are cases in which

the patient previously consents to having someone else
decisions on his behalf.

make

his

The use of a Durable Power of Attorney

to

assign surrogacy demonstrates one of two types of cases in which

surrogacy

may

be employed. In the

first

case the patient

is

unable to express and/or articulate a rational preference. Perhaps
the patient has

become

senile

-

at

one time he was able

to express

a rational preference, but no longer. In such cases, the patient

l^Humphry,

p. 22.
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may have
Attorney

)

explicitly
,

named

or a surrogate

cases represent (a)
section. In the

and

his surrogate (with a Durable

may

(b),

Power of

be chosen for the patient.

These

introduced at the beginning of

this

second case the patient never was able to
express

a rational preference. Perhaps the patient

is

an

infant, with

rational capacity, or a severely retarded
individual of

any

no

age. In

such cases, the surrogate was obviously chosen for
the patient.
These cases represent (c), introduced at the beginning
of this

section.
It

should be noted that there

is

a crucial difference between

a Living Will and the use of a surrogate.

wishes of an individual
in the future.

When

In this case, the
little

or

when

Will states the

certain states of affairs obtain

writing a Living Will, a person will ask

"What do I want (now),

himself,

as

if

A Living

if

c

were

to obtain in the future?"

person projects himself into the future, changing

as possible about himself so as to accurately be able to

assess his circumstances.

The person imagines the

world

and determines what he presently wants

in

which

c obtains,

closest possible

for himself in those future circumstances.

The surrogate

states

what he believes the wishes of the

individual he represents to be as certain states of affairs obtain in

the present.

The surrogate asks

want done now that

c

himself,

has obtained,

When

if

"What would

he were able to

my friend
tell

me?"

the patient lacks the capacity to make the
treatment decision, so that a surrogate decisionmaker
has decisionmaking authority instead, the surrogate
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should seek to choose as the patient
would
were able
(italics mine)

It is

if he

or she

important to stress that the surrogate chooses
not what

he wants for the patient, but rather "decide(s)
as the patient
would have decided if he or she had been competent." is

The

surrogate

the patient's advocate. Optimally, the surrogate
has a

is

close personal relationship with the patient,
so that the surrogate
will

be a good predictor of the the patient's

preferences. Of course,
is

to the patient, the

it is

a parent

more the

surrogate's assessment of what
will

be shaped by his

and not the preferences of the

may be

and

possible that the closer the surrogate

should be done with the patient
preferences,

beliefs

own

patient. For example,

the best judge of what a child would want for

herself, but the parent's

recommendation may be

closer to

what

the parent wants for the child, not what the child would want for
herself.

Another crucial difference between a Living Will and a
surrogate
for his

lies in

own

the distinction between a patient giving consent

treatment, and someone other that the patient giving

consent for the patient's treatment. The Hastings Center

summarizes the

distinction: in Living Wills the attending physician

"follow(s) the patient's explicit directive",

whereas surrogates

determine what should be done by "applying the patient's
preferences and values".

^

"^Hastings Center, p. 27. See also The Boston Globe Thursday, May 26, 1994,
"Drop Presumption to Live, Journal Urges", about the role of the surrogate
to consent to what the "person would have wanted".
.

l^Brock, p, 155.
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6

one case the patient seemingly has made a
claim about
what he wants for himself, whereas in the other
case the
In

surrogate makes a claim about what he believes
the patient would

want

for himself. 1

Problems for Surrogacy

There are several problems for surrogacy.

problem of agents whose preferences are
expressed by a surrogate.

The

in principle

a

first is

unable to be

The following case serves

as an

example:

The Case of Scrooge
old man. Everyone

.

Scrooge was an unkind, curmudgeonly

who knew him knew

certainly true of him: he hated to
to,

and he hated when people

someone

said,

that two things were

do what other people

tried to predict his behavior.

"Scrooge will want the cherry

pie,"

who

When

was appointed

fell

into a coma, a surrogate

wanted something

on Scrooge's

behalf, Scrooge

to

make
knew was

would have

different. After a night of deliberation, the

surrogate declined his role as a surrogate.

would have chosen,
wishes.

If

tried to guess his tastes.

decisions about Scrooge's health care. All the surrogate
that whatever he chose

him

he would choose

the apple pie, just to spite the person

he

told

it

No matter what he

would have been contrary

The case of Scrooge

illustrates

one way

to Scrooge's

in

which

l^See Chapter II for Thomas Scanlon's discussion of the value of an agent
choosing for himself over having another individual make a choice on his
behalf.
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surrogacy can

fail to

represent a patient's wishes.

a patient’s

If

wishes are in principle unable to be expressed
by others, then no
surrogate can ever speak on his behalf.

While

believe in principle that this

I

notion of surrogacy,

may

Scrooge

it

may

is

a problem for the

not be so great an

be too esoteric

-

The case of

issue.

perhaps there are no Scrooges, and

the lesson of Scrooge has no practical application.
This
true,

and the case may not demonstrate

surrogacy

is

may be

sufficiently that

flawed. However, there remain other problems with

surrogacy.

Presumably the surrogate knows the
of the patient for

whom

he

is

beliefs

uttering a statement of

counterfactual consent. However, two points
question. First,

and preferences

how well must

the surrogate

may

be called into

know

the patient

before he

is

qualified to speak

surrogate

is

expected to know the patient's "preferences and

values" 17, but sometimes this

on the

is

patient's behalf?

The

impossible. As with assertoric

antecedent consent and problematic antecedent consent, the
patient
to, if

he

is
is

not always in a position to
forced to choose

not acquainted.
patient

How

would want

is

among

know what he would consent

alternatives with

which he

is

the surrogate supposed to state what the

for himself,

if

the patient himself would not

have known?

A second problem
who never had

involves the surrogates for individuals

preferences about euthanasia. Small infants.

l^Hasting Center, p. 28.
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chUdren, and mentally incapacitated individuals
decisions

who

never made

and never had preferences nonetheless have
surrogates

who make important
individual

s life

decisions about terminating these

support machines. These are the nonvoluntcuy^2

cases that were discussed in Chapter IP^. in

surrogates

may

consented

to,

many

cases the

not consider what these individuals would have

had they been able

to consent.

cases such considerations are made^^.

there are two possible

means

When

for determining

individuals would have consented

to,

However, in some
they are made,

what such

even though they never had

consented to anything previously. These are the Best Interests
Standard and the Rational Agent standard.

The Best
patient

is

Interests Standard. In

we make

have consented

to:

the following claim about what he would

he would have consented to

action, because this

is

what would be best

would an agent have consented
This line of reasoning
it is

cases in which the

unable to consent, and never had consented to anything

in the past,

II,

some

to,

this course of

for him^o.

but that which

is

what

else

best for him?

however. As mentioned

in

Chapter

a mistake to say that what an agent consents to

is

by

definition

what

is

is

faulty,

best for him. Similarly,

what

is

best for an

^^See David H. Smith’s "On Letting Some Babies Die", Killing and Letting Die
ed. Bonnie Steinbock, Prentice-Hall, 1980, pp. 92-108, for the view that all
cases of euthanasia of newborns are involuntary euthanasia, not

nonvoluntary euthanasia.
l^James Rachels claims that in cases in which infants or mentally
handicapped people are euthanized, there is no sense in which the
patient's wishes were taken into account. See James Rachels, The End of
Life: Euthanasia and Morality Oxford University Press, 1986. p. 60.
.

^^Hastings Center, p. 28.
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,

agent

is

Consent

not by definition what the agent would
have consented

may

be one of several factors that contributes
to the

goodness of any alternative, but consent alone
determine which alternative
Furthermore, what

one

to the next.

physical pain
strength,
best.

to.

and

is

Some

is

is

is

not sufficient to

the best.

'best" for

an individual

differs

from

individuals believe that living without

their best alternative. Others value

autonomy and

believe that fighting death every step of the

way

is

Ronald Dworkin recounts the story of a seventy-six year old

widow who refused

to give consent to a "do not recessitate" order,

and whose family upheld the woman's wishes based on a family
"tradition to fight to the bitter end".2i For this
Interest standard

seems

woman, the

Best

to indicate that a great deal of pain

and

suffering were in her best interests, counter to our intuitions

about what

know about

is

in a person's best interest.

The doctors needed

to

the woman's history and beliefs before they could do

what was best

for her.

How can we

apply a Best Interests

Standard though to infants and the mentally handicapped, about

whom we know

so

little?

The Rational Agent standard.
Interests Standard

is

A variation on

the Best

the Rational Agent standard^2.

Rational Agent standard, individuals

who

Using the

are killed by

nonvoluntary2 euthanasia have the property of being rational
Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion.
Euthanasia, and Individuail Freedom Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, pp. 186-187.
21 Ronald

.

22Michael

J.

Resnik claims that "rational actions [are], in other words,
in one's best interest" to perform. See Michael J. Resnik.
Introduction to Decision Theory. University of Minnesota Press,

[those] that [are]

Choices:

1987, p.

An
6.
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agents counterfactually ascribed to them.
Hence,

we

say of them,

they were rational agents and able to
consent to their own
death, given their present circumstances,
then they would consent
"If

to their death.

Brock says "Lacking any knowledge of this

particular patient's wishes, such decisions
will inevitably involve

asking what most reasonable persons would
want for themselves
in the circumstances." 23

The Hastings Center says

that in these

cases the surrogate should "choose as a reasonable
person in the
patient's circumstances would." 24

The Rational Agent standard may
the Best Interests Standard.

If

in fact just collapse into

a rational agent

is

merely one who

always acts in accord with his best interests, then the two are
the
same.

It

one who

makes
is

little

able to

sense to say that a rational agent

make informed judgments about

is

merely

his

circumstances, without also incorporating some criteria of

preference ordering into the notion of the rational agent.
true,

then

all

If

this is

of the problems for the Best Interests Standard will

be shared by the Rational Agent standard.

A

final

problem with both the Best

the Rational Agent standard

For example,

if

is

that both

Interests

may

the Best Interests Standard

is

Standard and

be too objective2s.
useful in

determining what ought to be done for a small infant, then

presumably anyone can make a claim about counterfactual
consent on the infant's behalf.

However,

23Brock, p. 155.
24Hastings Center, p. 28.
25xhis problem was raised by Fred Feldman.
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this is

not what

is

commonly done.
in these cases

-

Parents are believed to have a privileged
status

their

judgment about what an infant would

counterfactually consent to

is

the infant's doctor26. But

both are using a Best Interests

if

held in higher regard than that of

standard for determining what

is

best to

do

for the infant,

why

should the parent's statement of counterfactual
consent be
necessary?

Why couldn't

the parents show up at the hospital one

afternoon to find their dead infant, and the doctor calmly

them
after

that his euthanasia of the infant
all,

telling

was permissible because

the infant would have wanted what was best for

himself?27

Ruth Macklin argues that since there

between who

is

Macklin

may

a distinction

authorized to give consent and

advocate for the child, that perhaps in
authorized to

is

kill

who

this case the

is

the best

doctor was

the infant without the parent's permission's.

be taking too radical a "rational agent" standard,

however. Our intuitions

may

lead us to believe that what the

doctor did was wrong because we counterfactually not only
ascribe rationality to the infant, but also
beliefs

and preferences. For example,

and would have

if

some of the

parent's

the parents are Catholic

raised their child to be Catholic, then

we would

counterfactually ascribe Catholic views, including the view that
^^Smith upholds the view that the parents have the right of surrogacy
over the iiifant's doctor; p. 95.
2^The Hastings Center, which says that one of the doctor's obligations is to
respect the considered choice of the patient or the patient's surrogate,
would find this to be morally wrong, Hastings Center, p. 19.
^®Ruth Macklin, "Autonomy, Beneficence and Child Development", Social
Research on Children and Adolescents Ethical Issues, ed. Barbara Stanley
and Joanne Sieber, Sage Publications, 1992.
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euthanasia was morally wrong, to the infant.
Thus, the child

is

understood not merely as a rational agent, but
one with many
potential beliefs

and preferences along with

Brock would agree with

rationality.

this reply to Macklin.

Brock gives

two reasons for preferring statements of
counterfactual consent
from the patient's own family members over that
of the doctor,

despite the fact that the doctor
access the patient's case.
life

of the patient, then

it

may

First, if

be in a better position to

the only concern

is

the continued

would appear that the doctors alone

should make the judgements. However, the medical well-being
of
the patient alone

is

not the sole concern. Quality of

life,

which

takes into account a variety of very personal facts about the
patient,

is

the primary concern^^. The patient would not be

merely a rational agent, were he to survive. Presumably he

would be much more than

what

that

that,

and

it is

would be before a decision

important to note that Brock,

in

is

making

important to consider

made on

his behalf.

this claim,

It is

seems to be

arguing against the application of both the highly impersonal Best
Interests standard

and the equally impersonal Rational Agent

standard. Second, there are social concerns, such as the "value of
the family" that
for

one of

its

is

preserved

own, and the

most about the
represent if'^o

when

makes a decision

fact that "the family

patient's well-being
it

the family

29Brock, pp. 148-149.
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care

and so be most concerned

seems that both the Best

^^Brock, p, 156.

member will

Interest sstandard

to

and the Rational Agent standard are not

as solid as they

first

appeared.

These problems demonstrate that the practice of
surrogacy,

even when
flawed.

If

legally sanctioned

by a Durable Power of Attorney,

the practice of surrogacy

is

is

flawed, then statements of

counterfactual consent that rely on surrogates to demonstrate
their truth value

rely
to,

must

on surrogates

also be called into question.

to tell us

had they been able

We can

not

what patients would have consented

to consent.

In conclusion, there are

many problems

in trying to

determine the evidence for the truth of statements of
counterfactual consent. The arguments that counterfactuals about

consent have no truth values or too

many are

not convincing.

However, assertoric antecedent consent, problematic antecedent
consent, and surrogacy are

those individuals
preferences

is

rife

with problems. Surrogacy for

who never had

or never expressed beliefs or

especially problematic. While counterfactual

consent has the power to morally justify some acts of euthanasia,
its

practical application

may

be
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less

than successful.

CHAPTER V

A PRINCIPLE ABOUT COUNTERFACTUAL CONSENT
AND ACTUAL CONSENT
In the case of a patient without decision
making
capacity, this discussion [about the termination of

life-

sustaining treatment] should involve a surrogate for
the patient. If possible, however, the health care
professional and patient should talk together.... any
patient who can participate to any extent in the

decisionmaking process should be encouraged to do
soL

Some people

will

make

this claim:

if

you can

justify

euthanasia by obtaining actual consent from a person,

wrong

to rely

on counterfactual consent

it

an act of

would be

to justify that act of

euthanasia. In the passage quoted above, the consent of the

surrogate

is

secondary to actual consent. The Hastings Center

Report notes

"It is

the patient

who

is

the key decisionmaker, with

the power to give binding consent or refusal.

When

the patient

lacks the capacity, the key decisionmaker

is

someone

which the patient

is

unable to give actual

surrogate. "2 In cases in

consent, the strength of the surrogate's consent

is

else,

a

derived from

the surrogate's belief that were the patient able to express
consent, then his statement of consent would be in keeping the
surrogate's expression of consent. As stated in the previous

chapter, the surrogate's responsibility
patient

would have wanted

is

to express

for himself, not

what the

what the surrogate

^The Hastings Center, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining
Treatment and the Care of the Dying The Hastings Center, 1987, p. 22.
2 Hastings Center Report p. 22.
.

,
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wants for the patient. But according to the
Hastings Center, the
surrogate should be relied upon to give consent
only if

the patient

is

not competent to give actual consent.

give actual consent, then relying

If

the patient

able to

is

on the surrogate's statement of

consent would be wrong. The surrogate

may offer a

statement of

counterfactual consent as one of her reasons for the
termination of

support.

life

this

way,

killing

I

I

knew him

know

that

if

all his life,

he were able

he would never want to
to offer consent to

him now, he would." While not

will.

And

yet, all

considered by the Hastings Center to be

is

secondary to actual consent. Hence, there
relationship between actual consent

assuming that both are

our

surrogates will rely on a

all

statement of counterfactual consent, some

consent by a surrogate

live

is

a significant

and counterfactual consent,

in fact available to the

person/ persons

performing the act of euthanasia. Actual consent

is

always better

than counterfactual consent.
In this chapter,

I

attempt to do four things.

will

state a principle that has

First,

I

will

been endorsed by many philosophers

about the relationship between actual consent and counterfactual
consent.

I

call this principle

Principle (SACl). Second,

I

the Superiority of Actual Consent

will

support of SACl. Third,

I

demonstrates that SAC 1

is false.

far

review

will consider

many

of the arguments in

an argument that

Finally,

I

will

present a second,

weaker principle about the relationship between actual

consent and counterfactual consent, called SAC2. Despite (or

perhaps because

of)

SAC2's being far weaker than SACl,

endorse SAC 2.
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I

will

The Superi ority of Actual Consent

In

Chapter

I

Principle

an analysis of informed consent was

introduced. However, the analysis of informed
consent did not
distinguish between actual consent (AC)

and counterfactual

consent (CC):

AC: A patient, S, gives actual consent to treatment x for
condition y iff 1) S assents to treatment x for
y, 2) S
is given sufficient information about x
and y and
the effect x would have on y, 3) S is able to
comprehend the information given to him about
both X and y, and 4) the assent given by S for an
agent to perform treatment x for y is given freely

and voluntarily

CC: Counterfactual consent is offered on behalf of a
patient, S, to treatment x for condition
y iff it can be
said truly that if S were able to offer AC to the
treatment x for y, then S would offer AC to the
treatment of x for y

The difference between AC and CC

is

that while

determining what the patient would have consented

been asked, with AC consent

is

given by the patient

CC
to,

relies

on

had he

who

is

to be

euthanized.
In

Chapter

II, I

introduced the categories of voluntary 1,

voluntary2, nonvoluntaryl, nonvoluntary 2, and involuntaryl and

involuntary 2 euthanasia. Involuntaryl euthanasia cases are of
particular interest to the

AC and CC

euthanasias are cases in which
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we

distinction. Involuntaryl

can get actual consent for a

person's euthanasia, but

fail

to

do

so.

Involuntaryl euthanasia

cases are cases in which a rational, capable
person

is

euthanized,

but the person did not offer either assertoric
antecedent consent
or problematic antecedent consent (in the
form of a Living Will, or

some other informal statement of consent), nor

give actual consent

to being killed at the time of death3. Despite
the fact that the

agents

who

kill

the patient in cases of involuntaryl euthanasia

could have gotten actual consent from the patient, they
so,

and euthanize him without

without actual consent, they

if

to

do

actual consent. However, even

may

nonetheless be secure in

attributing counterfactual consent to the patient. Even

not actually consent to being

fail

killed,

might

it still

if

he did

be the case that

he were asked, that he would have consented?

With actual consent,
worries that

we have made

able to consent,
to, if

in the voluntary 1 cases,

a mistake.

we don't have

he were able to consent.

him what he

will

consent

to.

If

a person

to consider

we have no
is

rational

and

what he would consent

We can go to the source, and ask

In this respect, actual consent

superior to counterfactual consent. This

is

is

the intuition behind

the Hastings Center's remark at the beginning of the chapter. The
patient's actual consent

is

preferable to the surrogate's

pronoucement of counterfactual consent.

If this is

true,

then the

^Again, voluntary? euthanasias are euthanasias that rely upon antecedent
actual consent or predicted consent on the behalf of those persons being
killed - typically in the form of Living Wills. These cases are justified by
making reference to the statement of consent as found in the Living Will,
and not counterfactual consent per se, although the Living Will can then
be used as evidence to support a claim about counterfactual consent. See

Chapter

fV.
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performance of acts of involuntaryl euthanasia,
get consent, but don't,

is

in

wrong. Our attempts to

which we can

justify acts of

involuntaryl euthanasia by employing a notion
of counterfactual

consent are misguided,

if

actual consent

is

in fact superior to

counterfactual consent. Actual consent was available,
but
relied

on counterfactual consent
People

are morally

over CC.

1

who

believe that

wrong

all

we

instead.
acts of involuntaryl euthanasia

believe a principle about the superiority of AC

will call this the first Superiority of Actual

Consent

Principle (SACl):

SACl:

If

a person

wrong

to rely

is

able to offer AC, then

it is

morally

upon CC

Richard Brandt compares actual consent with counterfactual
consent, and in doing so endorses SACl:

The

patient's

own

expression of preference or consent,
then, seems to be weighty. But suppose he is unable
to express his preference; suppose that his terminal
disease not only causes him great pain but has
attacked his brain in such a way that he is incapable of
thought and of rational speech... Must a person suffer
simply because he cannot express consent? There is
evidence that can be gathered about what conclusions
a person would draw if he were in a state to draw and
express them.^

Brandt believes that counterfactual consent can and ought
considered, but counterfactual consent

is

to be

secondary to the

"^Richard Brandt, "A Moral Principle About BCilling", Beneficent Euthanasia
ed. Marvin Kohl, Prometheus Books, 1975, p. 112.
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,

patient's

"own expression of preference or consent".

Counterfactual consent
patient

is

may be considered,

but only

when

unable to give actual consents. Hence, while

the

it is

not

always wrong to rely on counterfactual consent
to justify acts of
euthanasia,

if

actual consent

is

available

one ought

to obtain actual

consent rather than rely upon counterfactual consent.

Arguments

for

SACI

Several arguments have been made, or could be made, for

SACl. Some of the arguments for SACl include the Argument

from

the

Argument from

Rights, the

Paternalism, the

Argument from

Misinterpretation,

Utility,

Argument from

Prediction. Each of these

Argument from
and the

arguments

will

be

discussed in turn.

The Argument from
consent
in

is

Utility.

Michael Slote agrees that actual

better than counterfactual consent. Slote believes that

employing counterfactual consent, the consequences of your

action

may have

relied

on actual consent.

they "may

feel

lower

than the consequences had you

utility
If

you presume the wishes of someone,

resentment and

feel unfairly treated"

by virtue of

the fact that they weren't asked for actual consent^. Relying on
5

"If the patient cannot give consent, is the proxy consent of relatives
ethically valid?" asks Barry F. Brown in "Proxy Consent for Research on
the Incompetent Elderly", Biomedical Ethics ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane
,

Zembaty, McGraw-Hill, 1991, p. 225. The presumption is that actual
consent is primary, and proxy/counterfactual consent is secondary,
echoing Brandt's views.
^Michael Slote, "Dessert, Consent and Justice", Philosophy and Public
Affairs vol 2, no 4, Summer 1973, p. 344
S.

,

,
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CC,

when AC

is

available,

might insult them, or cause them

slighted. Insulting a person

would

by relying on counterfactual consent

result in lower utilities,

whereas relying on actual consent

and involving him/her wholeheartedly
process would not result in any lower

assumes that there

is

to feel

no hidden

in the decision-making

utilities.

Of course,

this

positive or negative utility in

performing the act of asking the person (no deep
moats have to be
braved to get actual consent, no dragons need be slain).
Asking
for actual consent will merely prevent the lower
utilities accrued

by insulting the person when counterfactual consent

AC

is

is

employed.

thus determined to be superior to CC.

argument

Slote's

is

similar in

many

respects to T.M.

Scanlon's view, as presented in Chapter IP. Scanlon claimed
that

consequences that follow from our choices may have both
instrumental value (the consequences are most likely to be the

ones we desire) and demonstrative value. Scanlon believes that

if

a choice has instrumental value then the consequences of that
choice are most likely to be the ones that
believes that

if

desire. Scanlon

a choice has demonstrative value then the free

choice reflects traits that

we value

independence, and

creativity.

instrumental value

- it is

better left to

we

someone

in ourselves,

such as autonomy,

Not every free choice has

possible for an agent to

else.

make a

choice

However, Scanlon believes that every

free choice has demonstrative value.

An

agent's exercise of his

^T.M. Scanlon Jr., "The Significance of Choice", The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values ed. Sterhng M. McMurrin, Cambridge University Press, 1988,
pp. 151-216.
,
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free choice never fails to assert
the agent's independence,
creativity,

and

control.

the asserting of these

If

there

traits,

consents to will have higher

is

some

utility

which attaches

to

then those acts that an agent actually
utility in virtue of their

demonstrative value than those that are merely
counterfactually
consented to, and have no demonstrative value
at

The Argument from
utilitarian

of rights.

Rights. While Slote

all.

argued for SACl on

grounds, he also argued for SACl from a consideration
It

may

be the case that relying on CC, and not on AC,

violates the patient's rights.

by invoking

Dan Brock argues

in favor of

SACl

"his (the patient's) right to decide."8 Slote's
election

example captures

this intuition:

Rawls seems to think that certain sorts of hypothetical
free consent suffice for justice, so that if people would
have consented to a certain social arrangement in an
original position of equality, then such an arrangement
is just even when people have not actually
consented
to it. But the difference between actual consent and
hypothetical (free) consent is very important in
matters of justice. To give an example of this (that
Rawls would, presumably, be able to agree with,
consistent with his principles), consider a situation
where certain people somehow manage to call off an
election whose eventual winner, the incumbent,
everyone knew would win in advance, and then
simply arrange for the incumbent to remain in office.
Clearly an injustice has been done here by denying the
people their right to give or withhold their actual
consent to the incumbent's remaining in office^.

^Dan Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 33.
^Michael Slote, "Desert, Consent and Justice", Philosophy and Public
Affairs vol 2, no 4, Summer 1973, pp. 343-344,
,
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.

Here, Slote

arguing against John Rawls' concept of
justice as
fairness. Rawls considers that the
just society is the
is

one that

would have been chosen by individuals

The

original position

is

in the original position.

a hypothetical place behind a veil of

ignorance, in which "no one knows his place
in society, his class
position or social status, nor does any one
distribution of natural assets
strength,

and the

society

the society

by

its

if

like."io

population,

if

and

know

his fortune in the

abilities, his intelligence,

According to Rawls, a society

is

a just

the one that would have been consented to

is

they were asked which society they wanted

while in the original position. Slote argues against Rawls by
calling into question the notion of counterfactual consent
in

choosing a perfectly just society.
society

is

society.

around

It is

After

all,

each

member of

to give actual consent in choosing a perfectly just

wrong

to rely

on counterfactual consent, when

actual

consent

is

election

example would merely be insulted by not having the

available.

It is

not the case that the people in Slote's

chance to cast their vote. Rather, their
vote would be violated.

It

may

legal right to cast their

be the case that relying on CC,

rather than AC, would be a violation of the patient's moral right to
actually consent to his/her
for

it

own

own death.

Thus,

AC

is

superior to CC,

preserves the patient's right to actually consent to his/her

death,

and SAC 1

is

true.

The Argument from Paternalism. Similar
from rights

is

lOjohn Rawls,

the argument from paternalism.

A Theory

to the

argument

Some philosophers

of Justice Belknap Press of Harvard University
.

Press, 1971, p. 12.
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1

may

prefer

when

AC over CC because

actual consent

a paternalistic
fails to

an

is

manner

respect the

relying

available
is

may be

paternalistic^. Acting in

often unjust, for acting in such a

autonomy of the

act of euthanasia

on counterfactual consent

patient.

by making reference

manner

However, justifying

to actual consent

is

never paternalistic, for in actually asking for consent
from a
patient, the patient's

autonomy

is

respected. Brock endorses

SACl

using the argument from paternalism, claiming that relying
on
counterfactual consent rather than actual consent infringes on
a
patient's "self-determination" 12.

if

the choice

is

between

performing an act that respects the patient's autonomy (getting
actual consent),
patient's

and performing an

autonomy

(relying

act that fails to respect the

on counterfactual consent), then

it is

better to perform that act that respects the patient's autonomy.

Thus, actual consent

is

superior to counterfactual consent.

The Arguments from Misinterpretation. Two more
arguments that might be used
superior to

CC make

to justify the claim that

reference to our complex, often

AC

is

fallible

attempts to determine the truth of counterfactual statements

about consent.

problems

in

1

have already discussed several of the epistemic

attempting to determine the truth of a statement of

counterfactual consent in Chapter
assertoric antecedent consent

IV:

the unreliable nature of

and problematic antecedent consent,

"We should resort to fictions such as presumed consent only with the
greatest care and caution, for under the guise of "consent" they may imply
a more extensive paternalism than is warranted." Tames F. Childress. Who
Should Decide?: Paternalism in Health Care Oxford University Press, 1982,
1

.

p.85.
12 Brock, p. 31.
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the inability of a surrogate to
reflects the

dying person's

make a

beliefs

decision that accurately

and preferences, our

determine what a "rational infant" would choose,
of actual consent have none of these
problems.

on statements

that are

etc.

inability to

Statements

We ought to rely

more straightforward than statements

about counterfactual consent, because statements
of
counterfactual consent are open to misinterpretation.
For

example, often a surrogate
reflect the

may have

dying person's

is

unable to make a decision that does

beliefs

and preferences. The patient

preferences that are in principle unable to be expressed

by a surrogate, or the surrogate may not know enough
such a decisions accurately,

or, if the patient is

severely retarded individual, the patient

preferences from the onset.

If

to

make

an infant or

may never have had any

the truth conditions for

counterfactual statements of consent leave open the possibility for
misinterpretation, then

consent.

we

to rely

Thus, in cases where both

preferable to CC.

should

we ought

rely

on CC

AC

to justify his death at

interpretation of a statement of

CC may be mistaken.

AC and CC

the person can give

If

on statements of actual

AC

is

are available,

to being killed,

AC

is

why

our hands? Our

never mistakenly, whereas

In cases of voluntary 1 euthanasia, the

person gives actual consent to the act of euthanasia. Cases where

l^It is possible for a statement of actual consent to be tH-mformed, or
coerced, or perhaps just difficult to interpret. However, as 1 have stated
previously, I am understanding "actual consent" to be free, voluntary, and
informed. If actual consent was not free and informed, it would not be
preferable to justify acts of euthanasia using actual consent rather than
statements about counterfactual consent.
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actual consent

is

available are thought to be the most

straightforward cases. Thus, SACl

A second

is

true.

version of the argument from misinterpretation

is

an argument from the claim that both assertoric antecedent
consent and problematic antecedent consent are offered
before
the patient

is

euthanized, whereas actual consent

offered at the time that the patient

consents at time

t

is

euthanized.

to being euthanized at

t', it is

is

typically

If

a person

possible for

have changed his mind during the time between

t

and

t'.

him

This

to

is

one of the drawbacks of assertoric antecedent consent and
problematic antecedent consent that was discussed in Chapter
-

the person could change his or her mind. Living Wills, for

example, could

to be

fail

an accurate reflection of what a patient

truly wants because the Living Will only states

what the patient

wants for himself at the time that the Living Will

The

Living Will does not state

at the time that the

euthanasia at
Will.

Now

t',

that

t'

is

is

composed.

what the patient wants

order in the Living Will

But a statement of actual consent,

made

at

t'

is

for himself

to be carried out.

about an act of

superior to the statement of consent in a Living

has obtained, a statement of consent

is

informed than a statement of antecedent consent given
If

W

a person consents at time

explicitly denies

consent at

t

to being euthanized at

t',

that the denial of consent at

t',

better

at time

t.

but then

which ought you believe? Given

t'

is

informed, free and voluntary,

we

are likely believe the present statement of consent over

antecedent statement of consent. Actual consent
the lack of consent)

is

(or, in this case,

better than assertoric antecedent consent or
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problematic antecedent consent. In the same
fashion, actual
consent is superior to counterfactual consent.
If you could
consider what a person would consent

do consent

to,

and what they

which version of consent should you

actual consent, of course! In this way,

than CC, and SACl

is

AC

is

argued

actually

act on?
to

The

be better

affirmed.

An Argument

I

to,

for Rejecting SACl

have catalogued some arguments that have been made, or

could have been made, in support of SACl. While there
intuitive appeal to such a principle,

misguided.

I

would now

like to

I

is

some

believe those intuitions to be

consider a case of involuntaryl

euthanasia that demonstrates SACl to be

false.

Consider the

following case:

The Case of Old Felix: Old
hospital bed. Old Felix's family
trying to decide

Old

Felbc

was perfectly

rational

own

euthanasia,

Felbc

spoke up: Old Felix was a

if

his family

While he might want to be

He might
asking

sit

and

him

fret

painful

was gathered

and able

in his

room,

in the next

attempted to get

killed,

his last

Suddenly Young

while he would

know

decision.

would make

was wrong. Certainly

if

that

him might be a

it

was

mistake.

The very

moments even more

act that
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it.

sensitive, introspective person.

and worry over the

Any

Felix.

to give consent to his

at this time, asking

him might make

they already were.

more

was dying painfully

euthanasia was the best option for Old

if

the best thing for

Felbc

act of

painful than

his last

moments

asked, he would consent.

But,

it is

best not to ask.

It

would be best

to just euthanize

him

without his consent, rather than ask for his consent.

Old

Felix’s

case demonstrates that SACl

not true:

is

SACl is true, then Old Felix ought to give actual
consent to his euthanasia.
It is not the case that Old Felix
ought to give actual
consent to his euthanasia.
Therefore, SACl is not true.

1. If

2.

3.

The

first

premise makes use of SACl.

If

SACl

is

correct,

then every case in which a person can offer actual consent, but
counterfactual consent

is

relied upon,

have offered actual consent
relying

was

on Old

available,

Felix's

-

is

wrong. Old

Felbc

could

he was entirely capable. Thus,

counterfactual consent,

when

actual consent

was wrong.

But as Young Felix argued. Old Felix ought not have been

asked to give actual consent. His

last

hours would have been

more miserable than they already were,
give his consent. Better to rely
case,

than to make Old

if

he were called upon

on counterfactual consent

Felix's last

is

in this

hours worse than they already

were. With the counterexample of the case of Old

been demonstrated that SACl

to

Felix,

it

has

not true.

Defenders of SACl would find the above argument unsound.

They could

object to line one or line two.

objection to line two
actual consent

is

first.

I

will

Defenders of SACl

so valuable in

itself,

results of asking for actual consent.

that

may claim

that

outweighs any bad

Those who choose

reasoning embrace the argument from
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it

consider the

utility in

this line of

favor of SACl.

Certainly Old Felix will be pained

and disappointed by having

give actual consent. But the alternative,
relying

consent,

to

on counterfactual

wrought with problems. Relying on counterfactual
consent shows a lack of respect for the patient,
argue defenders
is

of

SACl. Old Felbc would appreciate being asked, even
though he

would

also be slightly pained

death, but

if

by having

he weren't asked, he would

to think

about his own

feel slighted

forgotten. His insult, in not being asked about his

would

result in very low utilities.

lost.

Character

such as independence and

demonstrated by him
Certainly,

it is

if

traits that

self-reliance,

his family

own death,

Using Scanlon's terminology,

the demonstrative value in allowing Old Felix to
choice would be

and

made

make

Old Felix

his

own

may value,

would not be
the choice for him.

better to have Old Felix feel appreciated, rather

than slighted and forgotten. Thus, actual consent

is

superior to

counterfactual consent.
Slote uses this defense of actual consent in demonstrating

that social arrangements determined via actual consent are
just

than those determined by actual consent:

When

inequalities of

reward and the

like are

undeserved, only actual consent to their existence
me to be capable of rendering those
inequalities, and the society in which they exist,
completely just. It does not, intuitively, seem enough
that people would have consented to the undeserved
inequalities had they been asked. For even when one
knows that this is so, one may feel resentment and
feel unfairly treated because one wasn't asked.

seems to

l^^Slote, p.

344.
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more

Relying on counterfactual consent to
justify an act of euthanasia

when

actual consent

utility

available fails to maximize

is

of getting actual consent

is

on counterfactual consent. Old

higher than the

Felix

may outweigh

resulted from relying
for actual consent

It

of relying

his consent. This

the gain in utility that

may have

on counterfactual consent. Asking Old

may have

prevented the negative
consent.

utility

The

may feel resentment and

anger because he wasn't actually asked for
resentment

utility.

may seem

Felix

depressed him and his family, but

utility

it

of relying on counterfactual

that asking Old Felix for his consent

is

a

worse state of affairs than relying on counterfactual consent. But
in fact, since there

is

a gain in utility in asking for actual consent

rather than relying on counterfactual consent, asking Old Felbc for
his consent

is

There

is

changed

a better state of affairs after

a reply to this objection.

two would

slightly, line

still

If

all.

the example were

be true. Assume that the

pain involved in getting actual consent from Old Felix was far

worse than described. The suffering that Old

would undergo

The pain

in asking for his

in asking

Old

outweighed any gain
this case,

it

would

Felix for

Felix

and

his family

consent could be tremendous.

consent could be so great that

in utility that actual consent

result in higher utilities to rely

may

it

have.

In

on

counterfactual consent than to get actual consent. Again, using
Scanlon's terminology,

allowing the family to

it is

possible that the instrumental value of

make Old

Felix's

any demonstrative value that would
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choice for him outweighs

result.

If

the pain that Old

Felix

and

his family

would undergo

is

great

enough

outweigh

to

the seeming negative utility of relying on
counterfactual consent,

then

it

would

still

be better to rely on counterfactual consent

rather than actual consent. Thus, upholders
of SACl, like Slote,

who

believe that

defeated on their

SACl

is

true based on a utilitarian defense, are

own ground.

Those who reply

to the objection that line

two

is

by

false

invoking the argument from rights or the argument from
paternalism in favor of SACl are similarly mistaken.

If

Old Felbc

does have a right to give actual consent rather than have his
family act on mere counterfactual consent, then the rights of Old
Felbc are

not respected by his family acting on counterfactual

consent. However, the view that Old Felix has a right to give
actual consent

is

not sufficient to affirm that Old Felbc ought to

give actual consent to his

own

death. There certainly

that each of us has a right to do, nonetheless

we did

would be

it is

better

if

right to perform that action. In the case

Felbc, it is clear-cut that

it

would be

right

not bothered to give actual consent. His burden
great.

things

not do those things. Having the right to perform an action

does not mean that
of Old

it

many

Even

heard, that

if
is

he did have the right to have

if
is

Old

Felbc

were

already too

his actual consent

not sufficient to affirm the truth of the second

premise of the argument

have avoided the very difficult question of whether or not a person
does have a right to give his/her actual consent. For a discussion of this

Dan Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical
Ethics Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 21-54.

issue, see
.
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Similarly, those

who

object to line one by invoking the

argument from paternalism are mistaken. Perhaps
paternalistic to rely

an action
are
to

many

is

on CC when AC

is

available. But the claim that

paternalistic does not entail that

things that

do them.

In the

many actions

we have

same

vein,

it is

a right to do, yet
it is

would be wrong

is

would be wrong

to do.

definition wrong.

and

not sufficient to determine that those actions

Ruth Macklin claims

ethically obligatory."

Young

That

paternalistic.

it

also the case that there are

"Paternalistic

behavior towards infants and young children
it is

wrong. There

that people can perform which are paternalistic,

yet paternalism

indeed

it is

is

is

justified ethically;

Paternalistic actions are not

Felix's actions

by

may have been

not to say that his actions were wrong.

The defenders of SACl may

also object to line one.

They

might argue that a true Superiority of Actual Consent Principle

would

entail

of Old Felix

no such thing about Old

it

Felix's consent. In

appears clear that no one should ask for his consent.

However,

in all but these

consent

superior to counterfactual consent.

is

the case

very hard cases,

While the case of Old

Felix did

shortcomings in the argument from

it is

clear that actual

demonstrate the
utility,

the argument from

rights,

and the argument from paternalism

like to

say something about the arguments from

for SACl,

I

would

also

misinterpretation. Both of the arguments from misinterpretation

l^Ruth Macklin, "Autonomy, Beneficence and ChUd Development: An
on Children and Adolescents: Ethical
Issues ed. Barbara Stanley and Joan E. Sieber, Sage Pubhcations, 1992, p. 91.
Ethical Analysis", Social Research
,
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for

SACl are based on a mistaken assumption about

the nature of

counterfactual consent. These arguments for SACl
focus on the

epistemic difficulties in employing counterfactual
consent as a
justification for euthanasia.

However, as stated above, SACl

contrasts actual consent with counterfactual consent
that

"determines beyond reasonable doubt that
rational

and able

to give

if

(the patient)

were

an informed, uncoerced statement of

consent to being euthanized at

t,

then (the patient) would do

so".

Both of the arguments from misinterpretation rely on the

mistaken assumption that CC

is less

accurate than AC. The

arguments from misinterpretation turn on the epistemic
difficulties in

employing counterfactual consent. Each of these

epistemic difficulties implies that counterfactual consent

is

less

accurate than actual consent. However, given the formulation of

SACl

this

is

a mistaken assumption, and the arguments from

misinterpretation are mistaken. The second argument from
misinterpretation compares actual consent to assertoric

antecedent consent and problematic antecedent actual consent.

Both types of antecedent consent can

fail to

accurately reflect the

patient's wishes for euthanasia at the time that the euthanasia

is

performed, since they are not statements of consent by the
patient as the euthanasia

more

reliable

performed. Thus actual consent

is

is

than assertoric antecedent consent or problematic

antecedent consent. Those

who endorse

from misinterpretation

claim that similarly, counterfactual

consent

may

be

will

less reliable

counterfactual consent

is

the second argument

than actual consent, for

not a statement of consent by the patient
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as the euthanasia

is

performed. However, this analogy does
not

hold. According to the analysis of
AC

and CC required

to

formulate SACl, actual consent and
counterfactual consent are
equally accurate. CC is offered for a
treatment when it can be
said truly that

AC would have been

offered by the patient for the

treatment. The second argument from
misinterpretation for SACl
is

also mistaken, for

it

fails to

recognize that given

formulations of AC and CC, both

AC and CC are equally accurate.

Of the arguments discussed

them
that

is

my

in

support of SACl, none of

sound. Furthermore, the case of Old Felix demonstrated

SACl

is

certainly false.

SAC2

The case of Old

Felix

does

illustrate

an interesting point

about SACl. SACl has a great deal of intuitive appeal; however,
if

the costs in adhering to SACl are too high, then

to ignore SACl. In the case of Old Felix the costs

Old

Felix's last

it

would be best

were too high.

hours would have been more miserable had actual

consent be sought, rather than merely allowing his euthanasia to

be justified using counterfactual consent. In such cases,

it

would

be wrong to rely on AC, and instead we should rely on CC. The
defenders of the

spirit

of SACl might try to salvage SACl. SACl

would be more appealing
that

but

if

if

if it

were altered

it

to reflect the notion

the costs are too high then SACl ought to be abandoned,

they are not so high, SACl ought to be adhered
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to:

SAC 2. If a person is able to offer AC, it is wrong
to rely
upon CC, unless it would be better to rely upon
CC,
in which case it is right to rely on
CC

SAC2 were substituted

If

argument,

would be

it

for

SACl

clear than line

in line

one was

one of the

false.

may

It

not be

true that Old Felix should give actual consent
according to SAC2.

Old

Felix's case

may

be exactly the kind of case that

is

an

exception to SACl. SAC2 recognizes that such exceptions
do

and thus

line

one

exist,

is false.

Those who endorse SACl might not accept SAC2, however.

SAC 2 claims

that

it is

better to get actual consent, unless

be wrong to get actual consent, in which case,

it

it

would

would be better

not to get actual consent. This weak endorsement of actual

consent over counterfactual consent

who

believe actual consent

While
that

I

believe that

SAC2

is

is

SAC2 doesn't amount

to

all cases.

Any

not in the

spirit of

true,

and SACl

is false, it

is

like to

is

no true

preferable to counterfactual

principle about the superiority of actual
is

a prima facie principle at

bestir.

would

appears

much. To conclude, there

consent over counterfactual consent

1^1

those

superior to counterfactual consent.

principle that says actual consent

consent in

is

thank Owen McLeod for helpful suggestions.

CONCLUSION
Intuitively, counterfactual

when we

are about to perform

permissible to do this?

Is it

right? Perhaps,

am about

if

to do,

I

consent plays an important role

some morally

How can know

if

I

had permission,

if

I

what

had consent,

would make things okay.

it

interesting actions.
I

am

to

doing

is

do what

I

In lieu of actual

consent, then the fact that if I were dbie to dsk for
consent, then

consent would be given,
I

but

if

I

fine.

I

then

it

don't

know

may

if it is

be enough.

morally permissible to borrow your pen,

could ask for your consent, surely you would say

borrow the pen. The

would be

offered,

fact that

seems

to

if

it

was

consent could be offered,

count

in favor of the claim that

borrowing your pen was the right thing to do.

We stand
the

life

at a hospital bedside,

support machines

to ask for

it

would be

shutting off

On

life

first

offered,

The

life

we were able

support machines, then

fact that if

seems

shutting off

consent could be offered,

to count in favor of the claim that

support was the right thing to do.

glance,

it

seems that counterfactual consent

contributes something to
to prove that

if

the right thing to do. If

consent to turn off the

consent would be given.
then

is

and wonder

our

first

some

glance

acts of euthanasia.

may have been

I

have

too fleeting.

set

out

I

offered a definition of 'euthanasia' as well as explained both

consent and counterfactuals in Chapter
counterfactual consent

is

I.

I

argued that

not a necessary part of any act of

euthanasia. Whatever counterfactual consent contributes to an act
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of euthanasia,

it is

not the case that every act of euthanasia

counterfactually consented

My

first

to.

question in Chapter

II

was a simple one

-

when

appropriate to cite a statement of counterfactual
consent

attempt to justify an act of euthanasia?
counterfactual consent

is

is

I

in

is it

an

argued that

appropriately cited in cases of

voluntary 1, nonvoluntary 1, nonvoluntary and
involuntaiyd
2,
cases of euthanasia.
difficult to

moral

answer

-

My second
what

is

question in Chapter

II

was more

counterfactual consent's role in the

justification of acts of euthanasia? Philosophers
such as

Dan

Brock and Ronald Dworkin have considered the "Principle of
Self
Determination" and the "Principle of Autonomy", both of which

appear to demonstrate that the act an agent chooses, or would

have chosen,

is

by definition the best alternative

for the agent.

If

either the Principle of Self Determination or the Principle of

Autonomy was

true, that fact

would demonstrate that

counterfactual consent does justify acts of euthanasia. But neither

of these principles held up under further scrutiny. T.M. Scanlon's

views on the value of choice held more promise in demonstrating

how counterfactual consent can

morally justify an act of

euthanasia. However, even Scanlon's approach

argued that at

best,

some

among

by an appeal

short.

I

have

acts of euthanasia are morally justified

by counterfactual consent. Only those
already

fell

acts of euthanasia that are

the best alternatives for the agent

to counterfactual consent.

consent in justifying acts of euthanasia

have thought.
158

The
is

may

be justified

role of counterfactual

not as strong as

we may

Chapter

In

III, I

attempted to analyze statements of

counterfactual consent using a possible worlds
semantics.

found
is

is

that the

not what

we thought

it

was. Most counterfactuals are

world at which the antecedent
then the counterfactual

would

it

which

I

let

I

meaning of statements of counterfactual consent

interpreted in the following manner:

then

What

fall"

is

means

at the closest possible

true, the

is

true.

if

"If

I

consequent

were

to let

is

also true,

go of your pen,

that in the closest possible world in

go of your pen, your pen

Counterfactuals about

falls.

consent are not interpreted in that manner.

Counterfactuals

about consent use a cross-world comparison and an actuality
operator that

is

not part of the understanding of most other

counterfactuals.
to literally

mean

Counterfactuals about consent should be taken
"If

the patient were able to consent to being

euthanized, then he would consent to being euthanized
the condition that he

consent do not
In

is

actually in."

fV,

I

ever in

Hence, counterfactuals about

mean what they appear

Chapter

if

to

mean

examined the epistemic

at first glance.

justifications for

statements of counterfactual consent. Living Wills, the practice of
surrogacy, the "Best Interests" standard and the "Rational Agent"

standard are mainstays of Medical Ethics

might be used to epistemically
counterfactual consent.

one of them

is

And

literature.

Any

of

them

justify a statement of

yet,

I

have demonstrated that each

problematic in demonstrating the truth of a

statement of counterfactual consent. Living

Wills, as well as all

antecedent statements of consent, can be challenged. Any

antecedent statement of consent
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is

offered long before the action

to

which the agent

Is

consenting takes piace

changes her mind? What
situation similar to the

if

one about which she

or preferences about euthanasia,
significant question

is

if

the agent

the agent has never experienced a

Surrogacy, especially for individuals

most

what

-

is

is

consenting?

who have never had

beliefs

also problematic. Perhaps the

"Are the Best Interests standard and

the Rational Agent standard too objective?"

If so,

they

may

not

be appropriate indicators of what patients would counterfactually
consent

to, if

they were able to consent.

While

counterfactuals about consent are true or

which they are declared true or
Finally, despite all the

false is

can be said that

the basis

upon

somewhat shaky.

problems with counterfactual consent

that have been explored in Chapters
I

false,

it

11, 111,

and W,

in

Chapter

presented an argument that demonstrated that there

is

V

no

philosophical reason to prefer actual consent over counterfactual

consent.

The Arguments from

Misinterpretation
actual consent

is

all failed

to

Utility, Rights,

Paternalism,

and

demonstrate convincingly that

always preferable to counterfactual consent.

Many questions remain.

If

counterfactual consent can

morally justify some acts of euthanasia, namely those that are
already

among

the best alternatives for the agent,

how can we

determine which acts of euthanasia are already among the best
alternatives?

If

demonstrated,

counterfactual consent

is

If

actual consent

currently believe, in which ways

160

as problematic as

I

have

more problematic than we

actual consent also

currently believe?

is

is

is it

more problematic than we

problematic? Can these

problems be solved? The many questions surrounding
the
concept of counterfactual consent call for further
study.
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